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Abstract 
 
Government debt management, as a distinct policy, with a clear objective of managing risks 
and cost minimisation first started among the industrialised economies in the late 1980s. The 
need to improve government debt management arose with rising debt levels, caused by 
macro-economic imbalances especially in the mid-1970s and 1980s. In sub-Saharan Africa 
however, debt management as a strategy was undeveloped or lacking completely. A research 
in the area of debt management is significant to the economic growth and development of the 
sub – Saharan Africa. The significance of debt management is supported by empirical studies 
showing that effective public debt management could go a long way in protecting both low 
and middle income countries against the negative impact of the financial crisis. 
This research focus specifically on the choice between short and long term, domestic and 
external debts and how the process affects the economy as measured by per capita income 
and debt ratio or level of indebtedness. The work also looked at the extent of implementation 
of debt management among the SSAs especially as contained in the World Bank and IMF 
debt management performance guidelines.     
The research adopted the quantitative approach to answer questions raised in relation to the 
effect of government borrowing; the choice of debt maturity, and how sovereign debt and its 
management affect economic growth. 
It was found that debt is related negatively to economic growth; and the phenomenon of debt 
overhang actually exists. Debt management however was found to be relevant; where it was 
observed that the entire process of debt management is vital to economic growth and the 
development of a country. In particular, countries in sub-Saharan Africa need to put in place 
an effective and sound debt management strategy that would aid in promoting the needed 
stability, reduce risks in borrowing and guide in the prudent management of borrowed 
resources. The work contribute to both theoretical and empirical aspects of debt and its 
management. 
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Background of the Study 
 Introduction 
This chapter aims to prepare the background for the research work on how the strategy 
employed in the management of sovereign debt relates to economic growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The chapter focuses on the background to the study, statement of the research 
problem, research objectives, research questions and the rationale for the work. In particular 
the research work proposes to look at the phenomenon of sovereign debt; external and 
domestic, short and long term debt and how the strategy of debt management process affects 
economic growth among countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, the chapter will 
prepare the ground for research on how the strategy of debt management employed could 
result in an effective and efficient utilization of resources and its eventual impact on 
economic growth. The section on the background deals with the history of borrowing in post-
independence sub-Saharan Africa; and the accompanying debt crisis from the mid-1980s to 
the late 1990s. 
 The segment on background to research introduces sovereign debt and related terms of debt 
overhang, debt relief and debt management. In effect an overview of government borrowing 
is given by drawing on specific experiences from the developing and the lesser developed 
countries. Subsequent sections outline the major research objectives, where the focus of the 
entire study is laid down with the aim of obtaining relevant results. The chapter outlines the 
research objectives as well as the research questions posed by the work. These questions are 
formulated as a backup to the research objectives. The envisaged contribution of the study is 
covered under the section on significance of the study to research topic of sovereign debt in 
sub-Saharan African countries. The research methodology adopted for the proposed work is 
explained with the two major sources of data clearly specified. The scope and limitation of 
the work detailing the expected areas to be covered over the length of the research and the 
periods involved are specified under this section. Finally the plan of work is discussed as the 
last segment of the chapter.  
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 Background to the Study 
The debt crises of the 1980s impacted severely on many sub-Saharan African countries that 
had long been overburdened by heavy debts. The situation was so severe  that the total debt 
outstanding against 10 of the most heavily indebted countries in the region was over 1000% 
of their exports put together (Helleiner, 1989). Notably however, there were not many 
academic works on debt management (Missale, 1994). Although substantial research has 
been accomplished which centred on the relationship between external debt and economic 
growth, it was  evident that the majority of the works tend to be directed at issues arising 
from external borrowing by some developing economies many of which are located in  Latin 
America (Greene, 1989a). In comparison to the works on Latin America, little was 
accomplished on the subject of external debt and growth in Africa. Examples of such can be 
found in works by Krumm (1985) and by Lancaster (1989). Other works on external 
borrowing in Africa include by Feldstein, de Carmoy, Narusawa, and Krugman (1987) and 
Helleiner (1989). But even these studies on  sub-Saharan Africa’s debt tend to employ the use 
of low number of samples on Africa (Fosu, 1996). The trend observed after the 1980 debt 
crisis among the OECD indicated that academic literature on public debt had been 
substantial, with debates on issues linked to the field of debt management found to be lacking 
but on a constant build-up (Missale, 1994). In contrast however, among sub-Saharan Africa 
there tends to be a persistent dearth of scholarly works and the absence of discussion on the 
subject of debt management.  
Not very long after the HIPC debt relief initiative which proposed to grant  a completion 
point for sub-Saharan African countries debt forgiveness or debt cancellation, a debt 
sustainability analysis carried out jointly by the IMF and the World Bank showed that about 
61 per cent of the SSAs were already showing signs of debt distress (IMF, 2009). This tends 
to show that the subject of debt and its management is crucial for the economic growth and 
development of sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this however, only a few studies referred to the 
subject of debt and economic growth in Africa. Examples of the few include Esther O. 
Adegbite (2008) who investigated the effect of excessive debt servicing on Nigeria; Diallo 
(2007) researched the impact of external debt on the development of Guinea, and a number of 
other works. Recently however, Onyekwelu and ACA (2014) studied external debt 
accumulation and the management strategies adopted by the African nations caught in the 
crisis. Debt management as a strategy encompasses much more than external debts and how 
they are accumulated. While works that specifically focus on external debt and the crisis that 
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ensued thereafter were important, research into the aspect of debt management is required to 
guide economic policy formulation and the decision makers in articulating far reaching 
decisions on how government should borrow and to what extent. Issues such as the right 
source of finance and the maturity and composition of the instruments providing such are 
equally important in the developing academic literature on debt and its management. 
However, though these aspects of debt management are crucial in managing government 
debts in the sub-Saharan Africa, they are found to be conspicuously absent in both public and 
academic discussions in the region.      
Gooptu and Braga (2010), argued that until the global financial and economic crisis in 2008, 
sovereign debt management was actually being carried out even among developing countries 
under relatively favourable circumstances. However it was only with the advent of the global 
financial crisis in 2008 that the landscape of developing finance changed completely. 
A lot of empirical evidence has been given to back the argument that  efficient debt 
management has the propensity of  protecting both low and medium income countries against 
threats posed by financial crises prevalent in the world economy (Weist, Togo, & Prasad, 
2010). Earlier Tobin (1963)  further confirmed the relevance of debt management by 
observing that all charges an economy has on government are prepared and contained in 
monetary control and debt management. The relevance of the debt management theories that 
particularly put emphasis on the use of debt instruments was questioned by some scholars e.g. 
Missale, Giavazzi, and Benigno (2002), Milesi‐Ferretti (1995); and rejected by other 
researchers such as Ricci and Cordella (2010) who found the phenomenon of debt overhang 
not present in countries with bad policies.  Government debt management is however not an 
old field in finance. In the EU, effective practice of debt management started in the 1980s. 
This happened especially when public debt to GDP ratio of several OECD countries rose 
substantially; which led to a strong derive at reforming debt management (Currie, Dethier, & 
Togo, 2003). Consequently debt management became increasingly viewed as a process that 
had distinct objectives in terms of cost minimisation within risk limits. For example in the 
UK, there was a drastic shift in debt management policy, especially where it became mainly 
directed at cost reduction and practices concerning the trade-off between cost and risk  
(Leong & Britain, 1999). As a result monetary policy was no longer treated under the domain 
of debt management. And as a result debt management had to be practiced in conjunction 
with other government agencies involved with its external finance (Klein, 1994a). It is 
believed that, “Successful debt management requires close cooperation between different 
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elements of government concerned with external finance in order to have key information 
necessary to make informed decisions on the access to and uses of external finance. 
Specifically it is important that the government unit with responsibility for making future debt 
service obligations should also play a major role in the decisions regarding foreign 
borrowing” (Klein, 1994b, p. vii) 
According to Wheeler (2004) government debt management may be defined as that process 
of placing an effective strategy for managing government debt in a transparent manner, and 
with the objective to meet the government’s financing needs; as well any other set goals, 
especially the management of any costs and risks involved. Such goals include evolving and 
preserving an efficient market for government securities. Mehran (1985) however, observed 
that the process of debt management basically involves five functions: Policy, regulatory, 
operational, accounting and statistical analysis. While the policy function covers coordination 
between agencies charged with the responsibility for the management of a country’s debt; 
especially in the aspect of national debt policies and strategies formulation. But, debt 
management in sub-Saharan Africa could be faced with numerous challenges, such as the 
lack of up to date government statistics. 
Any discussion on debt management in sub-Saharan Africa however, needs to consider the 
origin of the debt crisis in the region. The commodity boom of the 1970s lowered the cost of 
borrowing among the exporting countries  (Humphreys & Underwood, 1989) but later fell out 
when the prices of primary commodity exports declined sharply and growth in industrial 
countries slumped. The sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) governments were slow to react and 
adjust. And to worsen the situation, the soaring of interest rates in response to oil shocks of 
the mid-1970s to early 1980s (Teunissen & Akkerman, 2004) made debt crisis inevitable. 
Later debt relief that is based on net present value (NPV) calculation and which failed to 
promote debt sustainability (Martin, 2004) and the IMF approach1; usually consisting of 
devaluation, removal of subsidies, and liberalisation and other measures that were based on 
the Polak model of the 1950s (Stein, 2005) further complicated the low income countries in 
Africa’s debt situation 
Traditionally however, an appropriate debt management strategy for low income countries 
was to ensure the maximisation of all the concessional debts against conditional ones (Weist 
et al., 2010). By so doing it is expected that debt servicing costs which raise risks of debt 
distress as well as debt unsustainability are minimised. This unconventional strategy however 
                                                     
1
  Student Paper, PG Cert. Res. Methods, 2013. 
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tends to raise the risk of exchange significantly. Alternatively the issue of the composition of 
debt could come as an optional strategy. This is where the low income countries chose 
between the two major sources of debt - foreign against domestic sourced debts; and in other 
instances choices can be made between short and long term debts. It was however discovered 
that this choice was simply a function of the international donor and creditor nations’ 
willingness and ability to provide external financing, where the domestic financing remains 
to be used as a residual to make up for the short fall in funding. But when the mix of external 
and domestic debt financing is not a domestic policy decision, the extent of the effectiveness 
of independent policy making becomes constrained. However utilising strictly the external 
sources of debt may also result in the neglect of the domestic sources of funding which 
negates much needed local capital market development. The function of a good debt 
management strategy is to strike a balance between all these with the objective of minimising 
cost and risk, with the intent of making a maximum use of the sourced funds.  
A study of debt management in sub-Saharan Africa requires a reference to the debt relief 
initiative of the late 1990s. The World Bank-International Monetary Fund’s debt relief 
initiative commencing in 1996 played a significant role in shaping the subsequent debt 
management strategies employed and adopted by the countries in this region. This is because 
the SSAs continued to experience difficulties in meeting their financial obligations, as at 
when due, despite the debt relief. According to Boote and Thugge (1997) these difficulties 
before and after the relief were not unconnected to external shocks from foreign borrowings 
e.g. deterioration in the terms of trade; civil unrest; growing inequality and poverty; poor 
macroeconomic policies and implementation of structural adjustments. Other factors include 
the lopsided nature of the lending terms and policies of most external private lending bodies 
in the form of providing loans on commercial interest rates with non-matching short 
repayment periods, resulting in an overall lack of prudent debt-management policies among 
the indebted SSAs. Also the over optimism of the foreign creditors and the debtors alike, 
especially when it comes to the prospects of raising the level of capacity to build up debt-
servicing through increased export earnings; and the lack of a careful management of the 
currency composition of debts sourced externally. With these impediments an effective debt 
management became imperative among the sub-Saharan countries.  
The debt relief initiative of 1996 was seen to be unable to serve as a remedy towards the 
threat of impending debt distress facing many SSAs, thereby casting doubts on the whole 
objective of the debt relief programme to free funds for the development of infrastructure 
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among beneficiary nations. It was therefore argued, that provided the discount rate of the 
government preceding the debt relief and in the period after are found to remain the same; it 
follows that all policies regarded improper may prevail in spite of any debt reduction or 
forgiveness (Easterly, 2002).  For this reason many view the initiative promoted was purely 
in the interest of the creditor nations and their institutions instead. The programme was thus 
seen to be aimed at salvaging and stabilizing the markets which the debt stricken nations 
patronise. Berthélemy and Vourc'h (1994), further observed that the gradual debt relief 
brokered by the Bretton Wood institutions was ostensibly in favour of the lending banks, 
protecting them from the negative effect of the debt crisis.  It was argued that the debt relief 
granted was not in any way too much or adequate for the debtor nations, the actual debt crisis 
threat was the risk to the global economy at large. Barry and Tomitova (2006), went on to 
question the reality of the debt of which relief was said to be made. To them the whole idea 
of relief was inappropriate, for the whole process from the onset had been exaggerated. Barry 
and Tomitova (2006) argued that upon all the claims there were actually no debts to the poor 
in the first place. It is worth noting that after several years there has been no improvement in 
the economy of any debt relief beneficiary nation, which came about due to a prevalence of 
sound policies or improved external environment. The only improvement in economic terms 
recorded, was simply as a result of the quantum of the debt relief, which was temporary. Debt 
relief as a strategy clearly turned out to be a mere availability of more funds at the disposal of 
the highly indebted poor countries, and have had no effect on the longer term debt situation 
of sub-Saharan African nations. The debt relief initiatives and debt restructuring was however 
seen by many to have actually impacted well on the HIPCs. The process tends to assist the 
indebted countries back on to the route for debt efficiency and sustainability but failed to 
resolve the question as to what really caused the distress in the first place. This further makes 
the need for debt management strategy among the sub-Saharan African countries crucial, 
imperative and necessary for the purpose of promoting long term economic growth and 
stability.   
1.3 Literature Review 
Several of the works undertaken on the subject of debt and growth tend to dwell on the so 
called “debt overhang”; a phenomenon, believed to be responsible for the dwindling or 
impaired savings and investment that forms the aftermath of huge external debt (Esther O. 
Adegbite, 2008). Deshpande (1997) confirmed the existence of  debt overhang, but (Cohen, 
1995) failed to gain any substantial evidence to support such a phenomenon. However, 
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Cordella, Ruiz-Arranz, and Ricci (2005) completely ruled out the theory promoting any 
negative effect of debt on investments of  a debtor nation. But Farzin (1988) working on the 
relationship of external debt and growth actually concluded that borrowing could be an 
instrument of economic growth. Not much of the literature was however focused on debt 
management in sub- Saharan Africa. 
Over the years however, government borrowing led to economic crisis particularly during the 
1990s, resulting in some nations being left with the only option of outright repudiation. The 
option for default as a strategy to manage sovereign debts was surprisingly drawing support 
from several scholars, who believed the entire process of lending had been faulting and in 
favour of the affluent creditor nations and institutions. For example Tideman and Lockwood 
(1993) argued that repudiation of sovereign debts would go a long way to increase economic 
efficiency and social justice. Montiel (2005) however, argued that although debt repudiation 
could be a way out for a country devastated by insolvency, the move could at the same time 
have serious implications. This is because creditors might seek legal enforcement that could 
ruin the credibility of the defaulting nation leading to the real danger of the dreaded “debt 
overhang.” Jeremy and Kenneth (1989) also considered repudiation by a small country as a 
deliberate move to alienating itself from potential lenders. Omotola and Saliu (2009) 
suggested instead a process of debt relief or outright cancellations of debts as a more 
appropriate strategy by the debtor nations in sub-Saharan Africa. There are however those 
opposed to debt cancellation or debt relief as a strategy in solving the issue of debt crisis 
facing many countries. This view is shared by Vallee and Vallee (2005) who saw the whole 
idea of debt relief as handing the instrument of power at the disposal of rich creditor nations. 
More so Freytag and Pehnelt (2009) concluded that debt relief was purely hinged on political 
rather than on economic considerations. But sovereign debt crisis was never an exclusive 
problem of low income countries or those countries in sub-Saharan African nations. This is 
because recent happenings especially with regard to the issue of debt and its management is 
central to the European economic crisis with Greece and Italy among the major concerns 
(Madeley, 2011). Therefore, an effective debt management strategy implementation was the 
only remedy in sight, especially for the purpose of stalling a debt crisis that had the capacity 
of crippling both global financial and economic systems. In this regard, Daud and Podivinsky 
(2011), acknowledged the tendency of a negative impact of debt on economic growth, but 
also believed that poor countries’ only option was to embark on a correction of misallocation 
of borrowed external funds and put in place a sound, effective and transparent debt 
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management policy. Hence the need for an effective, and efficient debt management strategy 
for developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. By debt management we 
refer thus, to an established process of how government debt is managed, with the aim of 
lowering cost, reducing risks and promoting economic growth.  Public debt management is 
defined as, the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the 
government’s debt in order to raise the required amount of funds at the lowest possible cost 
over the medium to long run, consistent with a prudent degree of risk ("IMF-World Bank 
Publish Revised Guidelines for Public Debt Management [press release]," 2014, p. 5).  
Debt management is an essential prerequisite for the development of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Without a functional debt management, there is bound to be misallocation and 
misappropriation of resources that could be used to promote the development of the economy 
with a view to attaining growth. One important factor is however very important to attain a 
functional debt management. The availability of an effective and vibrant domestic capital 
market is necessary in the development of an effective debt management strategy. A weak 
debt management capacity and the absence of efficient debt markets in sub-Saharan Africa 
leads to the existence of challenges that are policy, institutional and operational facing the 
sub-region. These challenges which include the emergence of brand new markets and 
conditions, a rapid global flow of finance, as well as the obscure financial boundaries which 
have come to substantially alter financial structure confronting developing economies, add up 
to necessitate the introduction of a number of debt management measures, an instance of 
which is the debt management performance assessment (DeMPA) tool, put together by the 
World Bank in collaboration with the IMF in 2008 (site, 2014). Debt management as a 
strategy therefore becomes a vital tool at the disposal of the debt over-burdened sub-Saharan 
African countries for use to utilise their borrowed resources for the purpose of the attainment 
of stable economic growth. 
 The Significance of Debt Management 
The study of debt management is very significant in the process of the attainment of economic growth 
of a nation, more so those in the sub-Saharan Africa. The significance of debt management is evident 
as it entails use of borrowed funds that come accompanied by costs and risks that need to be 
minimised for optimal utilisation. Debt management is however significant for several other reasons. 
Debt management is relevant because it seeks to remove mismanagement, promoting the attainment 
of longer term growth, helping to improve the means of economic performance, introducing effort to 
free resources for developmental purposes and for the management of an economy out of crisis.  It 
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helps to improve the investment climate and uplift overall confidence in the economy. Thus, debt 
management should be seen as that process whereby government chooses between alternative 
combinations of its outstanding financial obligations in respect of how they are affected by 
the aspect of risk and return, as well as the issue of cost and duration that is inherent in most 
financial transactions. Debt management is important because it provides policy makers with 
an effective and efficient means of raising funds to correct balance of payment situations at 
minimal exposure to risks and lowest possible costs. Debt management however involves 
different strategies which include the determination of the denomination and maturity of debt 
instruments and how they are selected in the process, the issue of debt securities indexation 
for the purpose of hedging inflationary effect; the strategy dealing with changes in the 
relative supply of government debt instruments and the methods adopted to evolve new ways 
of managing public assets.  Government debt management also includes the issue of taxation 
and resource mobilisation at domestic levels, and how the process is related to government 
borrowing decisions. 
An essential feature of this study is the issue of sovereign or government debt. Government 
borrowing is traditionally seen to be the least risky of credit because governments’ tend to 
possess the powers of taxation and foreign exchange management which give them the 
ability, in principle, to cover their financial obligations. But this sometimes may not 
necessarily be the case. This is because there are times when the social cost of borrowing, 
taxation and foreign exchange becomes very enormous. This is because policymakers may 
turn out to become unable politically or administratively to mobilize the power to direct the 
requisite funds for debt servicing, or may be unwilling to do so, or circumstances may affect 
the population that any effort to raise additional revenue would be an act of political suicide. 
Therefore, the extent to which governments of poor countries will go to sustain rather than to 
default on their sovereign debt is an especially monumental question in the current 
international economic environment. Thus the need for the evolvement of a sound debt 
management strategy can hardly be overemphasised. The subject of sovereign debt or 
insolvency tends to shed more light on the features of sovereign lending, and hardly does one 
come across terms such as a ‘bankrupt’ government. This differentiates sovereign debts from 
corporate and private debts. This is because it is unusual for creditors to force an insolvent 
government to be wound up or to take possession of its remaining assets. Therefore, there is 
no internationally agreed jurisdiction or procedure for how to address a nation’s inability to 
repay. As a matter of fact, jurisdictions differ in the legal specifics of how to handle a 
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sovereign’s default. However private foreign creditors of a defaulting sovereign nation can go 
out of their way to find the most creditor friendly jurisdiction in which to fight for repayment. 
Thus, the amount repaid by the defaulting sovereign nation only becomes feasible when the 
defaulting nation is willing to repay despite any court judgement in favour of the creditor. 
Consequently and because some of the debt is owed to official creditors, debt has usually 
been restructured through informal negotiations and other informally agreed processes. 
Therefore, the treatment of sovereign debt crises is always regarded ‘political’ at its core, in 
the sense that it involves relations among states even if private entities are part of the deal. 
But the concern here is that this political process should no longer be ad hoc but be explicitly 
shaped so as to be effective, efficient and fair. 
In the process of putting in place a debt management strategy, there is a need for a clear 
demarcation between the need for risk minimisation and cost reduction. Because of the extent 
of output and human losses that might follow, in debt management top priority should be 
accorded to measures to curtail debt default. In several instances mistakes by governments 
directing much focus on short run cost savings, involving issued chunks of foreign currency 
denominated, and other short term debts, tend to render government finances largely 
susceptible to risks of changing market situations. A sound debt management ought to be 
packaged in such a way that it enables officials handling debt management to scrutinize all 
the expected coats and risks inherent in government debt portfolio and effectively manage 
them. This can be achieved by means of carrying out stress test on debt instruments in respect 
of the level of exposure such a country is to prevalent financial turbulences. A debt 
management strategy developed upon a similar approach should be the kind to be approved 
and implemented by the authorities. All efforts at the development of a debt management 
strategy should be done taking into consideration all constraints imposed by other 
macroeconomic factors. These constraints might limit the composition of the debt portfolios 
of developing countries more than those in open, developed economies. These constraints 
range from capital controls, implementation of monetary policy through direct instruments 
and a weak fiscal position. When a government domestic debt market is underdeveloped the 
situation places constraints on a debt management strategy. Thus, developing a domestic 
government debt market describes the many facets in this area, especially with the 
complexity and interactions between these considerations, developing a debt management 
strategy is an iterative process (Herman, Ocampo, & Spiegel, 2010). 
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Debt management strategies can be expressed by setting ceilings in situations where targets 
on certain risks in debt instruments are yardstick used in approvals. For instance limits on 
debt maturity, the extent of fixed shares as against a floating rate of debt, how the share of 
domestic debt stands against external or foreign-currency borrowings, and the different 
currency composition of the external debts, are such risk characteristics. But when it comes to 
countries with poorly developed markets, and where there tend to be predominance of doubts 
in access, the best strategy would be having a general guidelines. Debt management should 
be what decision makers understand (Herman et al., 2010).  
A good debt management should be able to describe the risks being managed e.g. currency, 
interest-rate, refinancing and credit risks. There are a number of examples that could be 
employed to demonstrate how these risks could affect the debt burden. For instance the 
historical context for the debt portfolio could be provided, including a description of changes 
in the portfolio’s size i.e. in both absolute and relative to GDP and the composition of 
borrowing through time. Another equally important factor is the changes recorded in relevant 
market variables that needed to be incorporated, along with commentary on the key events in 
the evolution of the debt. A description of the environment for debt management in the 
future, including fiscal and debt projections, assumptions about exchange and interest rates, 
and constraints on portfolio choice, especially those relating to market development and the 
implementation of monetary policy is very important. In addition there is the need to describe 
the analysis undertaken to support the recommended debt management strategy, clarifying 
the assumptions used and the limitations of the analysis.  
The explanation for a debt management strategy should be able to specify ranges for the key 
risk indicators of the portfolio and the financing program, but need to be as detailed as a 
benchmark portfolio. The strategy should also describe measures or projects that are planned 
to manage unquantifiable risks and that support debt market development. Ideally debt 
management strategy should be specified for the medium to long term, however it is 
important that it gets reviewed periodically for the purpose of assessing whether the 
assumptions still hold in the light of different circumstances and new development. A good 
debt strategy should ensure such a review to be undertaken annually as part of the budget 
process and if the existing strategy is viewed as appropriate, the rationale for its continuation 
should be clearly stated. 
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It has however been argued that the market based approach on the problem of insolvency of 
sovereign debtors tends to be excessively creditor friendly and of high cost for developing 
countries. It was observed that the solutions put into place pose undue lags, causing 
unnecessary prolongation of uncertainty and attendant economic trauma (Herman et al., 
2010).  
 Statement of the Problem 
Overall, it has been argued by many, especially those working on international financial 
policy that the world actually does not need to develop any new way or strategy to manage 
sovereign debt and any crises that may arise. While arguably it may be plausible, because the 
international system is not fool proof, which rather tends to operate less smoothly and 
consistently than our expectations; but it is a fact that the same process helped to solve the 
debt crises of the 1990s. It is true however that there are present fund speculators who tend to 
take the advantage of the debt reduction agreed by willing creditors and that it is not fair that 
they succeed in obtaining full repayment in court actions. It also happens to be a fact as well, 
that not all the official creditors abide by the terms of relief agreed by the major creditors, as 
a consequence the speculators taking advantage of all the concessions given by the leading 
brokers of the day.(IDA and IMF, 2008). These problems however are not enough to deter 
the formulation of a strategy that would lead to a debt-restructuring process. Thus a 
considerable debt relief has been agreed both by private and official creditors (Arnone & 
Presbitero, 2010). It was argued however that more extensive reliance on rescheduling and 
standstills would have been more effective than the big bailouts. Such measures might have 
helped to reduce capital outflows out of an affected country, and this in turn would have led 
to a strengthening of its exchange rate (Herman et al., 2010). 
To some extent international policy toward the sovereign debt of the poorest countries has 
drastically changed in the past decade. An example was in the year 2005; after a prolonged 
global agitation by the debtor nations as well as widespread civil society anti-debt campaigns. 
This led the world’s donor governments to offer the poorest countries the largest debt 
reduction in history, when it was agreed in 1999 to cancel almost all the debt-servicing 
obligations of the HIPCs to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the 
regional development banks, as well as bilateral debts. Servicing of multilateral debt had 
hitherto been sacrosanct and debt service had gone a long way in worsening the debt 
conditions of many debtor nations. As a matter of fact, debt service is supposed to be 
negatively correlated to the economic growth of a nation. It is a direct drain on investible 
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funds which in turn fuel the case of debt overhang. Thus any meaningful debt management 
should consider the element of debt servicing as a relevant factor.  
Herman et al. (2010) explained that some middle income countries, especially in South 
America and Latin America went into the process of bond restructuring via a market oriented 
debt swaps. The last of the strategy was when the bad external debt issues of these nations 
were resolved in 2005. For instance in Argentina defaulted bonds were swapped with new 
ones at heavy discounts. In the sub – Saharan Africa Nigeria succeeded to negotiate an 
unprecedented benefit of reasonable debt cancellation and her debts with other external 
creditors rescheduled. The following year which witnessed a relatively encouraging 
economic growth and more stable global commodity prices several other developing 
countries experiencing higher per head income embraced the opportunity to restructure their 
external debts. Several of these countries realised higher foreign earnings, increased external 
reserves, and in many instances were able to repay part of their debt before it fell due. With 
this development, sovereign debt difficulties became a subject of the past posing not much to 
the policymakers to think about. In spite of this development it was not very long after that it 
became evident that debt relief or debt reduction alone, although necessary, was never 
sufficient in the case of the management of the lower income sovereign debt situations. This 
becomes particularly true when viewed from our experiences of the global economic crisis of 
2009.  As far as the low income countries’ debt situations are concerned our answer to this is 
not very far-fetched. For instance a few years after debt relief, precisely in March 2009, the 
IMF analysed the debt situation of seventy one low-income countries and classified twenty-
eight as high risk under its baseline projection. In sub-Saharan Africa notably we had Ghana 
and Uganda among others. This according to the Fund had the dangerous prospects of 
potential declines in foreign direct investment and aid. More poor countries were further 
added to the category of ‘high risk’ of debt distress (IMF, 2009). The threat of any debt crises 
that could ensue as a result of further mismanagement of sovereign borrowings could lead to 
a worse scenario than what was witnessed during the 1980s and 1990s. But this threat could 
also be faced by countries that have not completely experienced debt difficulties in the past. 
The fact any country that allows itself to carelessly slip across the line into debt difficulties 
during an ensuing period marked by the temporary stability as a result of the debt relief, is 
bound to have a difficult and protracted path to recovery. 
14 
 
The HIPC initiative, which championed the idea of a fresh start as the major objective of the 
idea of debt relief when it was launched in 1996, there was hardly evidence that the initiative 
had sufficiently lowered the debt burden for the selected countries, at least until the multi- 
lateral debt relief initiative (MDRI) of 2005. Sovereign debt problems in developing 
countries were highlighted by these movements where they tend to pitch the poor countries 
against rich creditor nations, thereby motivating the poor people in those countries to pull 
them out of poverty to a better stable and more sustainable condition (Arnone & Presbitero, 
2010). And for this reason the only panacea for the poor countries especially those in sub-
Saharan Africa is to devise an effective debt management strategy that would ensure an 
efficient management of their sovereign debts for purposes of growth and development. 
 Research Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research work is to study the overall impact of sovereign debt on the 
economic growth of countries in sub–Saharan Africa. The research work focuses on the 
process where cost minimisation and reduction in risks involved in government borrowing 
could lead to an efficient utilisation and allocation of resources to attain economic growth 
among sub-Saharan African countries. The objective of debt management therefore is to 
ensure that the government’s financing needs are handled efficiently and effectively and in 
economic logic and rational sense. And also to ensure that the stock of government debt and 
increases in debt flows as a result of budget and non – budgetary sources are managed in 
accordance with the cost and risk preferences of the government.  In summary the study is 
geared towards the attainment of the following aims and objectives:  
1. To establish whether sovereign debt management has impact on overall development 
in SSAs;  
2.  To critically investigate whether debt is related to economic growth;  
3.  To establish the relationship between the extent of debt and debt maturity; and 
4.  To critically examine the debt relief initiative and its role in debt and its management 
in sub-Saharan Africa.     
 Research Questions 
Government officials responsible for debt management traditionally share similar functions 
with fiscal policy advisers. The only aspect of the two that differs is their objectives. Given 
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the objectives of the study as outlined above, the research questions for the study include but 
are not limited to the following: 
1. What is the impact of borrowing on the economic growth of sub-Saharan African 
countries and does the phenomenon of debt overhang really exist? 
2. Does debt management as a strategy impact on the economic growth of an economy; 
and how does the debt relief initiative impact on sub-Saharan Africa’s sovereign debt 
management policy? 
3. Is a country’s level of indebtedness influenced by the composition and maturity of its 
debt?   
 
 Significance of the Study 
The proposed study examines the impact of an effective debt management strategy on the 
economic growth of a country in sub-Saharan Africa. Past studies on debt in sub-Saharan 
Africa mainly focus on the relationship that exists between debt and economic growth. Thus 
a study in the field of debt management is bound to have policy implications and a potential 
effect on the economic situation in sub-Saharan Africa. This is because the study will be 
based on both critical evaluation of past experiences and future policy to accommodate a 
changing global environment, especially on issues pertaining debt and its management.  
Until now, most studies carried out on debt tend to focus on the relationship between external 
debt and/or other factors of economic growth in Africa and other developing countries. Fosu 
(1996), showed previous studies which actually only examined the effect of external 
borrowing on a country’s level of savings and investment, which was in an attempt to 
measure the impact of debt on economic growth among low income countries. Of the existing 
research works on the impact of external debt on the economic growth of poor countries most 
of them sampled fewer countries (Fosu, 1996), in comparison to similar works carried out in 
Latin America for example. Examples of such studies were research by  Esther O. Adegbite 
(2008), who investigated the effect of substantial external borrowing with the accompanying 
servicing requirements on economic growth of the Nigeria. Another example of a study on 
debt was carried out by the UN (2000) showing an investigation of how debt servicing 
requirements tend to consume a reasonable chunk of resources meant for the provision of 
needed infrastructures for the development of the economy and raising the living standards of 
people. A work by Ifeoma (2011) carried out an analysis of Nigeria’s foreign policy and 
government policies on the issue surrounding external debt relief and its consequences on the 
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nation and its development. However, none of these studies focus on debt management, debt 
management strategyor on the effect of debt management strategy on economic growth as 
proposed by the current research work.   
There are numerous other works on the relationship between Africa’s debt and economic 
growth, but with very limited research being conducted on the impact of the debt 
management strategy employed by a sub-Saharan African country and economic growth. 
However, research works by Deshpande (1997) and Blommestein and Horman (2007) 
conducted a cross-country study on Public Debt Management and Bond Markets in Africa. 
Both concluded that the development of a sound debt management system and promotion of a 
vibrant securities trading will go a long way in helping to minimize the high cost involved in 
the management of public debt and keeping the figures at a level that could be sustained. The 
study indicated that an effective and well drafted debt management, sound fiscal and 
monetary policies have the potential to combine to drastically minimize the risk premium 
element prevalent in the structure of long-term interest rates. Their works actually contribute 
to the literature on debt management and its relation to the development of a bond market. A 
developed bond market and lower cost in public debt management are a few aspects of 
strategic debt management 
 This research therefore proposes to look at the aspect of debt management strategy as a 
strategy for economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa and taking an in-depth analysis of 
experiences in Nigeria. Hence the work will not only add to the existing literature on the 
subject of debt and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa but contribute to 
knowledge and understanding of the subject of debt management strategy and its importance 
to the economic growth of low income sub-Saharan African countries. With a persistent trend 
of non-efficient exploitation and under-utilization of resources in sub – Saharan Africa any 
literature on debt and the strategy of its management will contribute immensely in the process 
of linking the activities of debt management to economic growth.  
The study will have an impact on future policy making and also in areas of economic 
development, better management of the economy and macro-economic balances. It is hoped 
that the study would highlight the seriousness of both minimising the debt and service 
burden, better management of the economy, which will lead to freeing resources for future 
development in the SSAs. In a nutshell the study  is significant in the sense that it will: (a) 
Make possible the identification of the concept and framework of Debt Management Strategy 
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as an economic growth strategy; (b) Generate greater awareness among public organizations 
on the importance of having a proper and practical Debt Management Strategy as a tool of 
economic growth; and (c) Provide useful knowledge on factors that might have impact and 
contribute to the successful adoption of Debt Management Strategy in debt management 
offices  across sub-Saharan Africa.  
 Scope of the Work 
This work intends to cover the effect of borrowing and its management strategy on economic 
growth in sub–Saharan Africa. The work shall carry out a comparative study of some selected 
countries covering a period of 30 years; between the years 1980 and 2013. Furthermore an in-
depth analysis of debt management in Nigeria over the same period will be undertaken. 
While the work will look not at borrowing in isolation, the work is essentially concerned with 
sovereign domestic and external borrowings of the selected countries under study.  The work 
is however limited to sub–Saharan African countries as a region and Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda 
and South Africa in particular. 
 Research Methodology 
This work proposes to employ the use of the quantitative approach to research. Data was 
generated from a combination of primary and secondary data sources. The use of survey 
questionnaires was employed, however the bulk of the data used was generated from major 
secondary sources. The work made all efforts to obtain and compile comprehensive data on 
the sampled sub-Saharan African countries’ debt. Accordingly, the study relied heavily upon 
the most comprehensive data base of various governments’ financial statistics, the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics, gross government debt data, World Economic Outlook and 
the Public Sector debt statistics. Another equally relevant source of data for the work is the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
The choice of countries was limited to two HIPC eligible countries of sub-Saharan Africa; 
Ghana and Uganda, from the west and central Africa; and Nigeria and South Africa, two of 
the largest economies in the SSA sub-region, for greater representation and a wider coverage 
of the region. Information on debt was obtained primarily from individual IMF country 
reports e.g. the current issues of economic development reports and country desk databases. 
In situations where these turned out to be insufficient, specific country central bank reports or 
IMF country desk economists were sought to fill in the gaps; hence the use of the survey 
questionnaire. The debt management performance assessment (DeMPA) indicators were 
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adopted to form the basis for the survey questionnaire used to source the primary data for the 
work.   
 Sample Size 
Based on HIPC eligibility and the probability of future debt crisis analysis shown in appendix 
I, there are currently a total of 24 sub-Saharan HIPC countries and Nigeria, which could be 
sampled. The choice of Nigeria, though a non HIPC economy, was hinged on the fact that it 
was among the countries considered and later in 2004 benefitted from debt cancellation. 
Ghana, also from the West African sub-region was selected for being a HIPC economy and a 
beneficiary of the relief initiative showing signs of distress, Uganda for the same reason from 
the central African sub-region, were sampled. Thus to balance the equation from the other 
end of Africa, South Africa was considered; being a non HIPC economy like Nigeria and 
with relatively developed institutions and economy. Several countries were excluded from the 
sample because they belonged to the francophone e.g. Niger and Mali, the challenge of the 
language barrier, the problem of data availability, proximity and research resources. Hence 
for the purpose of achieving a good comparison, Ghana, a HIPC economy and a country 
already showing symptoms of distress was chosen. Uganda was chosen for similar reasons in 
addition to its location in the central African sub-region to reflect diversity. South Africa like 
Nigeria was not a HIPC economy, but was particularly sampled because it had a developed 
domestic market on which it relied 100 per cent for its funding and did not benefit from the 
debt relief initiative. Nigeria a non HIPC economy was considered for benefitting from debt 
cancellation in 2006.  
 Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion was able to prepare a background to the proposed work on debt 
management strategy as a tool for economic growth in the sub- Saharan Africa region. In the 
process of introducing the subject of debt and its management, the fact that the literature on 
debt management has been scant and particularly lacking in sub-Saharan Africa has been 
acknowledged. Most works we saw were in the area of the relationship between debt and 
economic growth, with few focused on countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Although several 
works had been undertaken in the field of debt and its impact on economic growth, much of 
the analyses either employed an insignificant number of African countries or were entirely 
lacking in empirical evidences. The work thus endeavoured to raise questions and outlined 
some objectives pertaining to the issue of debt and its management in sub-Saharan Africa, 
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with a view to promoting economic growth. It was concluded that the issue of debt in sub-
Saharan Africa could best be tackled by exploring the alternative of putting in place a sound 
and effective debt management strategy. This would be possible especially with a focus on 
the choice of debt, minimizing its cost and making prudent assessments of the country’s 
capacity to sustain the debt and servicing requirements attached to it. Despite the tendency of 
a negative impact of debt on economic growth, the proposed work strongly suggests that sub-
Saharan African countries’ foremost option was to embark on a correction of misallocation of 
borrowed funds and put in place a sound, effective and transparent debt management strategy 
and policy.    
  Thesis Format  
      This work is planned in different sections and chapters as follows: 
Chapter One: This chapter covers part I of this work and deals with the initial focus of the 
proposed research work on debt management as a strategy for the economic growth of a 
nation. Under this chapter the overall view of the thesis, its background, research problem, 
research questions, objectives, significance and scope of the work are covered.  
Chapter Two:  This chapter is under the second segment of work and deals specifically with 
the review of related literature on Debt and Economic Growth. The review here is divided 
into various sections covering subjects that range from the Theory of Public Debt; risks and 
costs involved in government borrowing; issues in Debt and Financial Crises as well as the 
role of international financial institutions.  
Chapter Three: Here the study deals with a review of issues related to Debt Management 
Strategy and Economic Growth. This chapter contains a general overview of Debt 
Management in sub – Saharan Africa. The sections under it include the history of Debt in sub 
– Saharan Africa; the involvement of Multilateral Debt and sub – Saharan Africa; issues in 
Debt Management in Africa; and Government Debt Management and capital market 
development in Africa. The literature review is concluded in this chapter. Chapter Four: This 
chapter specifies the methodology adopted for the work. The research philosophy guiding the 
work and justification for the use of mixed methods as well as the triangulation of data was 
extensively discussed. Most importantly model specification and formulation of hypotheses 
was carried out in this chapter.  
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Chapter Five: In this segment of the work, data collected from primary sources via 
questionnaires was presented. All the descriptive statistics and frequencies relating to debt 
management indicators that constituted the questionnaire were sorted, categorised and 
explained. Appropriated tabulations, charts and figures representations were also made 
available in this chapter.  
Chapters Six and Seven: These two chapters form a continuation of data presentation started 
in chapter five. However, as part of the triangulation and the mixed method approach adopted 
in this work, chapter six explained and presented responses from interviewees and chapter 
seven presented data collected from secondary sources. In chapter six the profiles of 
interviewees were given followed by the transcripts, and in chapter seven, tabulations 
graphical representation of secondary data collected on the four sampled countries was 
analysed and presented.  
Chapter Eight: This chapter covered the process of secondary data analysis using SPSS 
statistical software. The presentation covered multiple regression results which were 
modelled to answer three of the research questions raised in the process of the work. 
Tabulations were presented in support of the results and justification of the model employed. 
Two models were presented in the process.  
Chapter Nine: This chapter marks the conclusive part of the work, where a discussion of 
findings, summary and conclusion was carried out, with appropriate recommendations and 
contributions duly presented.   
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Debt Management 
  Introduction 
This chapter aims to critically examine and review various studies in the academic literature 
on economic theories relating to sovereign debt, debt crisis and debt management. A 
particular objective here is to look at theoretical and empirical studies with regard to 
sovereign debt and economic growth, the nature of the phenomenon of the debt overhang and 
how it relates to government borrowing, debt management and economic growth; the choice 
between debt types and maturities, debt relief and how it affects debt management strategy 
and debt crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter we focus on issues earlier raised under 
the research questions.  
For effective government debt management to be achieved there is the requirement for 
putting in place an effective and efficient debt management strategy.. A good debt 
management strategy should be able to ensure effective and efficient sovereign debt 
management through putting in place a process which may be complimentary, but 
independent of the macroeconomic policy apparatus of any government.  
With the availability of functional institutions and services, advanced economies find it quite 
possible to employ the use of markets and financial market instruments to promote and 
implement very important policies that impact positively on the economy. Capital markets, in 
more developed economies are vibrant, effective and more sensitive to policy changes, in 
comparison to many in the sub-Saharan Africa. For example, mere increases in interest rates, 
or a slight adjustment of government taxes, tend to result in a multiplier effect and at the end 
produce the desired results. Well-developed capital and functional markets have the ability of 
providing access to both domestic and external capital sources, as well as offering a wide 
range of instruments and derivatives dealt in by financial experts and governments for the 
purpose of stabilising the economy and to achieve meaningful growth. In sub-Saharan Africa 
however, a similar trend is lacking or in acute shortage. This due to the poor developed nature 
of institutions, capital markets and service sectors in sub-Saharan Africa. Hence the 
development of an effective debt management strategy in sub-Saharan Africa becomes very 
important, although there is the need for the process to be carried out in a manner that suits 
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the economic terrain prevalent in the sub-region and which can be accommodated by the 
extent of institutional development among the nations. 
 Role of Sovereign Debt in an Economy 
The IMF (2001), defines debt as all those liabilities which eventually require the payment or 
series of payments of interest as well as the principal amount by the debtor or his/her 
appointed agent to the creditor at a specified date or dates in the future. By this definition 
government debt is regarded as all those liabilities as recorded in the Government Financial 
Statistics System with the exception of shares and other equities and financial derivatives. 
Sovereign debt is thus defined as, Debt issued by a national government in the form of bonds 
in a reserve currency. Traditionally, sovereign debt had been considered low-risk, as 
governments were believed to have a variety of means to ensure they did not default on their 
obligations ("sovereign debt" 2014, p. 468). 
The last fifteen years have witnessed significant events in the field of sovereign debt, debt 
crises and sovereign debt defaults. One of the major happenings was the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997, which ultimately led to default by Russia. The IMF and the World Bank responded 
with a US$25 billion in bailout (Kolb, 2011). The same financial distress spread in the US 
with a direct effect on the hedge fund long term capital which was heavily invested in the 
Ruble. The events set a new stage for sovereign debt in the globalised financial world.  
 
Instances of default by sovereign governments date back to over two thousand years. In those 
times sovereign debtors tended to possess an over-bearing power over the lenders, which 
rendered the latter less capable of obtaining prompt repayment. In the not too distant past 
however, sovereign borrowers have tended to become smaller, weaker and poorer nations. 
But on the other hand lenders have become financial institutions located in the most powerful 
countries. Not very long ago there were instances of these lenders employing the gunboat 
diplomacy to enforce their claims on defaulting debtor countries. For example, in the year 
1898, following a considerable destruction of property as a result of revolution, Venezuela 
failed to honour its debt obligation. To enforce repayment Great Britain, Germany and Italy 
employed force to compel Venezuela to comply. Another instance of a forceful super-
sanction against defaulting nations was Egypt under the leadership of Ismail Pasha from 1863 
to 1879. When Egypt failed to repay its debt contrary to its undertaking, the Suez Canal was 
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sold to Great Britain in 1875. When that was not enough for settlement, the UK 
masterminded a change of leadership in Egypt in 1879 and effectively took control of Egypt’s 
finances in 1882, directing Egypt’s financial resources until the full facility was repaid (Kolb, 
2011). In the current dispensation however, it would be against international laws for one 
nation to enforce repayments through the use of ‘gunshot diplomacy’ or seizure of another 
sovereign nation’s finances.  
Also, the Dictionary of Economics ("sovereign debt," 2009) sees sovereign debt as the debt 
of a government of an independent nation. In the case of the debt of an individual or 
corporate body, legal procedures could be employed to enforce repayment of any interest and 
or redemption payments that fall due, or in severe cases to compel the handover of the 
debtor’s assets to the creditors. Unlike the case of an individual or corporation’s debt, such 
legal sanctions cannot be possible especially against a sovereign state or government, unless 
such a government submits voluntarily to legal procedures. This makes sovereign debts risky 
where repudiation, interest reduction and compulsory rescheduling become very probable. 
Sovereign debtors however, avoid taking the option of repudiation for fear of loss of 
reputation; because a defaulting nation could find it difficult and expensive to access funding 
in a future period. But if the creditor does not have the power to enforce repayment by the 
sovereign borrower, then the essence of lending tends to be questioned (Kolb, 2011). Two 
basic facts however need to be considered: (i) sovereign borrowers tend to escape super-
sanctions; and (ii) in spite of risk of default, sovereign lending remains robust. According to 
Fafchamps (1996) however, an  alternative for sovereign borrowing is to resort to 
renegotiation where emphasis is given to conditionality, especially with international 
financial institutions’ (IFI’s) investment. Under this arrangement debt rescheduling and 
reduction are made conditional on the adoption and implementation of a policy package that 
basically emphasise structural adjustment. But conditionality is mainly imposed to help 
resolve a debt crisis and remove the debt overhang (Sundaram, 1989). However, if 
anticipated by creditors, conditionality could lead to over borrowing and in the end causing 
the same conditions for its continuation.  
Most debt crises are defined in terms of the ability to repay. Sovereign debts are generally 
characterised by frequent failure of commitment. A country could default on its debt for 
running out of sufficient amount of foreign exchange. Thus sovereign debt stands in a 
category of its own (Eaton & Gersovitz, 1981); because courts may not be able to compel a 
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sovereign nation to honour its financial obligations. There are however in existence different 
enforcement mechanisms which prevent a breach of debt contract by a sovereign nation and 
make the commitment to pay credible. A default by a sovereign nation could damage its 
reputation and prevent access to more credit in the future. Kolb (2011) observed that a 
rationale for reputational factor as a deterrent against default among sovereign nations, was 
that sovereign governments want to maintain a reputation as creditworthy in order to be 
assured of future access to international funding. According to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), 
Kletzer (1984) and Jeffrey Sachs (1984) denial of access to future loans may not always 
work, as the procedure may require the support of all the different sources of credit involved, 
which may prove difficult to obtain. They argued that denial of access to future loans could 
encourage repayment when the initial credit had been meant for smoothening consumption; 
but the same process may fail to enforce repayment if the purpose of the facility was for 
growth financing. Bulow (1989) and Rosenthal (1991) considered the idea of denial as 
ineffective if sovereign nations had alternative means of insuring themselves against the 
refusal. But another means of squeezing repayment although very variant to those mentioned 
earlier is the threat of reduced external aids flows. And a large portion of the external debt of 
most of sub-Saharan Africa had been sourced through bilateral and multilateral donors. 
According to Hanlon (1998) in 1980 there was a net transfer of US$28 billion from the 
developed to the developing counties (including countries in sub- Saharan Africa). This trend 
reversed by 1987 where the indebted countries transferred a record US$12.4 billion to the 
creditors and the nations they represent. Debt service payments alone surpassed new loans by 
about US$34 billion, an amount partly compensated with US$13.5 billion in aid and grants, 
which inadvertently were used for further debt repayments. In aggregate, despite the amounts 
in debt repayment, the poor countries’ debt increased from US$603 billion in 1980 to 
US$1600 billion in 1992; and by 1997 the figure had jumped to $ 2200 billion.  
The discussions of sovereign debt circles as promoted by Minford and Kindleberger (1979), 
argued that lenders do not want debts to be repaid because they actually did not have any use 
for the capital for three reasons: (i) for debts to remain serviced; (ii) service ceases with debt 
write off and (ii) employing debt as an instrument of leverage on the debtors This has 
however been made possible through the role played by the IMF and the World Bank: All 
foreign aid and debt relief are made conditional on countries where the Fund and the Bank 
had projects. And the process involves structural adjustment to reduce consumption for the 
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purpose of freeing funds for debt repayments and also a chain of conditions to open up the 
indebted countries economies and lower the prices of their exports (Hanlon, 1998) 
Profiling debt repayments especially during crisis was a reform recently considered by the 
IMF. Debt ‘profiling’ could involve allowing greater flexibility in how the Fund deals with 
countries in crisis as a result of sovereign debts. Profiling proposed the extension of debt 
maturities and the postponement of payments until such a time when greater certainty in the 
country’s prospects had been observed (Fernández & Martin, 2014). Debt profiling could 
however make short term debt similar to long term, which invariably could lead to higher 
costs of funding. 
 Debt and Economic Growth: the Case of Debt Overhang  
When investment in a group of large debtor countries tumbled in the 1980s, many analysts 
blamed the poor performance on debt crisis. This was based on the theory that if there were to 
be a discount on the secondary debt market, the lenders might not expect to be paid in full; 
where repayments would be hinged on the debtor’s resources (Cohen, 1995), with debt 
operating like a tax on a country’s resources implying debt’s adverse effect on domestic 
investments popularly called the debt over hang. The phenomenon is referred to as the debt 
overhang which tends to give creditors the incentive to lend at an expected loss ostensibly to 
secure their existing claims (Jeffrey Sachs, 1984); JD Sachs (1989).  But the position in the 
real world however is one of both repayment and new borrowings; where if countries’ future 
repayments  were not in doubt they would have no difficulty borrowing (Krugman, 1988). 
But Krugman (1988), further saw debt overhang as referring to a situation of an existing 
‘inherited’ debt that was substantially large enough that creditors would not confidently 
expect to obtain repayments on their lending. Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), 
however differed especially while considering the case of emerging economies when they 
saw the entire phenomenon as a consequence of what they referred to as the debt intolerance. 
Debt intolerance was associated with the pervasive nature of persistent debt default among 
many sovereign debtors. These debt-intolerant countries tend to have weak fiscal structures 
as well as weak financial systems. But whether government decisions to borrow or reduce the 
amount of debt could have a positive impact on economic growth tends to depend on the 
existence of the so-called debt overhang. Hence according to Pattillo, Poirson, and Ricci 
(2011a) there existed some evidence for empirical turning points or thresholds beyond which 
borrowing tends to impact negatively on economic growth. This result confirms the findings 
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of Fosu (1996) working on a sample of sub-Saharan African countries where he found that 
debt negatively influenced GDP growth through a process of  reduction in the marginal 
productivity of capital. The findings indicated that on the average, associated with a higher 
debt country is a fall in GDP growth of about 1 percentage point annually, which 
approximately constitutes a third of the sample mean growth of GDP. The impact however, 
tends to be positive at low levels of investment, i.e. and after a GDI/GDP threshold of up to 
16 per cent it reverts to negative. The same negative conclusion was drawn by Cohen (1991); 
and many others. Sosin and Lin (2001) using cross-sectional estimates of the coefficient of 
foreign debt based on the total sample found that it had a negative sign, however without any 
statistical significance. According to them all available data from African countries indicate 
that foreign debt and growth rate per capita GDP were negatively related especially at high 
levels of significance.  
More studies however continued to show that higher levels of borrowing tend to negatively 
hamper economic growth. But a number of researchers went further to explain that the debt 
overhang phenomenon was more than just a drop in the investment level. For instance an 
implication of the debt overhang could lead to reduced government incentives to carry out 
difficult reforms in the areas of trade liberalisation or fiscal adjustments (Pattillo et al., 
2011a); because any activity that requires an expenditure in the expectation of an increased 
future output would be discouraged for fear of taxes by the creditors. But looking at the 
relationship between debt and growth in the light of specific features such as the quality of its 
policies and institutions, Ricci and Cordella (2010) discovered that the marginal effect of 
borrowing especially for non HIPC countries tends to be negative when the par value of debt 
was up to 20 per cent of the country’s GDP. Or where the net present value of such debt 
reaches up to 10 per cent of GDP. It was however found that those countries with sound 
policies were having relatively higher debt overhang thresholds over and above those 
countries with bad policies whom were found with lower thresholds. But good policies 
especially among the developing countries were usually as a result of outcomes of debt and 
debt renegotiations with the international financial institutions in the form of structural 
adjustments and conditionality. This is because at the centre of conditionality are the aspects 
of structural adjustment and trade liberalisation. According to Fafchamps (1996) however, 
conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt by providing a partial solution to a 
commitment problem. In certain situations conditionality promotes good policies that lead to 
the elimination of debt overhang. This is especially where conditionality comes with 
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concessionary lending of sufficient magnitude. But where it is anticipated by lenders, 
conditionality could get the IFIs and the debtor nation into a trap where the debt overhang is 
bound to persist; with conditionality continuing indefinitely.  
The issue of debt over hang however, tends to dwell on the threat of default to the creditors 
and a risk of strangulation of domestic investments as a result of high debt servicing, on the 
part of the debtor. Government policy with regard to the effective management of its debt is 
necessary if an optimal utilisation of the borrowed resources is to be made. Thus, a debt 
management strategy should relate positively with growth. The process of debt management 
involves different strategies, for example how the denomination and maturity of debt 
instruments are selected, including debt securities indexation features; how to cope with 
changes in the relative supply of debt marketable instruments and how to evolve fresh 
methods of managing public assets (Missale, 1994). Sovereign debt management operations 
may be regarded as an effort to establish and execute a strategy with the main objective of 
carrying out the management of government debt, for the purpose of achieving the following 
goals: (i) to be in a good position of mobilising the specified amount of funds required for a 
particular period; (ii) the ability to attain the government’s specified cost and risk targets and 
(iii) to fulfil the government’s important objective of developing a vibrant, effective and 
efficient market for its securities (Williams, 2009). Ricci and Cordella (2010) however, 
argued that countries with sound policies tend to record high instances of the debt overhang 
problem, thereby questioning the relevance of debt management policy.   
  Justification for Sovereign Debt Management   
Missale (1999), defined sovereign debt management as that government’s choice pertaining 
to the composition of its outstanding financial obligations in the form of their risk-return 
features. Debt management involves a variety of policies which cover aspects of choice of the 
right denomination and the maturity profile of government securities to be issued; their 
indexation process; how the supply of existing securities changes and innovative ideas in the 
form of public assets. The management of sovereign debt has been regarded to be of 
economic importance especially in the macro economic affairs of a nation. As a matter of 
fact, the function of government debt management has never been more desirable than in the 
post 2008 economic crisis world that ravaged the world financial system and economy at 
large. In the heat of the crisis around the world, nation states implemented a wide range of 
strategies with the assistance of leading financial institutions to put their economies back on 
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track and to curtail the negative impact of the crisis –  if the economy is not already deep in 
crisis. If debt distress was the major source of the economic decline facing sub-Saharan 
Africa, effective debt management by all the affected nations, as a measure to remedy the 
situation among the less developed economies would be appropriate. The effort would go a 
long way in securing the countries against the crisis and promoting the desired economic 
growth (Saleh, 2013). Weist et al. (2010), argued that there exists empirical evidence to 
support the fact that an effective debt management strategy could help middle and lower 
income countries stave off the negative effect of the economic crisis. However, debt 
management tends to become relevant when government borrowing has impacted on 
economic growth.  
Beard (1965) presented a theoretical argument that promoted a position that debt 
management could be an effective stabilization factor. The argument was popularly referred 
to as a “First Approximation,” or the “Availability Doctrine.” In other instances the theory is 
called the “Roosa Effect,” or the “Keynes Effect.” Under the theory, it was argued that the 
demand function for money2 is given as a condition where the demand for money (L) is said 
to decrease with an increase in the rate of interest (i); and increases with increases in national 
income (Y) or the level of government debt held by the public. The functional relationship 
thus shows that debt management operations can assist in restricting aggregate demand by 
prolonging the maturity of outstanding government securities through increasing debt. As a 
result a rise in D leads to a decline in the level of liquidity in the hands of individuals, where 
the desire to reverse the situation leads to an increase in the demand for money. Therefore 
given a constant money stock, an increase in money demand translates into a rise in the 
interest rate which invariably reduces aggregate demand. This implies that debt management 
operations serve as a reinforcement of monetary restraints. The demand function was 
however, found to be inadmissible because the variables i and D, as defined were mutually 
exclusive. 
The “Availability Doctrine” employed in defence of debt management operations, tends to 
assert that a rise in long term and a fall in short term interest will affect the value of the lender 
negatively. This will lead to a reduction in liquidity and will in turn force lenders to shift to 
more liquid assets. Thus an increase in government debt tends to reinforce the policy of 
                                                     
2
 (L = L (iYD), where i stands for interest, Y represents the national income and D stands for 
the maturity of marketable government debt held by the public.   
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monetary restraint due to a reduction in aggregate demand, resulting in a drop in the 
availability of credit. According to Lawrence (1965) however, the objective of the availability 
of credit can equally be achieved through an effective monetary policy via open market 
operations. Hence it would be much more effective to achieve the desired objective through 
monetary policy rather than a combination of monetary policy and debt management. As a 
“Keynes Effect”, debt management plays the role of a stabilisation tool. By means of keeping 
interest rates low in the short run, especially during periods of monetary restraints debt 
management operations are arguably a means of reducing the extent of change from demand 
for money to corporation’s held marketable short term securities. Since corporations are not 
known to attach much significance to higher yields especially in the long term. Therefore an 
increase in velocity punctuated by changes in cash balances demand tends to have its 
magnitude reduced by an appropriate and effective debt management operation. But it should 
be recognised that one other behavioural relationship needs to take place if debt management 
is to make any impact in reducing destabilising shifts in retaining cash. However investors 
that are ordinarily interested in long term instruments due to higher rates, or reduced cash 
holdings by long term investors are bound to be of smaller magnitude compared to the 
desired cash holdings as a result of  lower interest rates (Lawrence, 1965)    
Considering how an increase in the level of public debt in relation to inflationary trends and 
the impact the process has on public debt, monetary policy becomes relevant. Nastansky and 
Strohe (2015) argued that public debt and consumer prices are connected in a two-way 
relationship: The impact of debt on money supply and the aggregate demand and the role of 
the monetary authorities. Thus debt financed government spending tends to stimulate 
macroeconomic demand in the short term, with prospects of inflationary trends in the 
medium to long run. This in turn would be triggered by direct purchases of public bonds by 
the government, or alternatively through private demand of public bonds triggered by a 
simultaneous expansionary monetary policy to stabilise increasing interest rates.  This 
argument failed to strengthen the need for debt management. This is because it is believed 
that without debt management operations, monetary policy could have achieved the same 
result by simply reducing money supply by a larger margin. A question was thus raised as to 
whether debt management as a strategy is capable of accomplishing anything in difference to 
what traditional monetary policy had been used to accomplish. Lawrence (1965) observed 
that due to an error in the money demand function, there tends to be an incomplete analysis of 
the effect of the changing structure of interest rates on the behaviour of long term investors, 
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as well as on the desired liquidity of economic units. Likewise the assumption that relates to 
the behaviour of the lenders failed to be supported by any available empirical evidence. Debt 
management neutrality theory further opposed the relevance of debt and its management as a 
strategy for the attainment of a nation’s economic growth. 
 Debt Management Neutrality Theory and the Case for Debt Management  
It has been argued that, under the macroeconomic models of infinite horizon, coupled with 
complete markets, government debt is viewed as irrelevant and as a result believed to have no 
impact whatsoever on economic activity (Leong & Britain, 1999). This position was 
explained to be as a result of the practice among households that for any given level of 
expenditure which triggers higher borrowing, there always would be accompanying higher 
future taxes in the end. This argument developed into a theorem popularly referred to as the 
Ricardian Equivalence theorem. The theorem also known as debt management neutrality by 
implication as has relegated the need for government debt management. Debt management 
would thus have no impact on the economy whatsoever and is therefore not necessary. 
Buchanan (1976), however posed the query whether public debt issue was equivalent to mere 
taxation. He noted that the whole thrust of Barro’s argument backing the Ricardian Theorem 
was only to the extent that taxes and government debt basically give proportionately the same 
effect. Buchanan (1976) hence argued that Robert J. Barro (1974) based his analysis 
assuming a fictitious overlapping of species of people with fixed life spans, which naturally 
makes taxpayers to try to take advantage of future responsibilities that government debt 
represents. And if and only if the so-called capitalisation happens, then government issued 
bonds may not give any additional value to the aggregate economic growth. Hence it was 
concluded that the swap of debt in place of tax finance may not trigger any impact on total 
expenditure. 
But debt management could only be neutral and irrelevant provided a number of assumptions, 
already viewed to be unrealistic, hold. The assumptions stipulate that households seem to 
recognise that any variation in cost accruing as a result of government borrowing results in 
tax liabilities in later years, and it follows that households automatically adjust their 
consumption and savings behaviour in order to absorb the shift in government budgetary 
constraint. Secondly, taxes are assumed to be non-distortionary so much so that their 
imposition does not change economic behaviour. Thirdly, tax payers and bond holders are 
assumed to be the same which renders the relevance of concerns over distribution null. 
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Finally, there is the assumption that the choice of investment portfolios at the disposal of the 
private investors ought to contain the “same risk-return trade-offs” as given by government 
securities so much so that debts incurred by government may not necessarily create fresh 
investment avenues that were hitherto non-existent (Missale, 1999). The fact that these 
assumptions were rejected as utterly unrealistic as in the forgoing discussion, more works 
have emphasised the relevance of government debt management. Tobin (1963), observed that 
government debt can be regarded to consist of two kinds of impact. The direct effect of the 
budget occurs when expenditure is in excess of receipts. And this happens when the debt is 
being acquired. It follows that when expenditure is higher than receipt then the higher 
becomes the aggregate demand. This translates to a surplus or a deficit at the end.  The 
second effect of debt is the fiscal effect which mainly depends on the rate of borrowing than 
the size of the debt. To measure the effect here we need to measure the budget to see whether 
it is in a deficit or a surplus. Thus the debt incurred will serve as the opening balance for the 
new year.  
Debt management is however argued to matter greatly and is relevant for several reasons. 
Outlining the importance of the newly developed field, Missale (1994) argued that; (i) if 
taxes were distortionary to incentives, the process of debt management can be used to support 
the distribution of tax rates which eventually reduces distortions. In addition, if time 
inconsistency was the issue, debt can also be managed to beef up the credibility of promoting 
new policies. (ii) Provided private security markets remain incomplete, it follows that the set 
of public securities along with the implied distribution of taxes tend to determine the 
equilibrium allocation of risks. In this situation debt management can conveniently improve 
intergovernmental risk sharing. Furthermore debt management can readily provide human 
insurance to safeguard against situations of missing markets for human capital; (iii) Debt 
management tends to affect the opportunities facing investors in situations where financial 
market imperfections and other externalities arise. Thus with the markets for private 
securities, inefficiency can be minimised with the promotion of a robust market for 
government issued securities; and (iv) because the public tend to fail to take account of the 
existing tax risks, government debt management strategy is a ready tool to be employed to 
alter the pattern of risk distribution or even to change the perception that risky and cheaper 
borrowing can later be issued and the perceived insurance provided.   
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The Ricardian Equivalence Theory which opposes the relevance of debt management. can 
only be justifiable among the developed economies for instance the OECD, the USA and 
others where the domestic market is well developed, vibrant and sensitive to the central 
government’s policies. The Ricardian Equivalence Theory tends to be a valid approximation 
for the developed economies (Khalid, 1996). The theory may however lack validity and 
relevance for a majority of the countries in the lesser developed world especially those in 
sub-Saharan Africa. If the equivalence theory holds in lesser developed economies, it may 
have to follow that the IMF’s proposed programmes that are mostly on demand management 
and are tailored to control fiscal deficit policies do not affect aggregate demand (Khalid, 
1996). 
According to Smetters (1999) there was currently no agreement in the academic literature 
about the empirical relevance of the theory of debt neutrality. Even those sympathetic to the 
theory tend to acknowledge its theoretical shortcomings. For example the argument that 
government spending is on consumption type goods does not stand either. This is because if 
consumption type goods are regarded as substitutes for private consumption then private 
consumption is bound to fall heavily following tax increases. However when government 
spending is based on investment-type goods which in turn give rise to further production of 
goods and services which are regarded as substitutes for future private consumption, then any 
future private consumption will be less affected by government tax resultant from its debt; 
depending however on the degree of substitutability between production and consumption. 
Barro (1976) further contends that private debt are not actually substituted due to budget-
constraint requirements, but rather because private debt will be crowded out provided public 
debt issues result in an increase in the supply of earning assets and consequently to a rise in 
interest rates. One-to-one increase in the demand for bonds happens where the future tax 
obligations brought about by government borrowing are completely capitalised. However 
working on debt management in the process of fiscal stabilisation, Missale et al. (2002) 
casted doubts on the relevance of debt management theories which emphasise the strategic 
use of debt instruments. More academic efforts however began to question whether the 
criticism of the Equivalence Theory was valid particularly in a general equilibrium. See for 
example, Aiyagari (1989) and Evans (1991) where it was indicated that long run capital could 
become neutral to borrowing if some family lines in the economy had current bequests. 
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 Strategy in Sovereign Debt Management 
Blommestein (2009) explains the strategy of debt management to a process by which a laid 
out plan to realise a number of government’s set out objectives on debt and its liabilities. 
Thus, public debt management strategy stands for the setting up of objectives and policies for 
the management of government liabilities as well as providing frameworks for making 
portfolio arrangements and decisions in respect of certain parameters for cost and risk. 
Sovereign debt management also encompasses the important choices inherent in government 
debt management which concern the characteristics of debt instruments (Saleh, 2013). The 
process extends to include (currency) composition of the desired debt; the desired maturity 
structure and liquidity of government debt; appropriate duration of interest rate sensibilities; 
and the proportion of the domestic currency denominated debts, nominal interest or indexed 
to inflation debt to be issued. Another important aspect of the strategy of debt management is 
issue of cost and risk approach and the evaluation of the strategies in respect of the different 
projections of the forecasted costs and risks under different strategies for managing 
government finance. Wheeler and Jensen (2004) and Togo (2007), argued  that the objective 
of debt management is different from those of government fiscal and monetary policies but 
tend to overlap in the policy instruments and are not irrelevant. Missale (1999), however 
argued that the government objective of minimising the expected cost of debt and possible 
risks are not operationally useful and may turn out irrelevant. He even contended that the debt 
management objective of risk and cost reductions are not actually easy to accomplish 
especially in the absence of an appropriate determinant of the degree of risk aversion. This is 
the case despite the fact that the whole objective of real debt management is actually reflected 
in the cost-risk trade-offs. Melecky (2007), observed that debt management strategy can 
formally be considered in two forms: To serve as a set of guidelines to debt managers as to 
the costs and risks involved that could invariably refer to the structure of government debt; 
and the other serving as a benchmark where all the risk attributes are clearly spelt out and 
weighed, portraying in the process the optimal level of debt desirable at a point in time.   
Economic theory is not very specific about the appropriate response to many queries raised 
under the strategy of government debt management (Scott, 2009). However questions that are 
frequently regarded as unrelated are now seen to be relevant. The question of the appropriate 
amount of debt to be raised by a government at a given point in time and to what extent such 
an amount should be changed over time is one question; and the other question has to do with 
the aspect of composition of the debt government should issue, i.e. the type debt and how it 
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can be varied over time. According to Williams ( 2009), both the size and composition of 
government debt are relevant issues in the determination of debt management strategy. Issues 
relating to the size of debt implies a prioritisation of a country’s track record in debt 
sustainability. Debt sustainability which is not the focus of this work, is a term that is used to 
refer to the ability of a nation to maintain the servicing of its debt liabilities with no 
unrealistic tempering to its income balances and level of expenditure (Saleh, 2013). Under 
debt sustainability much emphasis is directed at the possibilities of underlying vulnerabilities 
associated with defaults and delayed servicing of debt. Debt sustainability analysis is mostly 
employed in policy and policy making decisions as well as the primary balance. It is used in 
situations where stress tests on results and alternative scenarios exposes the underlying 
weaknesses in government debt, and promotes realism in meaningful projections.  
Debt management strategy on the other hand, is however more concerned with the 
composition of government debt portfolios rather than the overall amount borrowed. For a 
debt management strategy to be viewed as ideal it is expected to be more inclined towards the 
realisation of a status of improved resistance to economic shocks; with a full 
acknowledgement of vulnerabilities arising from the composition of the debt portfolios.  
According to Tobin (1963) debt management operations could go a long way to supplement 
monetary policy of a nation to implement beneficial long term interest rate effects, as well as 
other investments and the credit market. 
Debt management strategies can be employed as an instrument for use in solving the 
problems associated with changing optimal taxation confronting various governments 
(Giovannini, 1997). There are different models of debt management strategies, which are 
based on the assumptions that given known capital markets, governments proceed to solve 
optimization problems on an objective function involving a set of constraints. Examples of 
debt management models that define the different strategies, include inflation-or foreign-
currency-indexed-debt. This strategy can be employed by a government for the purpose of 
signalling its type. Under this arrangement a government which issues real bonds is for a 
government that has no intention to inflate the economy (Giovannini, 1997). It follows that 
when markets perceive the signal, governments would be able to source funds at lower costs.   
Debt management becomes a very relevant field as a result of certain causal factors and their 
subsequent effects. The size and growth of a country’s indebtedness as measured by Debt to 
GDP ratios is a measure that generally suggests a fiscal problem facing a nation; which can 
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be both in the short or in the long run.  Secondly when government portfolios are poorly 
structured e.g. where the maturity, currency or the interest element composition are 
mismatched with too much concentration on short or foreign debt, this could lead to a 
financial and economic vulnerability and to some extent damage to a nation’s 
creditworthiness. Furthermore where a government incurred large and unfunded contingent 
liabilities; and certain exposures to economic shocks (i.e. lack of liquidity) there is bound to 
be a repercussion in the form of damage to private sector development and even inter-
generational inequality in the system. Figure 1.0 represents the debt crisis of the 1990s. 
Figure 2.1 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Williams, 2009) 
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long term debt; maximum share of floating rate to fixed rate debt; and the minimum average 
time to interest rate re-fixing (Bank, 2009). 
However, where a country has limited access to market-based debt instruments and therefore 
relies heavily on external official concessional finance, most of the outlined risk-based 
parameters may turn out to be not so relevant. This will be most probable in sub-Saharan 
Africa where the countries had weak rates of capital market development. In such instances 
the most relevant parameters to containing the risks to the debt portfolio might be assumed to 
be meeting the concessions requirements, the composition of currency, and the amount of 
debt that needed to be refinanced over a particular period and monitoring of the ability of the 
country to sustain existing debts. As a result, debt management performance assessment 
(DeMPA) was developed to assist developing countries to identify the priority areas that need 
improvement in the area of debt management (Bank, 2009). The DeMPA evaluates the 
strength and weaknesses in public debt management through a comprehensive set of 15 
performance indicators that cover six core areas of public debt management functions: 
governance and strategy development; coordination with macroeconomic policies; borrowing 
and related financing activities; cash flow forecasting and cash balance management; 
operational risk management and debt record and reporting (see Appendix A). 
 Debt Management Strategy: Indexed Debt 
Government Debt should be structured with the intent of hedging against macro-economic 
shocks. Macroeconomic shocks are known to affect government budgets; and in particular 
against aggregate output. Therefore any optimal structure of government liabilities must 
generally include securities that are regarded as risky but which are state contingent in real 
terms (Bonn, 1990). Therefore nominal and long term debt tends to portray some desirable 
features as hedges and thereby may be considered as instruments in effecting sound 
government debt management.    
Because nominal and long term debts possess some properties of sound hedging against 
potential risks they motivate the practice of issuing non-indexed debt of different maturities. 
It has been argued that risky nominal and long term debt may be used as a government 
instrument to improve the welfare of its citizen. This is made possible by the government 
taking a short position in the securities market. In addition the government does have the 
option of issuing foreign currency denominated bonds and bills in the capital market. 
Furthermore the government issue of treasury bonds and bills of various maturities may be 
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considered as a risk-free venture especially when regarded in terms of default risk. The real 
value of the instruments tend to change substantially. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006), agreed that 
fiscal policy tends to revolves around the choices bordering on expenditure, taxes and debt. 
Accordingly choices related to debt obligations invariably include maturity structure of debt 
and the decision on whether to issue nominal or indexed debts. The alternatives may even be 
extended to the decision of whether debt repayments should be made contingent on other 
external variables such as a country’s output. Calvo (1988), argued that public debts should 
be indexed. This reasoning is premised on the rationale that when a government issues 
nominal debt it is forced to monetize it by the self-fulfilling investors (the private sector). The 
fear of debt monetization by debt holders or the private sector pushes them to demand a 
higher nominal rate of interest. This will continue to the extent that government is not in a 
position to pay premium interest rates which could potentially trigger an increase in future tax 
burdens. Thus the option of monetization becomes inevitable.  
The choices between indexed and nominal debt may however become irrelevant especially if 
governments are faced with uncertainties in relation to their expenditures as well as  tax 
receipts (Alfaro & Kanczuk, 2006); and also where taxes are found to be irrelevant or 
ineffective in altering consumers’ or firms’ attitude in the market. This is argued to be 
unrealistic but where it occurs governments can resort to the choice of financing its spending 
by increasing taxes on current tax payers or outright long term bond issues that will be repaid 
by way of raising tax rates. Taxation as a fiscal measure has however been relatively 
ineffective as a policy. Generated revenue has always been a negligible proportion of the total 
revenue especially amongst the raw material producing nations of the region. While the 
institutional framework on the ground to ensure the collection of the right taxes is inefficient, 
the problem of corruption is hindering much of the gains to be tapped from the revenue 
source. Ghura (1998), observed that the average total tax revenue-GDP ratio for sub-Saharan 
African countries was about 17 per cent between 1985 and 1996. Of this number only 9 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa had a ratio of below 10 per cent and 10 countries with a ratio 
of above 20 per cent. But the choice between taxes and debt becomes relevant only in 
situations where the reality of the distortionary nature of the effect of taxes on consumers and 
firms are truly acknowledged and allowed. Debt indexation stands for the elimination of the 
pressure that leads government to monetize and as a result neutralises the expectations that 
induces government to monetize. While nominal debts offers the government the incentive to 
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default through the process of inflation; indexed debt on the other hand reduces the 
government opportunity to inflate for the purpose of reducing the real cost of nominal debts. 
In the past monetary economists such as Jevons (1885), Marshall (1887), Keynes (1927) and 
many others were in favour of government use of indexed bonds in place of nominal bonds. 
Generally nominal debts are preferred over indexed debts because there is the presumed 
stability of the price level in addition to the frictions that are associated with the index debts. 
Nominal debts are therefore regarded as a more standard form of government liability. 
Indexed debts are however preferred over nominal debts for several reasons. Firstly indexed 
debts (bonds) are known to provide the economy with a safe real asset that it would not have 
had; assets which actually are needed for optimal sharing of risks in an economy. 
Furthermore, indexed debts enjoy better preference over nominal debt because monetary 
policy tends to operate better with the use of the indexed debts (Tobin). Indexed debts tend to 
be regarded as a replacement for physical capital over any other liability held by the 
government. Because any sound and effective monetary policy should have the objective of 
controlling the market prices of the available installed capital. The variability in the quantity 
of indexed debt thus offers the opportunity for the achievement of such accurate controls 
much more than where the use of nominal debt is involved. Bach and Musgrave (1941), 
observed that Government issue of debts that indexed to inflation had the benefits of the 
following: (i) encouraging savings in the economy and also bring down the pressure of 
inflation; and (ii) indexed debts tends to give incentives to portfolio holders to reduce their 
money holdings in preference to longer term securities in the form of bonds. This would 
ensure that government deficits could be financed at a relatively lower rate in comparison to 
where nominal debts are issued. But because the government is the cause of the inflationary 
trend in the economy it is invariably and systematically cheating investors in nominal bonds 
especially the small savers among them. However with indexed bonds this problem would 
not have happened because inflation is already being taken care of. 
Most criticism of government use of indexed debt has to do with the neutrality theorem 
arguments; where Robert J Barro (1974) argued that deficits financed with debts portend no 
different effect from that obtained from taxation 
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 Debt Management Strategy: Debt Maturity 
The recent theories of debt management cover a relevant concept of debt maturity under the 
elasticity of debt value to unexpected inflation. Barro (1979), modelled the optimal maturity 
of risky market instruments in the process of government borrowing. This is where the 
optimal policy in government debt requires such a structure of government debt that 
translates the value of debt into state contingency. Thus the government tries to hedge against 
such macro-economic shocks that may impair its proposed budget. Buera and Nicolini 
(2004), outlined how the state-contingent debt structure is derived via a model with risk 
averse tax-payers. According to Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006), the maturity of debt matters 
only where there are uncertainties involved in government outlays, real interest rates and 
receipts or output. Under such situations achieving a level of optimal taxation or composition 
of market instrument maturities will require what is called the smoothening of taxes over 
certain situations. This is a process where the government will be forced to issue claims that 
are contingent on the appropriate risks. This in turn will eventually determine the optimal 
structure of debt or the choice between nominal and indexed debt on one hand and the choice 
between short and long term debt to be issued by the government. In essence we mean to 
suggest that government should make effort to stabilise taxes across many other states of 
nature, because taxes tend to be a function of debt policy. This condition clearly supports and 
defines the features of the optimal debt structure. The debt structure can therefore be used 
directly to test for optimality in the choice of debt.  
The choice from two or more different debt maturities tend to serve as a debt management 
strategy for government. This is where the longer the maturity of government debt the greater 
the gain a government makes from deflation (Giovannini, 1997). However, depending on the 
choice, long maturity debt can be very costly to a government especially if such a 
government is contemplating reducing the size of its borrowing through inflationary 
measures. Furthermore, debt management strategy can become a means of funding risk. Here 
it is argued that the lower the maturity of government debt, the more frequent the sale of 
government securities in the primary market tend to become. However, when the cost of debt 
becomes sensitive to the market rate of interest there is the tendency for the existence of 
multiple equilibria that may be characterised by oscillating interest rates; a development that 
could lead to crisis.   
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 Problems in the Development of Debt Management Strategy 
According to Williams ( 2009), there was an inherent crisis in the earlier years (1990s) 
concerning the development of an appropriate debt management strategy. Debt management 
was expected to deal with the issue of exchange rate and interest rate volatility; financial 
markets liberalisation created opportunities and the challenges arising from there. At the time 
the crises’ vulnerabilities led to poor structuring of debts and contingent liabilities and the 
realisation of the asymmetric nature of risks. Finally there was no systematic approach to risk 
where the strategic objectives of portfolios were poorly defined and there was total lack of 
understanding or data on debt balance sheets. There was an apparent confusion of the 
relevant institutional arrangements to handle debt management and strategy implementation. 
There was a crisis of authority between the central banks debt management offices, between 
debt management and monetary policy. There was a poor understanding within the 
governments about the activities in the financial markets – both market structure and market 
behaviour and there was a general lack of skills and required expertise.  
Debt management in sub-Saharan Africa may however turn out to be very difficult to 
implement. This is because the requirements necessary for an effective debt management 
system may prove extremely tough especially where the prevalence of a poorly developed, or 
a total absence of a functional capital market is the case. It had been argued that there were 
few African countries that could successfully finance a deficit that would amount to an 
equivalent of 1 per cent of such a country’s GDP through the sale of government securities in 
the domestic capital market (Roe & Griggs, 1990). Thus, the process of developing an 
effective domestic capital market may prove difficult due to the presence of both 
macroeconomic and political instability. In addition, due to the incident of controlled interest 
rates investors may become discouraged, fearing unrealistic returns. But a major deficiency in 
the ability for sub-Saharan African countries to develop an effective debt management 
strategy is the lack of an effective and stable capital market. A major objective of any 
government’s debt management policy is the ability for such a government to develop a 
viable and stable capital market. Thus, the   promotion of an effective and efficient capital 
market is directly dependent on the consistency of the frequency of a continued supply of 
government marketable securities which, in turn make possible the accessibility to a variety 
of capital instruments. The factors which tend to stifle the availability of securities in African 
markets are given below: 
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“(a) A predominance in many African countries of very small corporate sectors; (b) A heavy 
dominance within the corporate sector of public enterprises used to borrowing directly from 
government; (c) Within private corporate sectors, predominance of family owned businesses 
unhappy, possibly, about the greater disclosure and security associated with public issues 
rather than in family borrowing and lending; (d) The high costs of issuing and trading in 
securities arising from thin markets and unsophisticated techniques; (e) Fiscal disincentives 
for the issue of securities relative, for example, to borrowing from the banking system; and (f) 
The absence of any positive incentives for companies going public.” (Roe & Griggs, 1990, p. 
30). 
Sub-Saharan Africa however, tends to remain at the early stage in the process of defining a 
comprehensive medium term debt management strategy (MTDS). This, as with other many 
low income countries occurs as a result of the absence a functioning domestic public debt 
market that might assist in reducing financial vulnerabilities. This shortcoming is however 
more prevalent among countries that benefitted from the multi-lateral institutions’ 
programmes and initiatives such as the HIPC and the MDRI debt relief (W. B. a. IMF, 2007).  
In the process of debt management the minister of finance shoulders the responsibility for all 
government borrowings and the function of running of the aspect of debt management rests 
with the specified debt management office. Usually the process of delegation of authority 
gives rise to principal-agent problems; such that in the presence of asymmetric information 
the case of moral hazard may occur because it becomes difficult for the principal to monitor 
the activities of the agent. Generally it is however imperative that for the purpose of 
establishing effective agency arrangements to effectively handle the issue of public debt 
management a number of important considerations have to be taken into account (Currie et 
al., 2003). For the purpose of designing a suitable governance structure the following five 
points are necessary: (i) Debt management offices should be identified as independent and 
autonomous with clear responsibilities; (ii) Debt management offices should be specified 
clearly; (iii) Debt management offices should be afforded with incentives that will trigger the 
desirable level of effort and skills to be applied and revealed; (iv) There should be in place 
provisions for effective monitoring and risk control to cover the agent’s activities; and (v) 
The principal agency should be able to conduct monitoring functions over the activities of the 
agent. 
42 
 
To achieve an effective debt management there is the need for all government officials in 
charge of debt management, fiscal policy, monetary policy and cash management; fiscal 
policy advisors and central bankers to be brought together in harmony and to be coordinated 
for the purpose of understanding the objectives of debt management and fiscal and monetary 
policies. This is more the case especially with the existence of interdependencies between 
different policy instruments. Debt management arrangement has it that government’s fiscal 
advisors are usually responsible for carrying out debt sustainability analysis, information on 
the financial risks arising from the debt portfolio, while debt servicing projections is the duty 
of debt managers. This remains a key input particularly among countries posting high debt 
figures. A link tends to exist between a sound and effective debt management strategy, 
especially which includes a range of financial market scenarios and useful insights into the 
impact of changes in debt servicing costs on fiscal sustainability. Such results and its analysis 
can prove useful as a basis for policy coordination by governments to ensure that the policy 
mix is consistent and sustainable. It is the responsibility of the debt managers to ensure that 
appropriate communication channels are put in place to inform the government in a timely 
way about any emerging debt sustainability problems. In situations where the level of 
financial development allows, countries should separate debt management and monetary 
policy objectives and accountability. This way effective cash management contributes to an 
efficient debt management as well as assist in the implementation of fiscal and monetary 
policies. The government official responsible for debt management should work towards 
ensuring availability of sufficient cash, which is adequate enough to meet government’s 
financial obligations as they fall due. Efforts to meet this basic requirement when cash 
management practices are inadequate can result in large idle balances and over-borrowing, 
with associated negative consequences. 
 Functions of Debt Management  
A basic functional objective of government debt management is the ability to finance 
government deficits through the process of the issuing of government debt or bonds as well 
as the management aspects of government monetary financing. By so doing it is expected that 
the set objectives of maintaining a good access to market, ability to drastically minimise the 
cost of borrowing, ensuring a prudent and manageable level of risk and ensuring the 
development of an effective and efficient government securities market could be achieved. 
The function of ideal debt management therefore becomes that of securing market access; 
ability to develop a good government securities market, the establishment of a system that 
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will aid in the management of outstanding stock of public debt and general cash management 
(Blommestein, 2009).  The World Bank (1990) defined in broader terms the function of an 
effective government debt management. The Bank views effective debt management as a 
process that primarily revolves around seven major functional areas: The issues of policy, 
regulatory, resourcing, recording, analytical controlling and operating functions. The first 
three functions of policy, regulation and resourcing can easily be attributable to the executive 
aspect of debt management, and the last four have to do with active operational aspects of 
debt management. The IMF (2000), defined sound debt management as a process involving a 
careful coordination of different but important economic policy issues that are meant to 
influence the methods of sourcing external loans, how they are utilized and the assessment of 
the capacity of the borrowing nation to meet the servicing needs attached to the facility.   
In more developed economies the issue of implementing an effective debt management with 
the outputs as indicated is quite achievable. The prevalence of functional financial market 
institutions will make both the executive and operational functions of debt management 
possible. In sub-Saharan Africa however only the executive aspect can be achievable to a 
larger extent. Elizabeth (2003) observed that in developing as well as transition economies 
where domestic debt markets are not quite developed, debt management and monetary 
authorities as represented by the central banks may be forced to operate in the same portion 
of the market which is invariably one of short term maturity by nature. Eventually the 
involvement of the central bank indicates a contractionary monetary policy which in turn 
affects the ability of the debt management office to achieve its function of attaining roll overs 
at reasonable cost. This problem may leave the Debt Management Office with no option but 
to borrow from external sources.  Another factor is that the availability of a deep and active 
market may prove difficult and unfeasible in countries by characterised by frequent levels of 
macroeconomic and possibly political instability as is prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa (Roe 
& Griggs, 1990). The financial systems at any given period tend to help by offering some 
security against certain uncertainties but are unlikely to work when the situation involves 
more serious issues such as the inflationary trend that is very prevalent among the SSAs. 
 Issues in sub-Saharan African Debt  
During the debt crisis of the 1980s the debt management strategy adopted by the leading 
creditor nations was to encourage the commercial banks to reschedule repayments and by 
extension of more credits but not exceeding the equivalent of interest repayment by the 
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debtor countries in both Latin America and Africa. Jeffrey Sachs and Williamson (1986) 
noted that the debt burden is usually measured as a discounted flow of resources which the 
borrowing nations must remit to the lending countries. With much restrictions on debt relief 
Jeffrey Sachs and Williamson (1986), proposed a new debt strategy, viewing debt relief as 
necessary because it was regarded as a safety valve for countries that were collapsing under 
the debt burden. It makes little sense to argue that relief is unwise because ‘on average’ the 
debtor countries may be recovering (Jeffrey Sachs & Williamson, 1986).  
A debt management strategy was therefore promoted based on the following criteria: that 
debt relief was to play a role in a new comprehensive strategy of debt management;  that debt 
relief can and must be applied discriminately among nations, focusing on those nations 
considered most in need; that it was believed that selective debt relief would not pose any 
threat to the international financial system; that concessional financial arrangements should 
be made to increase net transfers to the debtor country where debt relief is considered not 
desirable; that the world financial markets should be made to absorb the risks of the debtor 
countries by way of encouraging multi-year rescheduling agreements, explicit interest 
capitalisation and making contingency clauses  to link capital flows to terms trade and finally 
the introduction of case by case international monitoring of debtor nations’ progress after the 
process of financial restructuring. 
Thus, several countries in sub-Saharan Africa qualified for the HIPC debt relief initiative 
commencing from the early new millennium. But then it was argued that even after the debt 
relief governments’ discount rates remained at least in the two periods before and after the 
debt relief, resulting in return to all the unwanted policies even after debt relief (Easterly, 
2002). With this development many saw debt relief as a strategy purposely for the benefit of 
the creditor nations and institutions in order to salvage and stabilise their markets that has 
been frequented by the debtor countries. Berthélemy and Vourc'h (1994), argued that the 
step-by-step strategy of debt relief as put together by the multilateral financial institutions and 
other private creditor bodies was actually packaged to systematically relieve the lending 
banks involved from the burden of the harsh debt crisis. The debt relief granted was not in 
any way too much as a benefit to the debt ridden countries, debt relief was rather meant to 
prevent the creditors from being exposed to the looming financial crisis and the danger of 
bank failure. Barry and Tomitova (2006), raised a serious ethical question on the debt, on 
which relief is claimed to have been granted. According to the researchers, incorrect and 
fictitious suggestions most of the time being made in reference to the level of poor countries’ 
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indebtedness create most of the time a wrong impression such that reneging on such stands is 
equivalent to what they think in error to be ‘debt relief’ or alternatively by stopping to make 
the whole claims the lending bodies or institutions have in a way ‘reduced their claims’ on a 
‘debtor.’ To these two researchers it follows naturally in such times of claims and counter 
claims to actually believe that there were no debts in the beginning of it at all.  
It is noteworthy however that there was actually no improvement in the economy of any debt 
relief beneficiary nation as a result of any sound policies or improved external environment. 
The slight change was simply as a result of the quantum of the debt relief and temporary debt 
relief obviously turned out to be a mere increase in free funds at the disposal of the 
benefitting nations which had no effect on the longer term debt situation of the poor nations. 
The IMF (2009), reported that the issue of unsustainable debt was yet to be completely 
resolved. According to the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) that was conducted in most of 
the year 2008, showed that about 61 per cent of sub – Saharan African countries fell under 
nations categorised under the low and moderate risk of debt distress.  
     
 Debt Relief as a Strategy in Debt Crisis 
In countries such as Argentina the dictatorship borrowed heavily from the international 
capital market, mainly at variable interest rate bank loans from the US and the European 
banks who were lending recklessly in search of higher yields, for the purpose of financing 
government and current account deficits. This led to private sector external debts increasing 
rapidly and at the time record high interest rates in the early 1980s caused a global recession 
which culminated in debt crisis in countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. The debt 
crisis which started from the latter part of the 1970s, was at a time when international private 
lending to developing country governments expanded and largely took the form of a new type 
of medium-term loan that was brokered by syndicates of internationally active commercial 
banks. The facilities were however not the classic form of general-purpose medium to long-
term credits to nations, which were usually in the form of bond issues that got floated 
domestically or in the international financial markets. Bond issues in the international 
financial markets had been comparatively slow to recover from the two world wars and the 
Great Depression, although by the 1990s, foreign and international bond issues once again 
became major instruments for foreign lending to developing country governments.  
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The syndicated loan market did not disappear in the 1990s, but turned its attention mainly to 
major corporate financings, especially within the United States, but also in Europe and 
emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. Perhaps one factor for the lower level of interest 
in additional syndicated bank lending to many of the developing country governments had to 
do with the unhappy experience with this type of lending in much of the 1980s, a situation 
where many sovereign borrowers could not service their syndicated loans according to the 
terms initially contracted. Eventually the final restructuring of the distressed bank debt in the 
early 1990s, saw the conversion of the same syndicated loans into bonds. A particular loss in 
this whole new arrangement was the fact that the international mechanism that evolved to 
renegotiate sovereign debt to international banks was flawed and failed to lend itself to being 
adapted to restructuring the bonds of debt crisis countries. This turned out to be the sole 
reason that proposals for a new sovereign debt-restructuring mechanism were seriously 
considered in the early years of the present decade. According to Herman et al. (2010), the 
Baker plan began with the acknowledgement that the debt-servicing difficulties of the major 
crisis countries, were of a more ‘structural’ character than had been accepted in the first 
stage, when temporary austerity and debt relief were the policy focus. Consequently, the 
Baker Plan called for a triad of requirements in order to restore the capacity of the highly 
indebted countries to service their outstanding debt and return to creditworthiness. Even 
though the institutional basics of the strategy followed during the first stage were preserved in 
the Baker Plan, innovations were needed to deal with consequences of the structural character 
and not merely the short-term nature, of the prescribed reforms and the desire to recover 
adequate and sustained economic growth rates (Herman et al., 2010).  
The Brady Plan introduced in the year 1999 was however a purely concerted effort at a debt 
relief package where commercial banks were given the option of choosing from a new menu 
and debt reduction of new money and debt-stock reduction options that were implemented 
within a framework of policy conditionality (Claessens, Detragiache, Kanbur, & Wickham, 
1997). In practice however very few of the commercial banks were ready and willing to 
extend fresh facilities and the Brady Plan was meant to be a debt reducing programme. The 
Brady Plan however was a plan that was mainly concerned with middle-income countries, 
who were mainly indebted to commercial creditors; which invariably had little or no 
relevance to the flight of the HIPCs. The Brady Plan was however seen to play a central role 
for macroeconomic stabilization in economic reforms through undertaken debt reductions 
(Arslanalp & Henry, 2006).  
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However, unlike in the “Brady” countries, debt relief as promoted in 1996 failed to work out 
especially among sub-Saharan countries. These countries were not actually facing problems 
of debt overhang. Debt overhang which refers to a condition where a country owes more 
money to its creditors than it would normally be able to pay (Krugman, 1988), and where a 
country tends to invest an amount far below what it would have invested if it had not had the 
debt (Jeffrey Sachs & Williamson, 1986). Furthermore in the process of debt relief there was 
no provision for the protection of the HIPCs from external shocks (Martin, 2004) where the 
multilateral institutions made little or no provision for development finance. In many 
instances donor nations are more concerned with the repayment of loans due to western 
companies (Dijkstra, 2004). These inconsistencies led to a situation where most HIPCs have 
slipped back into distress or were showing signs of distress (IMF, 2009) because the initiative 
did not provide for debt sustainability (Martin, 2004). Kuteesa and Nabbumba (2004) 
observed that in Uganda, a HIPC, debt to exports ratio was recorded to be 50 per cent higher 
than it had been before the debt relief. Uganda had however received extensive assistance 
from DRI and MEFMI long before the HIPC (CPB, 2008). With the failure of the debt relief 
initiative it is thus left for countries faced with the threat of a debt crisis to develop a suitable 
strategy for managing their debts.  
The failure of debt relief as a debt management strategy among low income countries 
especially under the HIPC initiative was because countries lack functional economic 
institutions that provide the necessary foundation for profitable investments and the 
attainment of economic growth (Arslanalp & Henry, 2006) rather than as a result of the debt 
overhang phenomenon. For the poorest countries several important policy initiatives were 
launched since the year 1997. For instance in late 1999, the IMF’s concessional lending 
facility was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The PRGF had 
its objectives broadened to include an explicit focus on poverty reduction, where Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were to be prepared by the authorities of low-income 
countries in open consultation with Civil Society and were intended to provide the overall 
framework for the international community’s support to low-income countries (Ross & 
Harmsen, 2001). The debt initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative, adopted in 1996, got enhanced in the fall of 1999 to accelerate, broaden and deepen 
debt relief for poor countries. Debt relief was directed at financing poverty alleviation where 
total assistance under the programme originally amounted to $3.5 billion in net present value 
(NPV) terms. Furthermore, the enhanced HIPC initiative that came on by the year 2000, had 
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a total assistance amounting to $20.3 billion in NPV terms all committed to about 22 
countries.  
 Operational Debt Management   
In practice an effective and efficient debt management strategy involves different financial 
and economic applications that could result in the attainment of economic growth over time. 
For instance the process of debt management may concern itself with the maturity of debt, the 
risk and the costs involved. Debt management can go further to consider the type; domestic 
or external, long or short term and whether nominal or indexed. To many people sovereign 
debts can be viewed solely as an extension of taxation by governments and vice versa.  
Sovereign debt management however represents any official action by the apex monetary 
authorities and the treasuries that are designed to alter the volume and composition of a 
national government’s debt obligations in the possession of the public (Rolph, 1957). But 
claims on the central government in the possession of individual and corporate bodies are 
however of different types (Tobin, 1963): (a) Demand obligations that are transferrable; (b) 
Marketable short term securities; (c) Long term marketable securities; (d) Securities that are 
non-marketable; and (e) Other government obligations.   
From the categorisation above it is evident that the first group represents securities and other 
deposit obligations currently issued by the central banks through the debt management 
offices. The next two groupings are securities with a maturity range of three months and up to 
forty years. Savings bonds fall under category d. The main focus of debt management was to 
reduce long run costs of a government held debt (Boothe & Reid, 1992). But Tobin in 1963 
assigned two major roles for debt management. Primarily debt management was together 
with monetary policy, achieve economic stabilisation. The secondary function of debt 
management was then, to minimise the interest cost of public debt. The principle of debt 
management was however regarded as rendering utility choices to a national government. 
This resembles an old economic idea that promotes efficiency. It therefore follows that at 
different combinations of debt, the government may derive different utilities but at different 
costs of debt. Thus, the composition and size of government debt becomes optimal when its 
marginal utility equals its marginal cost. The utility of debt results from the government’s 
revealed preference for a particular monetary stability and when an outstanding debt tends to 
affect the expenditure pattern for current output (Rolph, 1957).  
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 Domestic versus External Debt 
In the current era of a globalised world system, the traditional distinction that existed between 
external and domestic debt scarcely stands anymore. The dichotomy between the two 
different debt issues would have been possible if governments issuing debt find it possible to 
track down the ultimate holders of their bonded debts. This however is not practical. Debt 
issues made in the international market are classified as external debt (Levy Yeyati, 
Borenstein, & Panizza, 2005); while those debts issued in local or domestic markets are 
referred to as domestic debts. The composition of debt however does matter a lot in the 
process of evolving an effective debt management strategy. It is however very important for 
any debt management strategy to take into cognisance the fact that the composition of debt is 
not the real source of vulnerabilities. According to Panizza (2008), a good source of 
vulnerabilities to an economy are rather due to currency and maturity mismatches especially 
among countries with an open capital account and having a large stock of foreign or short-
term domestic debt. 
To be able to participate in a complex and uncertain globalised financial market even lesser 
developed economies need to develop and sustain a strong and viable domestic capital 
market. Just before the late 1990s domestic fixed-income securities markets were 
undeveloped in several emerging economies and almost all of the poor nations of sub-
Saharan Africa. This condition resulted in excessive reliance on external sourcing of finance, 
which invariably further exposes these countries to more external vulnerabilities, making 
their participation in the global financial system risky, threatened by shocks and difficult. 
This is because an influx in foreign exchange can lead to increases in liquidity which in turn 
poses the danger of macroeconomic instability in the form of inflation.     
Domestic debts are characteristically good to offer an equally suitable source of finance 
especially to take care of government deficits that are not wholly foreign financed. Domestic 
debts can also be employed as instruments of implementing government monetary policy. 
According to Christensen (2004), domestic debts are sources of financing open to 
governments trying to deal with economic issues related to deficits which are not totally 
financed using foreign funds and also for use in the implementation of a certain monetary 
policy. Domestic debts can be issued for the purpose of closing budget deficit gaps by 
governments faced with the problem of large recurrent deficits. Domestic borrowing can also 
come very handy in trying to achieve specified monetary policy targets. This mechanism is 
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the case where a country enjoys substantial balance of payment surpluses that could have 
been as a result of large aid inflows or revenue from crude sales. Blommestein and Horman 
(2007), however observed that debts denominated in local currency often tend to be costlier 
than those issued in foreign-currency although local-currency debts are believed to reduce 
exchange rate risks. When this happens central banks remedy the situation by issuing 
instruments of domestic debt. But Alberto Alesina et al (2009), argued that governments have 
two major ways of reducing the value of their debt riskiness. One way is by incorporating in 
the prevailing nominal interest rates a raise in inflation far above the public expectation and 
the second approach is for a government to embark on an outright default or more 
appropriately, repudiation. This is done by government use of taxes on government debt 
holdings and cancellations stemming from debt obligation laws. Any impending risk of 
default is compensated by the government pushing up costs in government finances in an 
effort to calm investors.  
Blommestein and Santiso (2007), however developed some modalities to avoid external 
vulnerabilities brought about as a result of borrowings originating from foreign markets: (i) 
Governments should endeavour to reduce both the global level of their external debt as well 
as change the composition of debt and maturities to short term debts; (ii) Governments should 
make reallocations with a view to issuing more local currency debt as well as alter the risk 
profile of all issues. Hence by decreasing foreign currency denominated debt, it follows that 
the maturity of issues is made shorter; (iii) Initiation and promotion of policies that are aimed 
at the correction of imbalances in government current accounts. Surpluses in current accounts 
lead to a decrease in external debt and directly a rise in foreign reserves. Therefore in some 
instances governments may have the choice of drawing on their foreign reserves for the 
purpose of reducing a country’s level of external debt; and (iv) Governments can reduce risks 
in the process of foreign borrowings by issuing locally denominated bonds in the 
international securities markets.   
Domestic debt financing becomes more attractive for the fact that the supply of foreign 
exchange is mostly determined by the aid agencies budget which is hinged on the agency’s 
assessment of the performance of the recipient country’s economy. More often than not 
international finance is associated with project financing which invariably cannot finance 
government’s recurrent expenditure or even a capital one that is not actually spearheaded by 
external donors.   
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 Utility of Government Borrowing 
In economics utility is understood to be the amount of satisfaction an individual derives from 
the consumption of a particular commodity. National debt has utility when government tends 
to have a preference for a particular pattern of monetary stability and where the amount of 
debt outstanding translates into changes in total expenditure in current output. An outstanding 
debt will have utility when it is effective in preventing high levels of private expenditure 
(Rolph, 1957). The marginal utility of an outstanding debt is normally positive but with the 
probability of being negative in certain conditions. The utility of debt becomes negative when 
there is a need for its reduction in order to increase private expenditure in line with a 
stabilisation policy of a government. When a current period tax reduction is financed by a 
government debt issue (Kormendi, 1983), the action tends to shift the timing of tax collection 
from the current period the next. It follows that where there is a lack of clear perception of 
the government debt and its implication in the form of future taxes by the private sector, there 
is bound to be what is referred to as a situation of “net wealth effect” which raises the private 
sector consumption which in turn impairs capital accumulation and growth. Thus, ignoring 
government spending translates into decreased private sector consumption relative to a 
reduction in disposable income. A decline in disposable income affects the utility derivable 
from the whole essence of government debt. But according to Levy Yeyati et al. (2005), 
when governments switch from external debt to domestic borrowing, this leads the economy 
to be exposed to a different type of vulnerability entirely. A shift from external sources of 
financing to domestic is tantamount to a currency mismatch for a maturity mismatch. 
Excessive use of domestic borrowing may result in excessive pressure on institutional 
investors with banks left to absorb too much government debt which will ultimately have 
negative effects on financial stability and investment known as debt overhang. The debt 
overhang theory postulates that the indebtedness of a nation turns out to be a sort of taxation 
on future output which in turn reduces incentives for savings and investment. Hofman and 
Reisen (1990), explained that the debt overhang phenomenon is believed to be the reason 
behind poor growth of investments among debt ridden nations. 
External borrowings were however found to equally have a negative relationship with 
economic growth at some level of exports and GDP. Pattillo, Poirson, and Ricci (2011b), 
argued that debt tends to have a nonlinear effect on economic growth of a borrowing country. 
They however were unable to estimate this relationship. This shortcoming notwithstanding, 
the researchers noted further that on average the effect of borrowing on per head growth 
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tends to turn negative for debt levels exceeding 160 to 170 and 35 to 40 percentages points of 
exports and GDP respectively. Furthermore the work noted that the marginal impact of debt 
turns negative even at low levels of a nation’s indebtedness. This was however found very 
difficult to estimate. There was however sufficient evidence to assert that excessive debt 
tends to generate inefficiencies. This notwithstanding a country may however embark on debt 
for purposes other than the need to offset fiscal deficits. A government could justify its 
borrowing if the objective is hinged on assisting sound investments and provision of 
infrastructures (Cohen, 1990). 
  The Cost of Sovereign Debt 
Sovereign debt should comprise of; (a) all those claims against the government which are 
held by the private sector of the local economy, or by foreigners that can be interest bearing 
or not; and (b) any other claims on that are owned by the government charged against the 
local private sector and external creditors (Modigliani, 1961).There are however a number of 
complications when it comes to the specification of the concept of national or sovereign debt. 
Besides the general administrative expenses incurred in the process of debt issuance and 
reissuance, coupons honouring and record keeping; the real cost of government debt is the 
interest commitment. Hence to form an effective and efficient sovereign debt management 
strategy, the interest aspect of debt as a principle must be kept at the lowest possible level for 
any given utility combination of debt. The interest charges are key elements of debt 
management and are treated as fixed charges that should not normally be subject to the 
control of the legislature or any other decision making process. This strategy is in turn built 
upon the government’s stated debt objectives (Melecky, 2007). Thus, the document which 
guides debt management is the strategy of debt management itself. It is argued that 
government should try to minimise the cost of its outstanding debt to satisfy the social 
objectives of its debt management.  
The view is however premised on the basis of two arguments (Rolph, 1957): (a) At some 
level of private expenditure, some are seen from a social and superior point of view than 
others; and (b) that the expenses to be incurred by government with regard to debt 
outstanding should be minimised drastically for the purpose of achieving any targeted 
stabilisation policy. Contrary to the suggestion that outstanding debt is measured as a utility 
to the government, government borrowing is regarded as a stimulating factor (inflationary). 
The notion follows that debt reduction is taken to serve only as a deflationary mechanism for 
53 
 
the government. But any change in government debt should be able to depend upon the size 
of a government’s budget surplus or deficit. According to Modigliani (1961), with a 
government’s purchase of goods and services, any increase in national borrowing may turn 
out to favour those currently enjoying the increase (in debt). Secondly, such an increase in 
government debt will invariably shift burdens to the future generations by means of a decline 
in the aggregate stock of private capital; which will also in turn inflict reductions in the flow 
of goods and services provided the net marginal productivity of capital remains positive. This 
condition would hold regardless of whether the decline in private demand prevents the 
attainment of full employment. 
However where national debt gets reduced the burden or cost of debt tends to fall squarely on 
the present generation shifting gross gains on to the future citizens. Therefore if the interest 
paid on borrowings can be approximated to equal the marginal productivity of private capital, 
the gross burden shifted forward on to the future generation mentioned earlier can readily be 
quantified by the interest charged on government borrowing (Modigliani, 1961). The cost of 
debt on the future generation can however be partly or completely offset provided any 
increase in government borrowing is accompanied by an expenditure that contributes to the 
generation of real income of the future generation. Burbidge (1983) observed however that if 
the benefits of government expenditure are neglected then private sector consumption will get 
deflated in same proportion to permanent disposable income up to the point where 
government expenditures are regarded as a replacement for private consumption goods. 
National debt is vital in government as it is modelled as a means of distributing tax 
distortions overtime (Alesina & Tabellini, 1990); where the policy is made with intent to 
even influence the choice of successor to the current government.  
 Types of Debt Instrument 
There are different types and classes of debt instrument which vary in value, maturity and 
yield. Debt instruments are however classified into three main categories: (i) Marketable 
securities denominated in domestic currency; (ii) non-marketable debt denominated in 
domestic currency; and (iii) debt denominated in foreign currency. Missale (1994), argued 
that the decision of whether a government should finance its deficits by utilising domestic or 
foreign currency denominated debt instruments is regarded as crucial in debt management 
processes. However it is only usually in countries where there is a significant amount of 
foreign currency denominated debt that the difference between the two types is actually 
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emphasised. According to Fair and Malkiel (1971), debt instruments of comparable risk 
levels and maturity and possibly with the same provisions may not have identical market 
yields. Marketable securities that are denominated in domestic currency are usually used 
more in the process of government finance. The use of marketable securities for financing 
purposes is however practiced and more prevalent in countries with developed securities 
markets as is obtainable among the OECD countries. In sub-Saharan Africa the development 
of the securities markets has been slow. In very few of the sub - Saharan African countries 
does the use of domestic instrument by governments as a debt management strategy exist. 
This is usually because with the exceptions of countries such as Nigeria, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe (Yartey & Adjasi, 2007) with listed companies of about  207, 403 and 79 
respectively, African markets are small with few listings and low capitalisation. This problem 
made sub-Saharan countries rely heavily on external sources of financing. Marketable 
securities are distinguishable through the following classifications: (i) short term marketable 
securities; (ii) medium term securities or notes; and (iii) Long term securities or bonds. 
Short term securities are securities that are issued with maturities of up to 90 days. These 
classes of marketable securities are generally considered substitutes for money. Short term 
marketable securities to a larger extent are regarded as  riskless (Chang, Hamberg, & Hirata, 
1983) and tend to pay reasonable interest. Short term money market instruments are literally 
known to be riskless. With these near money instruments it is a practice that repurchase 
agreements exist between banks and non-bank investors. Money market instruments pose no 
interest risk because the borrower must repurchase the securities involved at their issue prices 
plus interest. And even where maturity dates are fixed, beyond a day, investors needing 
immediate cash have the advantage of forming a reversal. A common example of a short term 
marketable security is the Treasury bill. Other money market securities include Certificates of 
Deposit (CDs), bankers’ acceptances; where all possess positive or at least a limited, interest 
risk when sold before maturity. Securities with medium and long maturities are classified 
based on the following types; (a) Fixed interest rate bearing securities; (b) price level indexed 
securities and real bonds; (c) variable rate securities or financially indexed bonds. 
Missale (1999), noted that long term debt may also bear maturity options. Option pricing 
formulae however are derived under certain assumptions that may not be the focus of this 
work.  Bollerslev and Ole Mikkelsen (1999), observed that the pricing of options assumed the 
price of the underlying asset tends to follow a persistent true random walk together with a 
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constant variable. The most relevant among the types of options are; (i) callable securities; 
(ii) put able securities; and (iii) convertible securities. Callable bonds are those long term debt 
instruments that offer the borrower the choice or option of redeeming the value of the 
security earlier than maturity usually at par value.  The use of marketable securities is to a 
larger extent widespread especially in industrial economies when compared to what obtains 
in their African counterparts. Records have it that some governments tend to rely more on 
external sources of funds to finance their deficits (Yartey & Adjasi, 2007) because domestic 
savings are not high enough and the banking and financial systems were undeveloped. 
 The Effect of Debt on the Domestic Economy  
In the process of borrowing, government debt strategy is bound to result in different utilities. 
Thus different instruments may have different utilities per unit of such a country’s currency. 
To prove this scenario we need to assume that debt instruments are far from being substitutes. 
Once debt instruments are seen as a close substitutes (Rolph, 1957), then there is the 
likelihood that investors would be holding the same kind of instrument and when found 
holding different types then they may end up choosing all or none of the varieties of debt 
instrument. Because debt forms are not similar it can be asserted that the utility of various 
debt instruments is positively correlated to their maturities. This implies therefore a shift in a 
combination of outstanding public debts of a certain size which reduces its average maturity 
and increases private expenditures and the opposite happens when its average maturity is 
increased. This hypothesis however is based on a number of assumptions. Firstly, there is the 
condition that the shorter the life expectancy of public debts the more it is necessary for them 
to possess the features of near “moneyness” and secondly, the marginal utility of any asset 
should be positive. It has been argued however that an asset other than cash i.e. demand 
deposit and currency, is expected to have a maximum level of moneyness when it possesses 
similar features with cash except in its expendability. Unlike in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
the financial system is still undeveloped with the absence of functional capital markets, many 
demand forms of government debt such as US savings bonds, which possesses this feature of 
moneyness.  
This observation may not however be misconstrued to mean that the market for government 
securities is out rightly imperfect, the US Treasury market for instance may be regarded as 
perfectly competitive and the same could be said for a 10-year bond, without however 
insinuating that bills and bonds are similar debt instruments. Whatever one’s definition of 
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liquidity, to say that a government bond, a speculative share, a house, are money in different 
degrees, can at best generate unnecessary confusion. It is true that money and securities are 
close substitutes, but this connection is to be found elsewhere than in the degree of 
moneyness. (Modigliani, 1944, p. 85) 
It is equally important to understand whether at all there is a particular optimal level in 
government debt instruments. While more works are developed to support optimal levels in 
government debt management (Tobin, 1963); it was however argued that there was no 
satisfactory theory of the type of debt instruments the government should issue (Fischer, 
1983). There are however new developments in the area of the interaction between 
government and the private sector especially in debt issuance. Debt management issues 
which range from the choices of maturity structure of debt or taking a decision on whether to 
index a bond can be employed as a strategy or a means of influencing the options open to 
governments. The alternative debt management strategies a government gets to implement 
are in fulfilment of its economic policy. Government may decide on the maturity structure of 
its debt in order to commit successive administrations in such a way that the current optimal 
policy is maintained (Lucas & Stokey, 1983); (Persson & Svensson, 1984), But to answer the 
question as to how best we can go about managing public debt we must try to focus onto two 
other important objectives of debt management (Missale, 1994). These two objectives are: (i) 
The establishment of a thick market for government securities; and (ii) the provision of 
human capital insurance, i.e. to place regulations that will ease borrowing constraints that 
may arise when a human capital market is missed.  
From the process mentioned above it may turn out worthwhile to address the simple query 
whether the risk-return feature of debt should be designed in such a manner that it could 
support either low or high taxes in situations where public spending tends to be 
uncharacteristically high or incomes become unexpectedly low. Debt management may seem 
to be the main instrument that can tackle these two objectives. However the objective of 
establishing a thick market that deals in government securities may have the disadvantage of 
reducing the possibilities of debt instrument diversification. This position tends to agree with 
the strategies that are referred to as risk-return.  While on the other hand the efficient tax 
approach provides that, indexing debt returns, positively to productivity shocks and 
negatively to public spending shocks, is the optimal strategy. (Missale, 1994, p. 11). But 
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generally the most important factor is the process of determining how debt returns are 
distributed. And this can best be obtained through an efficient choice of debt instruments. 
 Conclusion 
 
The chapter is relevant in the study of debt management strategies because it offers a more 
recent analysis and review of different strategies in public debt management. It has been 
established how the amount of government borrowing, its composition, maturity and source 
differs and determines the debt strategy to be employed at a given time. Debt management 
strategy is believed to be more functional and implementable in a more vibrant market and 
developed financial system, where debt management strategy becomes a tool for government 
fiscal policy implementation and the determination of successive administrations. Unlike in 
the more advanced financial systems in Europe or the USA, the HIPC in sub-Saharan Africa 
characteristically lacks both an effective financial system and a well-developed capital 
market. There is a real need for a determination of an appropriate debt management strategy 
for sub-Saharan Africa. A suitable debt management strategy could assist in the promotion of 
good governance and prospects of economic growth among the countries in the sub-region. 
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Sovereign Debt in sub-Saharan Africa 
 Introduction 
 
In this chapter focus shall be directed at sovereign debt in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with 
special attention on a number of selected countries in the region. As seen earlier, debt 
management among SSA countries may not be comparable to what is observed in more 
developed economies in Europe and the Americas. Part of the reason for this disparity is the 
absence of an effective and efficient capital market and as we shall see, the process of debt 
management itself is insufficient, as is government macroeconomic policy and debt 
management strategy.  
There is a wide acceptance that the cause of sub-Saharan Africa’s debt crisis is the result of 
what is commonly referred to as the debt overhang. The problem of debt overhang is believed 
to be the reason why many SSAs were classified as insolvent (Elbadawi, Ndulu, & Ndung’u, 
1997). Hence sub-Saharan Africa became our focus due to the fact that several of the world’s 
poorest countries are situated in Africa. Statistically, out of the 32 developing countries that 
eventually became categorised as highly indebted poor countries (HIPC), 26 (representing 
over 81%) were in sub- Saharan Africa. 
Among the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, public debt is still treated as a source of 
financing budgetary deficits. Unlike developed economies there is a wide difference between 
SSA countries with regards to the size of government securities markets (Christensen, 2004). 
Nigeria and South Africa for example, have always utilised their domestic markets, whilst 
another group have not utilised them, or have only just recently developed a government 
securities market (e.g. Angola, Mozambique and the Democratic republic of Congo). A third 
group contains countries that have either relatively small domestic debt markets or have 
recently experienced a reasonable increase in their domestic debt burdens (e.g. Ghana and the 
Gambia). 
In this chapter issues relating to sovereign debt and aspects of its management are scrutinised 
and how this relates to the type and maturity of debt in four countries; Ghana, Nigeria, South 
Africa and Uganda. The choice of Ghana and Uganda is based strictly on their HIPC status. 
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Nigeria, though a non HIPC, was chosen because it benefited from debt cancellation (along 
with other HIPCs). South Africa completes the sample as a developing economy with a sound 
domestic financial market. 
 Debt in sub-Saharan Africa  
The colonisation of Africa contributed greatly to a reinforcement of the unequal exchange that had 
been established during the mercantile era. Furthermore, the colonial masters deliberately structured 
the colonies to become predominant producers of primary products rather than manufactured goods. 
Thus, it is hardly a surprise that in the ultimate analysis, these countries failed to participate in the 
global market on a competitive basis (Ajulu, 2001). Ultimately, sub-Saharan Africa resorted to 
borrowing due to the fall in commodity prices in the late 1970s. However, according to Hoogvelt 
(1990), most of the outstanding stock of sub-Saharan debt was originally contracted at low and fixed 
interest rates in the mid-1970s. These debts were however rescheduled in the early 1980s at a time 
when floating rates prevailed. In addition, throughout the 1980s, the US dollar had added to the debt 
service burden of sub- Saharan Africa. With the advent of the debt crisis in 1982, the IMF and the 
World Bank had been commissioned and appointed to the frontier of the transnational economy to 
collect payments from and supervise credits to the third world. There were basically two groups of 
seriously indebted countries; the first group comprised of 15 so called ‘Baker’ countries consisting of 
middle income countries and Nigeria, whilst the other group comprised of 20 less developed 
countries, which were mostly in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Over the last 20 years, the IMF/WB intervention in sub-Saharan Africa has led to 
economic stagnation, widespread poverty and the disintegration of Africa’s social 
fabric on an unmitigated scale. African economies have remained small, fragile, 
and characterised by extreme poverty. According to the UN’s socio-economic 
indicators, sub-Saharan Africa today is worse than it was at the time of political 
independence in the early 1960s. Thirty three of forty one heavily indebted poor 
countries are in Africa. The debt burden of this group alone stood at $245 billion 
in 1996. The combined GDP of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa – excluding 
South Africa – remains a paltry US$300 billion. Real GDP fell by 42.5% between 
1980 – 1990 (Ajulu, 2001, p. 29).  
The size and structure of sub-Saharan African debt tends to follow a similar pattern to those 
recorded among other notable developing countries. The peculiar external source of SSA’s 
debt was however a result of a number of factors. These are both endogenous and exogenous 
factors, with the latter being more influential on the size, as well as the structure of 
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borrowings over the last three decades. The endogenous factors were routine and included 
issues such as the misallocation of funds and excessive military spending (Riddell, 1992) 
whilst the exogenous factors mainly include the declining terms of trade, as well as the 
prevalent droughts in the sub region. The fact that most of sub-Saharan countries’ economy is 
heavily reliant on commodity exports is also a factor in the process of their indebtedness. 
According to Krumm (1985) transitory commodity price booms coupled with ease of access 
to private financial and trade credits offered by western credit institutions and an upsurge in 
expenditure among exporting SSAs, contributed substantially to the size and structure of sub-
Saharan debt. Although the trend has changed dramatically since the late 1990s these factors 
remain what shapes the borrowing policy tendencies of governments in sub-Saharan Africa.  
For instance, the real stimulus of the expansion of sub-Saharan African countries’ external 
debt was due to the 1970s commodity export (oil) boom, and a bust in the prices in the 
international market. These sudden fluctuations affected most sub-Saharan economies. These 
increases in commodity prices led various exporting countries to increase their government 
expenditure that were mostly financed by renewed access to credits, but later became saddled 
with excessive external debts due to a sudden fall in commodity prices, which included crude 
oil. Cote d’ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria who were coffee, cocoa, and oil producing nations, 
experienced an increase in prices between 1973 to 1975; 1973 to 1977; and 1974 to 1975 
respectively. Countries affected by the sudden drop of their export prices responded by a 
sharp increase in expenditures. External debt as a means of finance jumped in most countries. 
In Nigeria for example, recourse to external debt was not very substantial until in 1978.   
The external factors that influenced the structure of SSAs debts includes expanded access to 
external sources of lending, resulting from the rapid evolution of the international banking 
system, especially after the post 1973 oil shocks where the banks played the vital role of 
recycling the substantial oil producing nations’ surpluses. Thus, the Euromarkets suddenly 
became another source of financing for many sub-Saharan African countries’ governments, 
who had hitherto never borrowed from them in the past (Krumm, 1985). Furthermore most of 
the commercial banks’ lending in the mid/late 1970s was linked to certain projects where the 
distinction between banks, suppliers and other credits were not clearly made. Export credit 
institutions also played a role in the huge size and external source of debt in SSA. This was 
where export credit was directly extended through official bilateral agencies who were 
officially guaranteed by export credit agencies and the credits stood to be converted to 
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official credit in the event of credits falling into arrears or rescheduling. Public sector 
expenditure increased as a result of expanded access to fresh avenues of raising funds as well 
as improvements in commodity prices for sub-Saharan oil importers. Much of the contracted 
debt went into financing large public investment projects that spanned a range of economic 
efficiency.  
Another equally important factor that affected the size of SSA borrowings involves shocks as 
a result of the global economic recessions of the early 1980s. This contributed to a decline in 
export earnings among the commodity exporting countries in SSA. This development not 
only led to a fall in terms of trade, but also to pressure on the current account by these factors 
led to the expansion of the external debt in SSA. In a departure from this view, Greene 
(1989b) views the problem of external debt among SSAs as largely a result of government 
actions, in particular the accumulation of external debt for the purpose of development 
projects. Furthermore these projects were sometimes erroneously initiated with donor funding 
and with heavy foreign financing in the form of loans. However, many of the development 
projects were either designed specifically to improve on domestic industry and infrastructure 
rather than to boost export production, or perhaps as a result of the activities of the Economic 
Hit Men (EHM). Perkins (2004, pp. xiv - xv) noted his role as an economic hit man: 
We build a global empire. We are an elite group of men and women who utilise 
international financial organisations to foment conditions that make other nations 
subservient to the corporatocracy running our biggest corporations, our 
government and our banks. Like our counterparts in the Mafia, EHM provide 
favours. These take the form of loans to develop infrastructure, electric 
generating plants, highways, ports airports, or industrial parks. A condition of 
such loans is that engineering and construction companies from our own country 
must build all of these projects. In essence most of the money never leaves the 
United States; it is simply transferred from banking officials in Washington to 
engineering offices in New York, Houston or San Francisco. 
Essentially, EHM are highly paid professionals who cheat countries around the globe out of 
trillions of dollars. They funnel money from the World Bank, the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and other foreign ‘aid’ organisations into the coffers of 
huge corporations and the pockets of a few wealthy families who control the planet’s natural 
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resources. All this happens through false economic projections for the countries to accept 
billions of dollars in loans they certainly could not afford  
In sub-Saharan Africa, a new institutional approach in the area of public debt management 
was readily adopted. Nigeria established a separate debt management office in 2000, with the 
objective of carrying out an effective management of Nigeria’s debt for development and 
economic growth (DMO, 2015). Beside Nigeria however, the majority of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (e.g. Ghana, Cameroon and Uganda), continue to have their apex banks and 
ministries of finance as the case may be to handle issues concerning debt and its management 
(Bangura, Kitabire, & Powell, 2000). But the term debt management tends to be loosely 
applied especially among the few sub-Saharan African countries where independent debt 
management offices happen to exist. For instance, the issue of cost of borrowing or the risks 
inherent in the process of government debt tend not to be prioritised. Bureaucratic red-tape-
ism, which hinges on corruption and mismanagement, remained entrenched and eventually 
with dysfunctional institutions, management is dictated by the executive. The bulk of debt in 
sub-Saharan Africa is externally sourced. By the end of the 1990s sub-Saharan Africa found 
itself engulfed in a debt crisis that culminated into a clamour for debt relief. Because sub-
Saharan Africa lacked a developed capital market there was increased reliance on external 
debt sources, mainly from multi-national financial institutions such as the IMF, the World 
Bank and ADB; and from lending bodies such as the Paris and London clubs.  
 Interest Element on External Debt 
The interest element on external debt of sub-Saharan African countries has been a major 
factor in the current size of their debt portfolio. While there have been arguments against the 
exorbitant interest charged on some of the facilities granted to Africa, interest continues to 
increase at an accelerated rate over the years. For instance international real interest rates 
jumped from low and sometimes negative rates in the 1970s to over 8% at the beginning of 
the 1980s. It has been argued by Schmitt (2000) that in reality the LDCs will only be rid of 
their external debt burden after they have been charged interest twice. The World Bank 
statistics elaborated on over 16 consecutive years for 133 countries affected. The work 
portrayed the double interest payment within the imperfect system of the international 
settlement witnessed currently.  
All interest was shown to be first settled by the residents, who bear the principal of the 
external debt and additionally by their country’s international reserves. This process had led 
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to the excessive size of external debt among most sub-Saharan African countries. 
International real rates of interest charged on loans which were very low and at some points 
negative in the 1970s suddenly recorded an exponential rise in the beginning of the 1980s to a 
figure as high as 81%. This development changed the status of sub-Saharan Africa’s external 
debt status and had a serious negative effect on their economies and ability to pay. As a 
result, interest serviced by SSAs stood at a high 31% of total exports of goods and services in 
1978 (Krumm, 1985) and by 1983, interest paid by the indebted nations of sub-Saharan 
Africa had reached 91% of total exports.  
  Debt Management in sub-Saharan Africa 
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been found to rely more on external debt in comparison 
to their developed counterparts. Relatively, SSA countries tend to find it difficult to issue 
larger amounts of longer-term, local currency debt than their richer counterparts. This, the 
lesser developed economies cannot appropriately accomplish, even in their own domestic 
markets (Alfaro & Kanczuk, 2009). It has been argued that excessive debt that is dominated 
in foreign currencies and short term liabilities may have the repercussion of unnecessarily 
exposing the borrowing economy to vulnerabilities in the form of, for instance, changes in 
market sentiments, sudden stops and rollover risks. Two measures are promoted to tackle this 
situation: The strategies of extending debt maturity and debt indexing. 
Public debts should be indexed in situations where a nominal debt is faced with no option but 
to monetize as a result of pressure from the self-fulfilling expectations of a private sector. 
Debts are indexed against perceived inflationary trends. According to Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1989), when bond holders begin to fear that governments may resort to monetisation, there is 
a tendency for them to demand higher interest rates. This process may persist until such a 
time as when the government would rather respond by the anticipated monetisation than go 
for the alternative offered by monetisation. The option of debt indexation saves the 
government from inevitable monetisation, as well as the public driver for the demand for 
monetisation. Indexing debt in lesser developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa may 
however be difficult, if not impossible. Because the stock markets in SSAs are not effective 
enough for major adjustments and decisions such as indexation, this important aspect of debt 
management can actually affect their ability to adopt certain strategies, especially those 
concerned with debt indexation, inflation and taxation. Yartey and Adjasi (2007), noted that 
critics of the stock market in SSAs argued that the markets were not performing quite so 
64 
 
efficiently and as a result the African states might not have found it feasible to promote stock 
markets, especially considering the huge sums involved.  
As a result of the progressive development of financial markets (both domestic and external) 
the more advanced economies of many African countries recorded an increase in the overall 
internationalisation of their markets, the development and introduction of various financial 
products (which in turn allowed for riskier and larger financial investments)  saw the 
evolution and rising role of new actors in the financial markets (particularly institutional 
investors), and a new drive towards the establishment of stock markets. Furthermore, the 
manner in which the advanced economies utilise the level of development of their financial 
trade and exchange services to their advantage in the world trade organisation (WTO) 
actually encouraged the development of capital markets in Africa. 
This development influenced the establishment of stock markets in Africa and the process of 
liberalisation of capital assets has likewise been linked to this. It is expected that a developed 
and vibrant stock market in Africa will go a long way to boost domestic savings and in turn 
trigger a rise in the quantity and quality of investments. Implied by this is the issue of debt 
overhang, which is said to be excessive and to have accumulated sovereign borrowing, which 
impedes on domestic investments (Elbadawi et al., 1997) in an economy. More importantly 
however, stock markets are believed to serve as an important factor, enhancing the smooth 
operation of the domestic financial system in general and the capital market in particular 
(Kenny & Moss, 1998). Stock market development has the potential of promoting growth in 
domestic economic revival, especially since it encourages increased investments.  
It has been argued that stock market prices fail to reflect the actual underlying fundamentals, 
especially where speculations result in fluctuations in the market (Binswanger, 1999). Prices 
are said to be determined through the process of discounting expected future cash flows and 
in accordance to the stock market approach, the process is expected to reflect all the available 
information regarding the fundamentals. This translates into creating a stock market that 
develops its own speculative growth dynamics, which in itself could be guided by irrational 
behaviour. But Bhide (1993) noted that stock market liquidity has the tendency to negatively 
influence corporate governance, since a very liquid stock market could push investors into 
ambitious irrational speculations. 
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 Domestic Debt and its Availability in Sub-Saharan Africa  
Recent works have indicated that domestic debts are turning into more interesting areas of 
investigation in comparison to external or international borrowing (Guscina & Jeanne, 2006). 
Thus, when attempting to determine the optimal size of debt government securities, which 
comprise mainly of domestic debt, instruments of short and long-term maturities are normally 
considered. However, in more developed economies and the emerging markets, even debts 
that are issued abroad are of medium maturity and denominated in foreign currency. Debt 
should be structured in order to protect against macroeconomic shocks that affect the 
government budget and the negative effect on aggregate output. The choice of an optimal 
structure of government liabilities is achieved with a view to contain the risks inherent in 
government borrowing; therefore it involves risky domestic debt instruments 
The phenomenon of debt overhang is often associated with the strangulation of domestic 
savings and invariably, investments due to accumulated charges, repayments and penalties on 
external loans. It is therefore argued that domestic borrowing by governments is what really 
causes the deterioration of their ability to save and invest. There is a need for a well-
articulated strategy to handle debt in SSAs. Macro-economic policies in sub-Saharan Africa 
must be capable of specifying the appropriate amount of domestic debt to be contracted by a 
country in its effort to correct its balance of payments situation. The domestic debt method of 
finance was never a new phenomenon in Africa, it has simply been very insignificant when 
compared to the way in which external sources are utilised. Christensen (2004) noted that the 
average ratio of domestic debt has recorded an increase from 11% to 15% of GDP between 
the 1980s and the 1990s.   
Table 3.1 shows how sub-Saharan African nations utilised domestic debt as a mechanism for 
financing government deficits and the promotion or implementation of economic policy. It is 
clear from the table that most countries in sub-Saharan Africa made little or no use of 
domestic sources of finance. For example, countries such as Angola, Botswana, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe had no domestic debt 
between the 1980s to 2000. These countries either had no access to their local financial 
resources, or their capital markets were undeveloped, or were otherwise completely non-
existent. Of those that patronised the domestic debt markets, the amount representing the 
domestic debt share of total debt was most insignificant. For the three periods under review; 
1980 to 1989; 1990 to 1994; and 1995 to 2000 these included Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
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Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leon, Rwanda, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with a domestic debt to total debt ratios of  
below a third of total debts or 33%, except Zimbabwe, which recorded an almost balanced 
distribution between domestic and external markets (Christensen, 2004). South Africa was 
the only African nation with a wholly domestic source of financing, recording zero external 
borrowing and 100% domestic debt. In the first period, Uganda recorded zero domestic 
borrowing; 100% external finance. In the second period, 1990 – 1994 it had an insignificant 
ratio of domestic debt to total debt at a low 1%. By the third period its domestic financing 
had reached 14%.   
Based on the trend above it can be deduced that at low levels of domestic finance there is a 
higher likelihood of debt related distress, or the country being downgraded to the level of 
HIPC. The row in Table 3.1 showing average borrowing for the 27 SSAs depicts this when 
taken in relation to the next rows of HIPC, Decision Point, Eligible and Non HIPC. When 
average domestic debt was at 11, 21 and 15, corresponding HIPC and Non HIPC of 9, 6 and 
8; and 14, 18 and 23 percentages were recorded respectively for the three periods. In contrast, 
an average ratio of external debt of 87, 87 and 103; a corresponding high ratio of HIPCs of 
56, 124 and 156 was recorded. Unlike under the domestic debt case, here the non HIPC 
number fell short of those countries heavily reliant on multilateral aid and debt forgiveness at 
39, 40 and 35 for the three periods under review respectively. 
 
67 
 
 
Table 3.0.1: Domestic and External Debts (1990-2000). 
S/N
o 
Country Type of DD 1/ 
1980-
89 
1990–
94 
1995-
00 
1980-
89 
1990-
94 
1995–
00 
1980-
89 
1990–
94 
1995-
00 
1980-
89 
1990-
94 
1995- 
00 
      
Domes
tic Debt 
  
Extern
al Debt 
    
Total 
Debt 
  
Domes
tic 
Total 
Debt (%) 
1 Angola 
  
0 0 0 158 113 81 158 113 81 0 0 0 
2 Botswana 
  
0 0 0 5 4 10 5 4 10 0 0 0 
3 Burundi TB,TC 3 2 6 40 96 138 44 98 144 8 2 4 
4 Cape Verde TB 0 11 34 42 42 40 42 53 74 0 20 46 
5 Congo Dem. Rep of the 0 0 0 50 126 254 50 126 254 0 0 0 
6 Ethiopia TB, B 16 19 10 31 115 109 47 134 120 34 14 9 
7 Gambia TB, DN, S 3 13 23 80 84 104 83 96 127 3 13 18 
8 Ghana TB 12 8 24 19 55 83 32 64 106 38 13 22 
9 Guinea TB 
      
0 0 91 
        
… … 
10 Kenya TB,B,S 21 23 22 61 77 52 81 100 74 25 23 29 
11 Lesotho TB,B 8 8 5 40 49 58 48 58 62 17 15 8 
12 Madagascar TB 3 3 3 71 120 110 74 123 113 4 2 2 
13 Malawi TB,S 13 8 9 65 100 126 78 109 135 16 7 7 
14 Mauritius TB,S 27 29 33 39 21 15 66 50 48 41 57 69 
15 Mozambique 0 0 0 75 207 121 75 207 122 0 0 0 
16 Namibia TB 0 8 19 0 4 2 0 12 21 … 69 89 
17 Nigeria TB,B,TC,S 28 29 16 49 93 80 77 122 97 37 24 17 
18 Rwanda TB,B 8 9 5 17 55 70 25 65 75 31 14 7 
19 Sao Tome and Principe 0 0 0 155 422 643 155 422 643 0 0 0 
20 Seychelles TB,B,S 14 45 68 29 24 20 43 69 88 33 65 77 
21 Sierra Leone TB,B,S 13 5 7 34 94 143 47 99 150 28 5 5 
22 South Africa TB,B 30 37 45 0 0 0 30 37 45 100 100 100 
23 Swaziland TB,B,S 4 1 1 20 21 16 24 22 17 16 5 7 
24 Tanzania TB,S 26 6 12 71 131 100 96 137 112 27 5 11 
25 Uganda TB,S 2 1 2 0 73 57 2 74 59 100 1 4 
26 Zambia TB,B 25 9 6 134 178 196 159 186 202 16 5 3 
27 Zimbabwe TB,B.S 35 29 37 27 34 48 62 63 86 56 45 44 
  
Average 
  
11 12 15 49 87 103 62 102 118 25 19 22 
  
HIPC 
  
9 6 8 56 124 156 69 138 169 22 6 6 
  
Dec point reached (2) 10 7 8 58 126 150 73 143 164 25 7 7 
  
Eligible (3) 
  
2 1 3 45 111 196 47 112 199 4 1 2 
  
Non-HIPC (4) 14 18 23 39 40 35 53 59 59 30 35 40 
Source: (Christensen, 2004) 
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From the outset, it is evident that domestic debt and its consideration is vital to any 
government debt management strategy, especially when the objective is to reduce the 
complications that come with external debt. Domestic debt is known to mitigate the 
problems associated with patronising foreign sources of finance. Stability in currency 
exchange and general prices is ensured when borrowing is denominated in local 
currency. Kahn (2005) argued that a country having a prior experience in issuing 
domestic government bonds in the domestic stock market would likely have an edge 
on being successful when it decides to issue sovereign bonds in the international 
market. Furthermore, Fry (1997), argued that market based domestic debt tends to 
have the advantage of the least cost method of financing budget deficits when 
compared to the external debt alternative.  
On the other hand, Hauner (2006), found that commercial banks that regularly 
allocate and make credit to governments tend to result in higher profitability, but end 
up being less efficient in service delivery in comparison to other banks in the industry. 
Consequently the absence of efficiency will relegate competition and may eventually 
extinguish the zeal of banks to mobilise deposits that could transform investment 
funds into private sector funds. Furthermore, reducing the size of domestic debt in 
relation to the gross domestic product and deposits may have the tendency of exerting 
a negative impact on financial market development and the process of detachment 
from the shackles of foreign aid dependency long impeding African nations’ 
development.  
Government domestic debt instruments, when traded in the domestic stock market 
tend to provide savers with an attractive alternative to capital flights, due to the fact 
that there is a local avenue for investors which is cheaper, stable and less intricate (del 
Valle & Ugolini, 2001). With this method, all saved funds stand to be ploughed back 
in the form of investments, thereby avoiding the effect of debt overhang. In addition, 
Carey, Gulde, Christensen, and Pattillo (2006) argue that government securities are 
vital for the conduct of indirect monetary policy operations. According to them, a 
well-developed domestic debt market would make it easy for the Central Banks in 
such a way that they would not need to depend on external links and instruments that 
could prove distortive. Yields on government securities are known to serve as a 
benchmark for future longer term private debt issued by commercial banks, and in the 
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process promoting the development of corporate bond markets this will go a long way 
to boost competition between banks in the sector (Fabella & Madhur, 2003).    
  Maturity and Composition of Domestic Debt  
Another very important determinant of good sovereign debt management is the issue 
of the composition of debt instruments, since as we have seen in the previous section, 
domestic sourcing of financing could help sovereign governments as a debt 
management strategy. Domestic debt is noted to prevent many sub-Saharan African 
nations from the debt crisis experienced by the HIPCs. Domestic debt playing the role 
of an alternative source of finance to the external source tends to minimise the 
exposure of a country to the inherent vulnerabilities in the form of risks of reversal of 
capital flows and external shocks (Presbitero & Arnone, 2006). It is further argued 
that by exploiting the domestic market, locally developed securities can serve as ready 
substitutes to external financing and thereby help to stall the unnecessary build-up of 
foreign currency denominated debt, which comes packaged with exchange rate and 
devaluation related risks. Domestic debt on the other hand is relatively devoid of 
inflationary effects associated with external financing used in government monetary 
policy to tackle deficits. When managed well, domestic debt is known to minimise a 
government’s exposure to risks associated with interest and foreign currencies. A 
developed government securities market will go a long way to support the 
implementation and the transmission of an efficient monetary policy, which will 
eventually become essential in the process of achieving meaningful economic growth. 
The maturity structure of government debt can however affect both the cost and risk 
advantages enjoyed through the use of domestic debt instruments. Christensen (2004) 
argues that governments in sub-Saharan Africa must attempt to issue only those debt 
instruments which possess the appropriate maturity length. The maturities of 
government securities should be chosen to reflect the maturity structure of short-term 
current and long-term capital expenditures. Here we shall examine the existing record 
on the structure by type of instrument and term to maturity of some selected sub-
Saharan African countries for the period 2001 to 2012. We tried not to give an 
estimate of figures, though data on domestic debt especially was very difficult to 
generate. This informed our choice of Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and South Africa. As 
with Missale (1994) our analysis is designed to provide information on the risk-return 
70 
 
characteristics of public debts. The presentation of this information is accomplished 
through a process of examining the components that determine the risk-return 
characteristics of public debt. These features are: currency denomination, terms to 
maturity, indexation features, options provisions and marketability. Because we are 
trying to understand government debt, how it works and how it affects real 
government policy decisions, then it is of utmost importance to study the relationship 
that exists between the extent of debt and its maturity. 
 Composition of Debt by Country 
In this section specific country experiences are examined. As seen in the preceding 
sections of this study, most sub-Saharan African countries rely on external sources of 
financing in order to correct their budget deficits. Thus, debt in a number of selected 
countries with relatively developed and functional domestic markets would be 
investigated, namely; Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Ghana.  
In the following section the analysis is intended to provide information on the risk-
return characteristics involved in government debt. Information is presented through a 
process of examining those debt components that determine the risk return features of 
government debt. These features include currency denomination and term to maturity. 
Notably in the African security markets indexation, features and option provisions are 
rare or completely absent. However, where these features exist it is the aim of the 
study to enumerate on the securities’ maturity and marketability and in trying to 
understand government debt and how it affects real government policy decisions it is 
viewed with utmost importance to study the relationship that exists between the extent 
of debt and its maturity.     
  Nigeria  
Although Nigeria has never been classified as a HIPC, it is a country that has 
benefited from debt cancellation, which amounted to the equivalent of $18 billion 
(Okonjo-Iweala, Soludo, & Muhtar, 2003). Nigeria’s debt record however started with 
a paltry debt stock of $1 billion in 1971 and by the end of 2005 Nigeria had incurred  
foreign debt close to $40 billion with over $30 billion of that amount owed to the 
Paris Club (Aina, 2006). Because Nigeria was not classified as a HIPC it was at first 
difficult to convince the international lending bodies to consider cancellation for 
Nigeria, even though the combined debt liability of the 18 HIPCs favoured for debt 
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relief would not have exceeded that of Nigeria. Without debt cancellation Nigeria 
would be paying $2.3 billion annually on debt servicing alone; with the total reaching 
$32 billion between 1985 and 2001. This debt figure was actually the result of the 
accumulation of outstanding interest payments and penalties for delayed interest 
payments over the years. Thus, Nigeria pushed for a debt cancellation and was able to 
secure a deal in 2006. Nigeria made a down payment of $12 billion in order to get $18 
billion outright written off. The deal was a remarkable reduction in the country’s debt 
liabilities. However, for a country with an annual budget of between $3-4 billion, to 
make such an immediate down payment was a monumental long term financial and 
economic commitment and sacrifice, especially considering a fraction of the amount 
was direly needed for health and infrastructure projects in the nation. J. D. Sachs, 
Botchwey, Cuchra, and Sievers (1999) note the debt burden during relief or 
cancellation tends to fall heavily on a country’s budget, on line ministries such as the 
ministry of health and grants went to finance extra budgetary activities as established 
by the donors. 
  Composition of Public Debt by Type in Nigeria 
Since its debt relief, Nigeria as a country has tried to manage its debt with the 
establishment of a debt management office in 2000. The DMO was charged with the 
responsibility of co-ordinating the management of Nigeria’s debt. As of 31st 
December, 2013, Nigeria’s total public debt stood at $64,509.95 million. Of this 
amount $55,688.05, representing 86.32% was domestic debt and the sum of $8,821.90 
million or 13.68% was from external sources 
Table 3.2: Composition of Debt by Type – Nigeria 
Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Short DD 5223.77 6064.13 6380.9 6560.56 6626.6 5472.44 4922.26 3595.65 5403 8561.38 11026.9 13628.6 
Long DD 3864.52 3572.23 3902.9 3,754.24 5202.17 8332.75 13653.9 14082.9 16467.12 21952.95 24856 28340.56 
Ext. Debt 28347 30991.87 32917 35944.7 20477.97 3544.49 3654.21 3720.36 3947.3 4578.77 5666.58 6527.07 
Debt 
Ratio 1.18 1.28 157 1.9   11.8 12.5 11.6 15.4 17.8 6.9 19.7 
Source: DMO Annual Reports and author’s computation 
 
Table 3.2 shows Nigeria’s public debt by type of instruments recorded in millions of 
US dollars. The proportion of short term debt, which mostly consists of treasury bills, 
is shown to be steadily rising at an increasing rate between 2001 and 2005, then it is 
dropping off briefly in 2006 and 2007. This perhaps might not be unconnected to the 
secured debt cancellation which freed the government’s funds for important projects 
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that the treasury bills would have been used to cover. The instrument of treasury bills 
picked up momentum and continued to rise up until the end of 2012 at $13,629 
million representing 32.47% of total domestic debt.  
Long term domestic debt was 67.53% as of the end of December, 2012. However, 
looking closely at the trend of long term domestic debt over the years from 2001, it is 
clear that until the year 2006, the choice had always been unfavourably compared to 
its short term counterpart. The trend indicates that from the debt cancellation, 
governments tend to patronise the long term debt alternative more. The patronage of 
long term domestic debt suddenly picked up, more than doubling the amounts of the 
short term domestic debt sources with recorded figures of $13,654 million, $14,083 
million, $16467.1 million, $21,953 million, $24,856 million and $28,341 million; in 
the financial years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. There were 
substantial increases in 2006 and 2007 with $5202 and $8332.75 respectively.  
Prior to these periods, the Federal government was keener on short term debt, which 
was preferred over long term debt. Thus, before the debt cancellation in 2006 more 
short term domestic debt was recorded compared to long term debt. After 2006; after 
cancellation there was more long term debt. Is there a correlation between short term 
domestic debt and debt distress, or is there a relationship that exists between longer 
term and growth in real investments? The picture we see tends to go against the 
popular debt overhang hypothesis. Debt overhang actually happens in domestic debt 
rather than external debt (Abbas & Christensen, 2007). This is because longer term 
domestic debts tie down funds and tend to strangulate local investments.  
Figure 3.1: Debt Composition by Type – Nigeria 
 
Figure 3.1 represents the data presented in table 3.2; in a bar chart form. The figure 
shows short and long term domestic debts, external debt and debt ratios recorded in 
Nigeria over the years between 2001 and 2012.   
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Table 3.3: Composition of Domestic Debt by Instrument – Nigeria 
Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
FGN Bonds 0 0 72.56 72.56 250.83 643.94 1186.2 1445.6 1974.9 2901.6 3541.2 4080.1 
NTBs 584.54 733.76 825.1 871.57 854.83 695 574.92 471.93 797.48 1277.1 1727.9 2122.9 
Treas. Bonds 430.61 430.61 430.6 424.94 419.27 413.6 407.93 402.26 392.07 372.9 353.73 334.56 
Dev Stock 1.83 1.63 1.47 1.25 0.98 0.72 0.65 0.52 0.52 0.22 0 0 
Prom Notes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63.03 0 0 0 
Total 1017 1166 1330 1370.3 1525.91 1753.3 2169.6 2320.3 3228.1 4551.8 5622.8 6537.5 
Source: DMO Annual Reports 
 
Table 3.3 shows the composition of Nigeria’s public debt as of December, 2012. The 
composition of Nigeria’s public debt however consists of two major types of debts.  
All debts reported were sourced internally from the local, domestic market. The 
structure of debt here does not specify any domestic debt that is denominated in a 
foreign currency. The composition strictly specifies the maturity of government 
public debt over the period under review. The debt figures recorded in the table can be 
categorised into short term and long term debts. The short term debts mainly comprise 
of treasury bills and promissory notes. The long term debt on the other includes the 
federal government of Nigeria bonds, treasury bonds and the development stock. 
A closer scrutiny of the domestic debt trend reveals that up until 2006 when the 
federal government’s bond almost equalled the value of treasury bills issued with a 
first time high figure of $643.94 million against $695.0 million recorded under the 
treasury bills. From 2007 to 2012, the growth in domestic long term debt was 
astronomical, where amounts averaged at double the figure recorded under the short 
term security of treasury bills. FGN bonds were reintroduced in 2003 through 2004, 
2005 and reached a substantial proportion of the total public debt in 2006, with 72.56, 
72.56, 250.83, and 643.94 million dollars respectively. Incidentally, 2006 was the 
year Nigeria secured the cancellation of its external debt, thus the sudden shift in the 
source of public debt from short term to long term might be to ensure the liquidity to 
the government in the absence of external sources. Longer term debts tend to ensure 
liquidity to government. Long term domestic debts are however seen to tie down 
funds and choke much need domestic investment. 
The trend in domestic debts does not however show any indexed debt or any foreign 
currency denominated domestic debt. The fact that no debt instrument is issued with 
an adjustment for inflation makes all the debt instruments to be of the nominal debt 
category. Nominal debt holders are however said to be on the receiving end as the 
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government creates inflation without making adequate provisions to compensate the 
small savers who, invariably, are the investors in government debt instruments.   
Figure 3.2: Domestic Debt Instruments – Nigeria 
 
Figure 3.2 represents the data in table 3.3. The domestic debt instruments issued by the 
government of Nigeria are shown in the form of bar charts.  We have the federal government 
bonds, Nigerian Treasury Bills, treasury bonds, development stocks and the promissory notes. 
From the trend federal government bonds took the largest proportion of the total domestic 
debt in Nigeria. 
Table 3.4: Composition of Public Debt - S/Africa 
TYPE 2000 2001 2002 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 2010 
201
1 2012 
Foreign currency 
den debt 24.9 24 25 27.4 27.9 28.1 35.3 45.1 44.1 42.1 45.2 50.9 53.2 
Bearer bonds 5.5 6 7.8 9.7 9.7 9.1 10.5 15.2 13.9 15.4 16.5 20.9 22.9 
Converted long 
term 0.2 0.1                       
Other 0 0 
                      
Public sector 4.2 3 5 4.9 4.9 4.8 5.2 29.9 30.2 26.7 28.7 30 30 
Monetary sector 8.3 8.9 6.3 5.9 7 7.9 10.3 5.6 5.3 5.7 6.5 7.6 8.3 
Non-monetary 
private sector 6.7 6 5.9 6.9 6.3 6.5 9.8 12.7 12.8 10.6 10.3 9.9 11 
Rand-denominated 
debt 12.1 7 9 11.9 17.1 20.5 23.6 11.6 12.1 10.4 11.9 12.5 11 
Bonds 8.3 4.3 4.5 4.2 5.8 6.3 7.5 7.9 8 11.6 24.6 30.3 33.2 
Other 3.8 2.7 4.5 7.7 11.3 14.2 16.1 22.3 20.8 24.9 34.6 30.3 32.1 
Total Foreign debt 37 31 34 39.3 45 48.6 59.4 75.3 72.9 78.6 104.4 112 118.5 
Debt/GDP  
  
41.2 
  
20 23.2 19.7 22.7 26.4 26.6 27.6 28.7 27.3 29.2 
Debt/Export 
Earnings             70.3 77.8 70.1 96.9 
100.
3 90.8 98.1 
Source: South Africa Reserve Bank Annual Economic Report 
 
South Africa is the leading economy in Africa. South Africa is generally considered to 
be relatively a more viable economy in Africa, boasting of a more market driven 
economy, functional institutions and a more stable polity. South Africa belongs to the 
emerging market economic block that comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa, popularly referred to as BRICS. Of all the sub-Saharan African 
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countries analysed by Christensen (2004) in a survey of domestic debt markets in sub-
Saharan Africa, only South Africa was presented as having a 100% domestic sourcing 
of its debts needs. As of 2004, South Africa had a zero record of externally sourced 
finance.  
Table 3.4 shows the structure of the composition of South African debt. South 
Africa’s debt over the years under study comprised of foreign currency denominated 
domestic debts and Rand denominated domestic debts. Domestic debts issued in 
foreign markets are categorised as a domestic source of financing. Furthermore, both 
foreign currency denominated and local currency denominated debts are further sub-
divided into bearer bonds and others. The bearer bonds are clearly debts that are long 
term while the others represent sources of domestic finance such as treasury bills and 
short term loans. From the table we see that of the total foreign and Rand 
denominated debts, long term debts account for a larger proportion of the 
government’s source of financing. Bearer bonds alone constituted about $5.5 billion, 
representing 22.09% of the total foreign denominated debt in 2000. In the same year 
inflation-linked debt instruments were introduced. The use of bearer bonds continued 
to rise steadily over the years with $6.0 billion, $7.8 billion, $9.7 billion, $9/7 billion, 
$9.1 billion, $10.5 billion, $15.2 billion, representing 25%, 31.2.%, 35.40%, 34.77%, 
32.38% and 29.74% respectively. The use of bearer bonds flattened between 2003 and 
2004, with a recorded relative decline in 2005 to 2006. However, it picked up in 2007 
with $15.2 billion or 33.70%, up by 3.96% compared with the previous period. With 
the exception of 2008, when bearer bonds were used as a long term source of finance, 
to $13.9 representing 31.52% of the total foreign currency denominated debt, the long 
term debt instrument continued to record a persistent rise in the years 2010, 2011 and 
2012 with $16.5, $20.9 and $22.9, representing 36.5%, 41.06% and 43.05% 
respectively. This is also the situation with regard to the Rand denominated debts 
figures shown on the table. While bonds clearly constituted a significant proportion of 
the Rand denominated debts, other debts comprised of inflation-linked, fixed income 
debts and treasury bills.  
The South African Reserve Annual Report noted that domestic instruments used to 
finance deficits comprised of mainly fixed-income and inflation-linked bonds and 
treasury bills (S. A. R. Bank, 2012). The use of the treasury bills as a domestic debt 
instrument was emphasised further by the report. For instance in the fiscal year 
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2011/12 the South African Reserve Bank co-ordinated the government’s generation of 
R19 billion from the country’s treasury bills and short term loans from the corporation 
of public deposits. In addition the sum of R133 billion was generated from the 
government domestic bond market, with R45 billion or 33.83% as inflation-linked 
bonds; and R88 billion or 66.17% representing fixed-income bonds. Overall, domestic 
debt is seen to account for over 90% of total public debt for the fiscal year, with 
external finance accounting for the insignificant 10%. While excessive use of external 
debts for financing purposes is regarded as risky (Levy Yeyati et al., 2005), too much 
domestic debt on the other hand is argued to be very costly and has the tendency to 
result in excessive pressure on institutional investors. In the case of South Africa, one 
major issue is most obvious; it had a relatively well developed domestic capital 
market. Inflation-linked debt was introduced over a decade ago with the first in 2000.  
South Africa’s debt to GDP ratio stood at an average of 26.6% over the period 
under review. The highest ratio was recorded in 2001, at 41.2%, which then dropped 
to 20.0%, 23.2% and 19.7% in 2003, 2004, and 2005 respectively. From 2006 the 
debt ratio rises to an increasing rate reaching 29.2% in 2012; lower than 160 to 170% 
of GDP. These ratios are however regarded normal and within the safe region (Pattillo 
et al., 2011b). The country’s debt to exports ratio was on the high side, having 
recorded ratios of 70.3%, 77.8%, 70.1%, 96.9%, 100.3%, 90.8%, and 98.10% for 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. These ratios are regarded 
to be excessive, far above 35 to 40% (Pattillo et al., 2011b) 
Figure 3.3: Composition of Public Debt - S/Africa 
 
Figure 3.3 depicts the data presented earlier in table 3.4 showing the composition of 
public debt in South Africa between the year 2000 and 2012. In a bar chart form, the 
figure clearly shows that foreign currency denominated debts constituted a larger 
portion of the country’s debt in comparison to the Rand denominated debt. The figure 
also shows a moderate debt to GDP ratio and a very high debt to export earnings ratio.  
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Table 3.5: Composition of Public Debts – Uganda 
TYPE 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
T-bills 589 928.5 1202.6 1248 1176 1092 1089 1,528 1,518 1386 1657 1712 2583 
T. Certs 414.6 460.6 482 390.4 184.2 
-
47.09 
-
521.1 
-
731.3 
0 0 0 0 0 
Bonds 0 0 0 151.23 291.36 631.4 773.2 1257 4880 1406 1960 2648 3411 
Govt. Stock 1051 1151.6 1151.4 1246.1 1198.5 2724 3793 3835 1854.4 1407 0 0 0 
Disc. Notes 0 0 0 2728.2 3361.7 0 0 200 200 200 0 70 30 
Ext. Debt 3380 3395.3 3825.2 4215.5 4404.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Debt Ratio 58.13 61.54 63.81 61.83 47.93 44.83 12.46 13.16 0 0 0 0 0 
 Source: Bank of Ugandan; Researchers computations  
Uganda is among the sub-Saharan African HIPCs. It suffered from problems with 
both domestic and external debt sources of finance. This sub-Saharan African nation, 
we reported earlier as having attained domestic debt ratios of 8%, 9%, and 5%, 
between 1980 and 1989; 1990 and 1994 and 1995 and 2000, respectively. These ratios 
compared unfavourably with the external debt to GDP ratios of 17%, 55%, and 70% 
for the same periods respectively. It is argued that excessive reliance on external debt 
by a government tends to expose such a country to external vulnerabilities (Panizza, 
2008), and might even be a factor in pushing low income countries into debt crisis 
(Christensen, 2004). 
Table 3.5 shows the trend in Uganda’s borrowing over the recent decade, starting 
from the year 2000. The data made available shows the debt ratio to have never 
crossed a high of 63.81% in 2002. It is clear that this period was before debt relief and 
therefore with outstanding figures of $3380.0 million, $3395.3 million, $3825.2 
million, $4215.5 million and $4404.9 million for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 
respectively. From 2005, Uganda completely relied on its domestic debt market for 
financing. 
Based on the information in table 3.5 it becomes obvious that Uganda, as a HIPC, 
patronised its domestic market relatively well for a sub-Saharan African country. 
Between 2000 and 2012 the performance of the short term security market for 
treasury bills, treasury certificates, long term instruments of government bonds and 
government stocks and discount notes were highly patronised by the government as a 
source of financing. Interestingly however, the government of Uganda tended to 
employ the use of longer term debt instruments in relation to the shorter term 
instruments of treasury bills. This was more evident in the period immediately after 
debt relief. For instance, the government development stock was recorded as $1198.5 
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million, $ 2723.88 million, $3792.7 million, $3834.7 million, $1854.41 million and 
$1407 million, for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. Government 
bonds issued for the same period were $291.36, $631.43, $773.17, $1256.7, $4880, 
$1406 and $1960 respectively. The sum of the two long term instruments exceeds the 
short term market instruments of treasury bills. Long term debt instruments are known 
to ensure liquidity, but they are however criticized for reducing domestic investments. 
Figure 3.4: Composition of Public Debts – Uganda 
  
Figure 3.4 is a graphical representation of the data presented in table 3.5, showing the 
different types of debt instruments that made up public debt in Uganda. From the figure we 
see that external debts remained an important source of finance reaching a peak in period 5 
(2004), whilst suddenly falling to zero in period 6 (2006). Treasury bills however became one 
of the leading sources of finance for the government in Uganda. Treasury certificates ceased 
to be a source of funding for the government from 2005. The bond as a source of government 
finance became a leading source of long term finance.  
Table 3.6: Selected Debt Indicators - Ghana 
Type Column1 Column2 Column3 2004 2005 2006 
Debt Stock 
   
6367.9 6759.8 2773.4 
Debt st/Exp 
   
1.9 1.7 0.6 
Ext Debt Serv/ Exp 
   
5.7 5.6 3.1 
Debt Stk/ Dom Rev 
   
3 2.6 0.9 
Ext Debt Ser/Dom Rev 
   
9.3 8.4 5.3 
Ext Debt Serv/ GDP 
   
2.2 2 1.3 
Debt Stk/GDP 
   
72.2 63.4 18.7 
Source: Bank of Ghana Annual Report 
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Table 3.6 shows some debt indicators for Ghana, another HIPC located in sub-
Saharan Africa. The Debt/GDP indicator reached the highest point of 72.2% in 2004. 
The ratio continued to decrease in subsequent years to 63.4% and 18.7% for 2005 and 
2006 respectively. Ghana is however among the HIPCs that were reported to be 
showing signs of debt distress some years after debt relief. 
Figure 3.5: Selected Debt Indicators – Ghana 
  
 
Figure 3.5 represents a graphical presentation of the relevant debt indicators for 
Ghana. A significant change recorded an indicated debt ratio falling from over 72.2% 
at the end of 2004 to a low 18.7% by the end of 2006. A similar decline was recorded 
under the external debt service to revenue ratio, from 9.3% in 2004 to 5.3% in 2006.   
 Conclusion 
In the course of discussion debt management situation in sub-Saharan Africa has been 
examined. The trend in debt management demonstrates how the absence of well-
developed and effective institutional frameworks tends to affect the effectiveness of 
debt management as a tool for the implementation of government policies in the 
economy. For instance, the review has exposed deficiencies in the development of 
debt instruments of different maturities in sub–Saharan African markets. Out of the 
four countries reviewed, only South Africa had a record of dealing in foreign currency 
denominated domestic debt, and was able to separate the use of inflation-linked debt 
from fixed-income debt. The few countries that have relatively developed domestic 
debt markets such as Nigeria, Uganda and Ghana, the instruments involved are mostly 
the short term treasury bills, treasury certificates, promissory notes, long term 
government bonds and development stocks. It is clear that these countries’ various 
stock markets are yet to fully develop to ensure an effective and meaningful debt 
management strategy for growth. Another obvious factor is that due to the 
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inefficiencies associated with domestic stock market development; these sub-Saharan 
African countries still afford the external source of finance a priority over the 
domestic source. This trend may have the repercussion of plunging SSAs into another 
round of debt distress. 
In the course of the upcoming chapters it shall be observed how the data on debt 
instruments can be applied to determine how the choice of source, size, composition 
and maturity of debt instruments among SSAs could lead to a suitable choice of debt 
management strategy.  
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Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to specify the methodology for the research undertaken 
in this project and also discuss and justify the sources and the methods of data 
collection. However, most importantly this chapter is where the philosophy that 
guides this research is explained: the ontology or the perception of the writer is 
defended and the epistemology or kind of knowledge the writer envisaged to be 
released to the public is also discussed.  
This research adopts a positivist ideology and accordingly the work is guided by and 
adheres to the objectivist approach in dealing with the problem in question. 
Objectivism in research refers to a situation where the researcher is found to be a 
detached entity from the phenomena under investigation and by following such a 
process the empirical method is produced. Consequently the empirical process leads 
to a positivist method of research, where the researcher is encouraged to get inclined 
only to record results as they are, with room only for interpretation regarding how and 
possibly why, a phenomena or social reality has occurred. The positivist research 
approach is characterised by epistemologies that strive to give an explanation to what 
is happening in the social world around us, by way of identifying certain rules and 
regulations that govern the causal relationships between apparent consistent elements 
or variables (Falconer & Mackay, 1999)3. 
Epistemology, according to Crotty (1998) represents a theory of knowledge that is  
embedded in a theoretical perspective as well as a theory in the specified 
methodology of the research. Epistemology entails the manner in which people 
understand what they believe in and how they are able to explain the process through 
which they get to know what they believe they know. For example the subject of debt 
and debt management is a branch of study under finance. Although not an observable 
social reality per se, the phenomenon of government debt can best be viewed under 
the positivist stance, because it may eventually possess a law-like end research 
product, which could lead to generalizations similar to those obtained in the natural 
                                                     
3
 Student Paper, Saleh A.S. (2013) 
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sciences. Furthermore, debt data that is used in this particular research, is almost 
wholly of a historical and numerical nature and could easily afford to be transformed 
into a causal relationship as proposed in the current work, i.e. the effect of debt 
management on economic growth. Economic growth in turn is measurable by a 
number of different indicators, which include variables such as the gross domestic 
product, which may be employed in generalizations and further analysis. This 
assertion is in agreement with Hammersley (1993), who views positivism as a 
philosophical attitude to human knowledge which does not actually prejudge 
questions as to the manner by which researchers arrive at knowledge, or the 
psychological non-historical foundations of knowledge. Instead, positivism tends to 
seek to apply positivist principles, specifically through the adoption of the methods of 
the natural sciences.4   
Ryan, Scapens, and Theobald (2002) basically sees the research process to be all 
about the discovery, interpretation and communication of new knowledge. Research 
can therefore be seen as a process of constructing precise economic theories that are 
only validated by well-designed tests, which employ the use of large and unbiased 
samples. Like other disciplines in the social sciences, the discipline of finance is 
methodologically diverse. Thus, in order to make sense of any process of research, 
especially in the field of finance, there is a need to attempt to try to answer questions 
such as: what are the different assumptions about the nature of financial reality that 
actually inform research? And, what role does theory play in the process of financial 
knowledge acquisition? And  how does the research in the field of finance progress 
(Ryan et al., 2002).5 
The choice between two binary options, true or false, right or wrong are viewed to be 
issues that generally characterise knowledge. The most important factor however for 
our purposes tends to be the manner by which knowledge is perceived. The major 
problem of epistemology is therefore found in the process of deciding the means by 
which knowledge can be acquired. At any point in time therefore, an individual may 
tend to be confined as a subject in what appears as a ‘subject – object’ relationship. 
                                                     
4Student Paper, Saleh A.S. (2013)  
5
 Student Paper, Saleh A.S. (2013) 
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As a branch of finance, the subject of debt is appropriately placed under the positivist 
and the objectivist field of knowledge and it follows therefore that debt is even more 
appropriately placed perspective-wise, under the functionalists’ paradigm. The 
paradigm is hinged upon the assumption that the society possesses a concrete, real 
existence and a systematic feature that is focused at the production of an ordered and 
regulated state of affairs, whose objective is to promote a social theory striving to 
understand the role of humans in society (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). According to 
Ardalan (2011) in situations where there exists an independence between the observer 
and the observed, the listed assumptions result in the existence of an objective and 
value free social science that can produce true explanatory and predictive information 
about reality.6   
Furthermore Ardalan (2000), argued that the functionalist paradigm has been applied 
to mainstream academic finance, especially in the area of theory and research. While 
there are debates and known anomalies in the finance literature (Frankfurter & 
McGoun, 2002), that suggest some evidences which counter the empirical validity of, 
for instance  the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM).  It is thus believed that the functionalist paradigm has become quite 
dominant in academic sociology and mainstream academic finance. Consequently the 
world of finance under the functionalist paradigm is treated as a place of concrete 
reality, with the individual taking a detached, passive role and his/her behaviour being 
determined by the economic environment (Ardalan, 2011).  
It is therefore of utmost relevance to emphasise that the choice of topics and their 
pairing with a certain paradigm can only be based upon various given considerations, 
as well as the researcher’s logic in design. Thus, Morgan (1980) observed that 
categorization into different paradigms appeared quite convincing and relevant, but 
with the exercise tending to be constructed upon a network of unrealistic assumptions, 
which most of the time are taken too much for granted. By extension, it may not 
necessarily be that all features must adhere to the approach. According to Nickles 
(2003), changes in paradigm get likened to religious conversions or political 
revolutions, where social scientists such as Kuhn struggled to justify the claims which 
suggest scientists working under competing paradigms tend to become isolated in a 
                                                     
6
 Student Paper, Saleh A. S (2013) 
84 
 
different world. Nickles (2003) however concluded that there was no point in the 
belief that paradigm changes convey such a scientific field any closer to the truth, in 
respect of a complete determinate world entirely out there to be discovered. 
4.2 The Quantitative Method 
In every research endeavour questions such as, “How to go about conducting the 
research?”, “What to research?” and “Why research should be conducted?” are 
frequently found at the centre of the entire process. These questions are very 
important and they tend to directly replicate and shade more light on what was 
discussed especially what pertains to the philosophy of research as it relates to the 
methodology, epistemology and ontology of research. With the epistemology of this 
research already identified to be of the positivist perspective, which specifically 
represents what to investigate, it then follows naturally, that the end product of the 
work will turn out to be of the pure, strictly unbiased and objective contribution. This 
will represent the need to set out to investigate in the first place. The investigation 
essentially represents the process of attaining the objectives that were outlined and the 
research questions that have specified in the beginning, which in all represent the 
methodology of the research.  
The data on debt, and the debt indicators employed in analysis, are numerical in 
nature and all in a time series format. For this reason the research adopted the 
quantitative method as the most appropriate approach to accomplish the work. 
Bryman (2006) argued that the assumptions underlying the quantitative research 
approach should be based on the objective approach to the world. In addition the 
objective approach should be one that adheres to the positivist model of controlling 
variables, as well as to carry out tests of the pre-specified hypotheses. Morgan and 
Smircich (1980) however, observed that while there was a level of certainty regarding 
the fact that a balanced approach to research in an organization is desirable, there tend 
to be certain hurdles arising out of the process of deciding upon a method of which 
the debate on the benefit or otherwise of the quantitative or qualitative; subjective or 
positivist, is yet to be explained. Hence, the process of measuring debt management 
strategy is a most cumbersome task which involves the human element particularly as 
result of the fact that it is unique and quite unpredictable. It is presumed that there are 
hardly two separate individual behaviours that end up to be similar. The epistemology 
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of the non-positivist approach, on the other hand takes various forms and it tends to 
oppose the comfort of discovering the underlying regularities (Falconer & Mackay, 
1999) especially in the world of social affairs. 
A substantial review of the literature on debt, debt management and strategy indicates 
that most of the academic research works undertaken have been accomplished 
through the use of the quantitative method where the objectivist and the positivist 
ideology remained the guiding principles. Instances of  relevant and related works 
carried out by prominent researchers included but are not limited to  Rolph (1957), 
prominent research on the principles of debt management; Tobin (1963) in an essay 
on the principles of debt management; Giavazzi and Pagano (1989) research on 
confidence crisis and public debt management; Cohen (1990) on debt relief and the 
implications of the secondary market discounts and debt overhang; Missale (1994); 
(1999); (2000); famous research on public debt maturity and currency crises, Levine, 
Mandilaras, and Wang (2008) on optimal reserve management and sovereign debt and 
several other relevant works on debt and debt management all adopted the 
quantitative, positivist approach to research. However, while all of these works were 
focused on debt management in more developed economies, very few made  reference 
to sub-Saharan Africa (Fosu, 1996). 
The problem of insufficient and missing data on Africa’s debt (Panizza, 2008), the use 
of data from primary sources obtained  by means of the questionnaire survey method 
was considered a viable option for the work. It is imperative to note however that the 
choice for any research method whether qualitative or quantitative cannot be adopted 
as an abstract. The reason being that such a choice and its sufficiency must present us 
with certain assumptions concerning the nature of knowledge and the methods 
through which such knowledge can be accessed (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). For 
instance, Kuhn (2012) observed that traditionalist theory building in organizational 
study have succeeded in producing valuable but somehow incomplete views regarding 
organizational knowledge, particularly due to the fact that knowledge is based on a 
single paradigm or approach to understanding  it. G. a. M. Burrell, G. (1979) argues 
that in the present it has been recognized that the use of any single research paradigm 
tends to promote a narrow view of the multi-faceted organizational society we 
experience today. Furthermore, Gable (1994) observes that the case for combining 
quantitative and qualitative research methods is quite strong. Nonetheless, the 
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positivist approach tends to however be based on an epistemology whose features 
seeks to answer the social world by adopting some regularities and causal 
relationships between elements (G. Burrell, 1979), which also tends to accept the 
processes relevant for the study, which can be reduced to dependent and independent 
variables (Rosen, 1991) and which may be captured through the questionnaire or 
experiment. All this therefore justified the choice of the quantitative method for the 
study. 
4.3 Sources and Uses of Data 
This work strictly adopts the quantitative approach to research. Data was however 
collected from both primary and secondary sources. Due to the nature of the subject 
under investigation the data was expected to be mainly secondary and cross-country 
in nature. The choice of data was based purely on availability and suitability as 
material in the process of answering the stated research questions. Data collection was 
mostly from secondary sources, except in situations where certain confirmations were 
needed, as well as to make up for the case of missing data, which was very common 
among the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. A comprehensive data base on debt is 
accessible from several sources, which includes government financial statistics, the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook and the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Other relevant sources are the ADB and the 
individual countries’ central bank annual reports and publications.  
While these sources are relevant in the process of data generation there is however the 
problem of missing data, especially where data regarding SSAs is sought. For instance 
a section of this work relies much on the availability of data on domestic debt in most 
of the sub-Saharan African countries. Data on sub-Saharan African countries debt is 
generally difficult to come by. This is especially the case when the data is concerned 
with the aspect of domestic debts. External debt data is relatively easier to collect 
because a substantial proportion of the SSAs’ debt originated from Bretton Woods 
related institutions. According to Panizza (2008), detailed information regarding the 
level and composition of for instance, domestic debt in the most sub-Saharan 
countries was difficult to obtain. Up-to-date data is necessary in, for example, debt 
sustainability analysis which mainly focuses on total debt and the study of the impact 
of debt structures. However, this kind of data is not even available for policy making 
and research analysis. Hence, the writer’s own computation was required in several 
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stages of the work to augment the process. There are however more problems of 
definition encountered in the process of generating data on debt. 
4.3.1 Rationale for the Quantitative Approach 
When choosing an appropriate research methodology it is imperative for the 
researcher to understand two concepts in order to assess the qualitative method. The 
model that is used in the evaluation of a quantitative research design may turn out to 
be a model that is irrelevant in qualitative research. In addition, not all qualitative 
research can be evaluated using the same strategies adopted for quantitative research 
(Krefting, 1991). Quantitative research tends to recognise, document and value 
research through the process assessing the reliability and validity of projects (Payton, 
1988). This kind of procedure is not emphasised in the qualitative method of research.  
The survey method in research is often related to the qualitative method, particularly 
when it involves the opinion of respondents during interviews and responses to the 
questionnaires. The interview as a method of research tends to be adopted where an 
in-depth knowledge of a phenomenon is sought and where a process of building a 
theory is pursued. However, interviews are often viewed as being influenced by the 
respondent’s bias or point of view. Schmid (1981) described the qualitative approach 
in research as an approach that promotes the study of the natural world through the 
eye of the person being studied. It is believed that under the qualitative method, the 
behaviour of the respondent tends to be influenced by the physical, socio-cultural and 
even the psychological environment in which the subject resides. There is also a 
tendency for the respondent’s behaviour to extend beyond what is expected and 
observed by the researcher. This paves the way for subjectivity and biased 
perceptions, which may end up being critical to qualitative research as a whole.  
The fundamental difference between qualitative and quantitative research approaches 
is clearly outlined by the twin notions of reliability and validity. These two features 
play a very significant role in natural or quantitative research approaches. In 
qualitative research however, these two aspects of research tend to lose their 
relevance. By reflecting on two principles, Kirk and Miller (1986) defined the 
qualitative research method as a specific condition in the social sciences which 
fundamentally relies on observing the research subjects in their different domains, as 
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well as interacting with them through their own medium at their chosen times. This 
makes qualitative research pluralistic, thereby possessing a variety of approaches, 
which include phenomenology, semiotics, ethnography, life history and historical 
research. 
Therefore, the qualitative method may not be evaluated against a criterion that is 
appropriate for the quantitative approach, because in most instances the qualitative 
method tends to portray shortcomings in for instance, the area of reliability and 
validity. A researcher with a tendency for the qualitative approach may however 
contend that due to differences in the nature and purposes that exist between the 
qualitative and the quantitative method, there may not even be a basis of comparison 
between the two. It is therefore erroneous to apply similar criteria in the comparison 
of these two approaches. On the other hand, Agar (1986) observed that terms such as 
reliability and validity are found to be more compatible with the quantitative, rather 
than qualitative approach. According to Payton (1988), the notion of external validity 
is more concerned with the ability to carry out generalisations from the sample of a 
population, which is largely a key criterion of the quantitative method in comparison 
to the qualitative research approach.  
4.4 Population and Sample of Research 
A population is a set of existing units of people, objects or events, whereas a sample 
represents a subset unit of a population (Bowerman, O'Connell, & Orris, 2003). The 
population of the proposed survey was drawn from among the sub–Saharan African 
countries:  
Of the 28 SSA countries, the researcher selected four (4) countries; Ghana, Nigeria, 
Uganda and South Africa. Nigeria and South Africa, though they reside in sub-
Saharan Africa were not categorised as HIPC. However, their relative economic 
strength warranted their selection in order to produce a relatively balanced and 
credible analysis. For instance, Nigeria’s experience as beneficiary of debt 
cancellation was regarded relevant for the work, while the inclusion of South Africa 
was regarded important as a non-HIPC with a relatively growing economy and a 
vibrant and developed domestic market. Ghana and Uganda were selected purely 
based on their status as HIPCs, whom attained the decision point and were granted 
debt relief, but just as they started showing signs of debt distress. Other reasons for 
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the selection of these countries range from proximity, lower cost of access and 
language. All Francophone countries were deliberately eliminated as non-eligible. 
4.5 Determination of Sample Size  
The process of determining the sample size from the population drawn from these 
four countries was arrived at by  applying the Krejcie and Morgan (1970) process of 
sample size determination. They note that a sample can easily be determined once the 
number of observations (N) is known. The sample size computation would simply be 
read from a ready statistical table constructed from the following formula: S=�XʹNP�ሺͳ�‐�Pሻ�÷�dʹሺN�‐�ͳሻ�+�XʹP�ሺͳ�‐�Pሻ 
where: 
S = required sample size. 
X2 = the table value of chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired confidence 
level 
(3.841). 
N = the population size. 
P = the population proportion (assumed to be .50 since this would provide the 
maximum sample size). 
d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05) 
To determine the total number of observations, we needed to consider the calibre of 
our respondents. The topic of debt management is both a technical and professional 
branch of the subject of economics. In financial economics for instance, aspects of 
debt and its management are classified under international finance. For this reason the 
target respondents were mainly mid-level and senior management staff of Central 
Banks, Ministries of Finance and Debt Management Offices in the selected countries, 
while a number of respondents were sampled from the West African Institute for 
Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM). While all the countries under 
study had at least a Central Bank in place, the management staff in all countries were 
found to average twenty staff per country. Of this number, about 5% or 25 were found 
to be directly involved with the core aspect of borrowing.  
In Nigeria for instance, several of the management staff met during the pilot exercise 
had no idea regarding the debt process. More than half of the questionnaires were 
distributed in Nigeria. This is because apart from the fact that it was the only country 
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visited, it happened to be the one with the largest population, doubling the population 
of the three other sampled countries combined. Furthermore in Nigeria, more than one 
agency involved with debt management was visited: the Debt Management Office, the 
Central Bank and the Federal Ministry of Finance. For the other countries there was 
the Bank of Ghana, Bank of Uganda and the Reserve Bank of South Africa. These 
were contacted online, with follow up through telephone calls. 
Thus, at an average of 20 staff per organisation, the population of the study was 
determined at 120. This resulted in twenty of the total respondents each in Uganda, 
Ghana and South Africa. Nigeria had 60 distributed among three organisations and 
WAIFEM. Sample size determinations of a population of 120 require a sample of 92. 
Approximately 100 questionnaires were distributed. Questionnaire distribution and 
collection was relatively feasible in Nigeria, whereas the cost of travelling to 
remaining sampled countries made it impossible to visit all four countries physically. 
Thus, all contact with respondents in the other three countries was made electronically 
via email and telephone calls. The result from Ghana, Uganda and South Africa was 
very insignificant whereas collection from Nigeria was most remarkable.  
4.6 The Survey Process  
The survey research method offers a unique inferential strategy to known populations 
within measurable levels of sampling error. This power stems from the cumulative 
result of the numerous individual decisions of the respondents in the survey. Where 
full participation proved impossible to obtain, the ability of the method to generalise 
tends to be threatened (Groves, Cialdini, & Couper, 1992). Fowler (2009) provides 
the reasons for adopting the survey method, which are as follows: the need to create 
statistical data that is quantitative or numerical, collected by means of asking people 
questions where their answers constitute the data to be analysed. The data obtained 
from the process is quantitative and thus turns the survey method into a process of 
tapping into the subjective feelings of the respondents. The data collected via 
questionnaires are however mainly primary in nature and it is first-hand information 
collected for the purpose of carrying out a specific study by a researcher on variables 
of interest to him or her  (Sekaran, 2003). 
According to Rea and Parker (2012), survey research involves the act of soliciting 
self-reported verbal information from people about themselves. It was precisely this 
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impression of the survey research design that was the rationale behind it being ranked 
lower on the ladder of methodologies employed to accomplish this work. Firstly, the 
entire work is centred on the phenomenon of debt and its management and secondly it 
is not about the respondents’ feelings or attitudes towards it. But because the ultimate 
goal of sample survey research is to give the research the power to generalize from a 
study of a small portion of a population to its larger body, survey research becomes 
necessary to complement pre-existing data or secondary data. Rea and Parker (2012) 
argue that survey research is only one among many different methods of data 
collection. Survey research may be embarked upon where other alternative research 
techniques are considered inadequate or inappropriate.  
Survey questionnaires should be able to enquire about existing sources of information 
as a first step in the research process to take advantage of information that has already 
been collected and which may shed light on the study. Common sources of secondary 
information include libraries, government agencies and others. There are however, 
numerous sources of secondary data regarding debt, which come in different forms 
and for different period intervals. The secondary data obtained for this work was 
specifically obtained from the World Bank debt data base, the IMF, HIPC and Central 
Banks of Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and South Africa.  
Survey questionnaires administered in this work included some basic details about the 
respondents. Less emphasis was placed on the person of the respondents however. 
This part of the questionnaire was to enable the researcher to have a better 
understanding of the larger population that was being represented in the sample, but 
most importantly it was used to determine the competency and responsibility of the 
respondents in their response to such a sensitive subject as debt. The survey employed 
the use of well-structured sample surveys that generate a standardized set of data that 
can be quantified, and subsequently be subjected to computerisation and statistical 
analysis.    
By the first week of January 2013, field work started in earnest. Out of the four 
sampled countries Nigeria was physically visited. While the remaining three countries 
could not be visited due to costs involved, the option of online survey method was 
employed. Survey Monkey, a popular online research site, was utilised by the 
researcher and several questionnaires were dispatched to respondents. Online survey 
is characteristically slow in response, however with a regular telephone follow up and 
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letters of reminder a good number have so far been returned. A total of 100 
questionnaires were distributed in all the sampled countries with 70 distributed in 
Nigeria. A total of 77 responses were recorded. 
4.6.1 Primary Data Collection 
This work adopts the survey method in the process of collecting primary 
supplementary data. Given the scant nature of data and the difficulties encountered in 
generating data on low income sub-Saharan Africa, primary data is collected to 
support secondary data collected from the sources mentioned earlier. This is done 
with the intent of filling potential gaps in the data as a whole. 
The process of administering questionnaires and data collection in Nigeria became an 
uphill task. There was a general security problem due to insurgency attacks, which 
became rampant since January 2012. Movements were curtailed and in many 
instances, access to targeted offices were hindered. In addition, the researcher’s field 
experience in Nigeria confirmed the poor attitude to work displayed by most of the 
workers. There was a total lack of awareness of the relevance of research and as a 
result it was difficult to recruit more respondents to participate. Whenever a 
respondent was found, the objectivity of their responses was always difficult to 
ascertain. There was lack of information even among respondents who on paper were 
qualified to participate in the survey. There were many instances of management staff 
who were not knowledgeable, and competent enough, in respect of the process of 
government borrowing. The Central Bank of Nigeria, Debt Management Office, the 
Ministry of Finance and West African Institute of Financial and Economic 
Management were visited. 
4.7 Limitations of the Research 
The major limitation of this work was that fewer similar works have been 
accomplished on the subject matter of debt management in sub-Saharan Africa. As 
explained earlier, out of the works accomplished on sovereign debt, most of the 
authors have concentrated on the relationship between government borrowing and 
economic growth, and/or how the process impacts upon investment and growth and 
even these works were mostly found to cover Latin American countries. Where 
African countries were involved, very few samples were used. Thus, the proposed 
work on the impact of debt management on the economic growth of sub-Saharan 
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African countries was faced by an acute dearth of literature on the subject of debt 
management. Hence, references were frequently made to situations and instances 
outside the sub-region. Also, the very fact that the subject of debt management was 
relatively new, even among the developed economies, generating up to date data, 
especially on the low income economies of sub-Saharan Africa, proved to be equally 
difficult.  
The multi-lateral financial institutions of the IMF and the World Bank, which 
inadvertently became a major source of data for this work, were also found to be 
lacking in several aspects of the African debt data. For instance, data on domestic debt 
was difficult or completely unavailable (or not updated) from the data bank of these 
institutions. Except for data on external debt, which was not sufficient for the 
proposed work. Even the figures representing external debt, for some sub-Saharan 
African countries, some were found to be incomplete, showing discrepancies and lots 
of missing data over the years. Thus the work employed the used of mixed sources of 
data in order to accomplish some of the research questions raised in the introductory 
chapter. 
4.8 The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed to capture both the administrative and technical 
aspects of debt management. The questionnaires are visualised as tree-like directed 
graphs, which are designed to model the situation of a broad class of discrete 
recognition and identification problems in the broader sense of those perceptions 
(Parkhomenko, 2010). The questionnaire used in the work adopted the World Bank 
designed debt management performance assessment tool format. The debt 
management performance assessment (DeMPA) tool has been designed for the 
purpose of undertaking an assessment of the strength and weaknesses in government 
debt management practices (Bank, 2009). The DeMPA is primarily concerned with 
how government debt management is conducted and covers all the aspects of central 
government debt management functions. The tool also covers other related aspects of 
central government debt such as issuance of loan guarantees, on-lending, cash flow 
forecasting and cash balance management. 
The questionnaire captured all the performance indicators which aim to measure debt 
management performance, as well as measure elements recognised as being necessary 
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in order to achieve a sound debt management practice. Each of the indicators reflects 
measures for the assessment of a sound practice (See Appendix A). By adopting this 
performance assessment tool as a guide in constructing the questionnaire, it is 
expected that a set of performance indicators, which would cover the full range of 
government debt management activities, critical activities inclusive as well as 
ensuring that the assessment and the number of chosen indicators can be adequately 
managed.  
4.8.1 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire consists of six sections. A section expounding the issue of 
governance and debt management strategy development; coordination with 
macroeconomic policies; a section dealing with borrowing and related financing 
activities; cash flow forecasting and cash balance management; operational risk 
management and debt records and reporting. These sections cover different indicators 
that directly affect the status of a government’s debt management process at a point in 
time. Appendix A shows a specimen of the questionnaire, which is directly adopted 
from the debt management performance assessment guidelines of the World Bank. 
The issues included in the questionnaire were reflective of a country’s debt 
performance indicators as contained in the debt management performance assessment 
as put together by the World Bank and the IMF. The questionnaire responses were in 
turn aggregated and analysed quantitatively. 
The variables being adopted directly from the debt management performance 
indicators follow the same pattern and carry similar weight. These variables in turn 
represented the issues responded to by various respondents. The performance 
assessment indicators consisted of one or more dimension that were to be assessed 
separately. When a country is being assessed, any of the dimensions that failed to be 
assessed was designated not rated (N/R). At a country level, assessment of a 
minimum score of C is required for each dimension, which is the necessary condition 
for the attainment of an effective performance under the particular dimension being 
measured (Bank, 2009). Performance scores under DeMPA are rated A, B, C, and D. 
A stands for outstanding, B for sound, C for fair, and D for poor. Countries’ debt 
management performances were scored accordingly. To complete the scale column E 
was added to reflect country performances prior to DeMPA.Under the variable of debt 
management strategy focus was directed at two dimensions; the quality of content and 
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the decision making process. The essence of this variable is to ensure that every 
government prepare and publish a debt management strategy that is based on long 
term debt objectives as well as being set in the context of a government’s fiscal policy 
and budget framework. The debt management strategy in this regard may vary from 
country to country, depending on the stage of development of debt management 
reform, the source of borrowing, as well as the transactions employed to manage 
central government debt. These issues are dealt with under the variable of debt 
management strategy. 
Evaluation of debt management operations is another dimension under the indicator 
of governance and strategy development. This dimension tries to ensure that the 
principal debt management entity is accountable for its activities by way of evaluating 
outcomes against stated debt objectives, as well as ensuring compliance with the 
central government’s debt management strategy. This aspect of debt management 
tends to encourage transparency in debt operations and good governance through the 
promotion of accountability among the principal actors in debt management and 
entities.  
Another indicator is the audit and the frequency of audit assessors. The rationale for 
the auditing indicator is to ensure that government debt management activities, 
policies and operations are subjected to scrutiny by such a country’s national audit 
bodies. Here, all the auditing standards must be consistent with international audit 
standards, such as those set up by the international Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI). It should be noted that the objective here is to identify 
whether regular internal audits and periodic external audits or as it obtains in many 
countries, where the office of the auditor general have been provided and thus issues 
such as what was the nature of the audits undertaken, who had undertaken it and the 
findings of such audits should be addressed. A further dimension under the 
governance variable is the frequency of the audit discussed earlier. 
Under the performance indicators are more variables each with a number of 
dimensions or indicators to be responded to. The questionnaire specimen attached as 
an appendix to this work lists all the variables and indicators covered. The remaining 
variables include co-ordination with macroeconomic policies, borrowing and related 
financing activities, cash flow forecasting and cash balance management, operational 
risk management and debt records and reporting. Descriptive statistics of responses 
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were taken to determine the impact of debt management strategic tool application and 
how the respondents’ response was related to the debt situation in sub-Saharan Africa.  
4.9  Secondary Data 
In order to determine the relationship between debt management and economic 
growth; debt management and the probability of a country becoming debt distressed; 
debt and growth; the correlation between choice of debt instruments, maturity and 
extent of indebtedness the use of regression analysis was employed. The regression 
method was considered appropriate in measuring relationships between debt 
management and debt distress, as in Weist et al. (2010); Kraay and Nehru (2006) and 
Reinhart et al. (2003). Missale (1994); (1999) also employed the use of regression 
analysis to determine the relationship between debt maturity and the extent of 
indebtedness. (Secondary data is attached as Appendix D)  
4.9.1 Model Specification 
The model has been formulated in accordance with research questions outlined earlier 
in chapter one. In this respect, a number of relationships have been designed to tackle 
each of the research questions. The research question referring to debt management 
strategy and economic growth necessitated the setting up of a causal relationship 
between the indicator of debt management against that of economic growth; then 
another relationship for debt and economic growth; extent of indebtedness (debt ratio) 
to debt maturity and debt ratio to market capitalization to provide us with the impact 
of capital market development on borrowing. Another relationship was constructed to 
reflect the choice between maturities of debt instrument. In all relationships however, 
regression models would be employed to determine relationships.  
According to Ryan et al. (2002) in financial disciplines just like in the natural 
sciences, model development becomes central to the development of any research. 
This is why the research questions and objectives seek to address the issue of whether 
or not there exists any relationship between debt management and economic growth. 
In order to assess this, there was a need to readily create a functional relationship 
between economic growth on hand to be referred as the dependent or explained 
variable and debt management (DeM) as the independent or alternatively the 
explanatory variable. This research question is formulated based on the premise that 
prior to the 1990s,  the function of debt management (DeM) had not been detached 
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from the field of monetary policy (Leong & Britain, 1999). As a consequence, two 
decades after the advent of the function of debt management (DeM), the area stirs 
interest among scholars with a desire to establish whether the separation was 
worthwhile or has it actually assisted in the attainment of economic growth? In an 
effort to answer these questions successfully, there is however the need for making an 
inference, or an application of the result to sub-Saharan Africa depending on the data 
employed.7 
Ryan et al. (2002) observed that for a model to succeed in the core of research it has 
to fulfil certain characteristics outlined as follows: 
(i) Every model ought to generate certain theoretical implications based on 
which a number of  observational conclusions can be reached; 
(ii) All assumptions contained within a model should have logical internal 
consistency and to be as simple as the logical premise of the model can 
accommodate; 
(iii) A model is expected to be commensurate theoretically with any known 
empirical fact within its domain; 
(iv) The theoretical scope of the model should have been defined by the model 
itself and any of its predictive and explanatory implications; and 
(v) The summation of other related models in the same domain should be able to 
convey a similar message of a particular research program.8 
 
Given the above, the work is divided into three stages. The first stage is designed to 
test the relationship that exists between debt and economic growth; through the 
process confirming the existence of the debt overhang factor or otherwise. The second 
stage is to consider some variables in testing debt management in relation to 
economic growth. This is because, if borrowing is positively related to economic 
growth, it therefore follows that an effective debt management strategy should also be 
found to positively correlate with economic growth. In the third stage, is the need to 
examine the appropriate debt management strategy a country in sub-Saharan Africa 
should adopt. This is done by considering the relationships between debt ratio and 
maturity, domestic/external debts to growth and size and term of debts.  
                                                     
7
 Student Paper, Saleh A.S. (2013) 
8
 Student Paper, Saleh A.S. (2013) 
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Finally, two models will be employed to answer the research questions. The first 
model will be used to determine the relationship between debt and economic growth. 
To accomplish this and to test for the overall effect of borrowing on economic 
growth, the work of Elbadawi et al. (1997) is adopted as shown below. 
4.9.2 Model 1: Debt and Economic Growth ۵۲۾۱�۾= � ሺ۳۲܂۵۲۾, ۳۲܂۵۲۾ۺ૛, ۲܁܆,۲۳۴۵۲۾,۲۳۴۵۲۾ۺ,۾܃۷ۼ܄, ۷ۼ۴, ۱܄܂۽܂,܀۾۽۾, ۺ܀۵۲۾,܀۳܀ۻ܂܁, ۺ܁۱۶۽۽�, ܴ����ܵ  
where:  
GDPCAP represents per capita GDP growth as the dependent variable; 
EDTGDP represents the ratio of current stock of debt to GDP and is expected to be 
positive in order to confirm the first channel; 
EDTGDPL2 represents debt overhang and past debt accumulation. The value is 
therefore squared in order to capture the highly indebted countries’ level of 
indebtedness in relation to growth. Here, the coefficient is expected to be negative 
because it is believed that a high accumulation of debt stock tends to reduce the flow 
of finance meant for investment purposes as a result of repayments and debt service 
obligations. This will hinder the growth of domestic income. 
DSX represents debt service as a ratio of export earnings. Here, the coefficient is 
expected to be negative in order to confirm as well as reinforce the liquidity channel. 
DEFGDPL represents the ratio of fiscal deficits to GDP for the current period and the 
previous. The coefficients here are expected to be negative as well.  
PUINV represents the extent of public investments as a ratio of GDP. The coefficient 
here is expected to be positive such that it confirms the positive relationship that 
exists between investment rates and income. 
INFL represents the rate of inflation. The rate of inflation is expected to stimulate 
growth at low and sustainable levels. INFL however impacts negatively on growth at 
high and crisis levels. Here a dummy variable of INFL is 1 where inflation reaches 40 
per cent and above for two or more consecutive years and 0 when it is otherwise.  
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RERMTS represents the real exchange rate misalignment in the model. This is 
computed from the purchasing power parity relations and misalignment, which is 
defined as the percentage deviation from the mean. Because this variable has the 
tendency of creating distortion in economies it is therefore expected to be negatively 
correlated to growth. 
CVTOT represents the terms of trade variability in the model. 
REVOLS represents internal shocks. Both coefficients are expected to portray a 
negative impact on growth. 
RPOP represents the impact of population pressure on domestic resources. The 
coefficient is indeterminate and ambiguous. 
LSCHOOL represents human capital development. This variable is expected to 
impact positively on growth.   
LRGDP is included to capture convergence effects and is supposed to take care of 
initial income. 
The third relationship to be established is the behaviour of the structure of 
government debt in relation to the extent of indebtedness as well as the effect of the 
extent of stock market development on government indebtedness. Here debt ratio 
(DTGDP) as the dependent variable is related to government long term debt, short 
term borrowing and level of market capitalisation over the period under study. 
The model was however modified to exclude variables where the extent of relevance 
was considered insignificant or where data was inadequate. Among the variables 
discarded were CVTOT terms of trade variability in the model, REVOLS which 
represents internal shocks, LSCHOOL reflecting human capital development and 
LRGDP, a variable capturing the convergence effect in the model specified. The data 
sourced from the identified data bank came out scanty with a substantial portion 
missing. The research work therefore proceeded, with measuring the model excluding 
these variables for a more reliable result.  
4.9.3 Model 2: Debt Ratio on Debt Composition and Maturity 
A good measure of debt management as discussed above are the indicators contained 
in the World Bank-IMF debt management performance assessment (DeMPA) tools, 
which are adopted as a potential source to quantify the variable of debt management, 
100 
 
especially for those periods where the country’s performance institution assessment 
index (CPIA) was not readily available. Accordingly our model assumes a functional 
relationship between a country’s debt ratio and the key explanatory variables of debt 
management (DeM), here represented by the country performance institution index 
(CPIAdt). Note however, a priori theory does not give the exact structure of the 
function. Thus, in this study, different specifications of the model will be estimated. 
Based on the review of the available literature, models are specified for economic 
growth and debt management. The aim of the model is to verify the impact of 
sovereign debt management on the overall level of indebtedness. 
(vi) Specifically, level of indebtedness (dtgdp) is taken to be a function of 
sovereign debt management (DeM). 
(vii) The general framework of the functional form is expressed as: 
(viii) ܇ = ƒሺ۲۳ۻሻ�  
(ix) ࡰࡱࡹ = ࡳࡻࢂࡱࡰ + ࡯ࡻࡾࡹ࡭࡯ +࡮ࡻࡾࡲࡵࡺ࡭ + ࡯࡭ࡿࡴࡲࡸࡹ+ࡻࡼࡾ� +ࡰࢀࡾࡾ + ࡳࡻࢂࡰࡱ࡯ + ࡭ࢁࢀࡴ 
(Each one of these debt management indicators are scored in the various 
sections of the administered questionnaire. See appendix A)9  
(x) ࡰࢀࡳࡰࡼ = �ƒሺࡳࡻࢂࡱࡰ + ࡯ࡻࡾࡹ࡭࡯ + ࡮ࡻࡾࡲࡵࡺ࡭ + ࡯࡭ࡿࡴࡲࡸࡹ+ࡻࡼࡾ� + ࡰࢀࡾࡾ + ࡳࡻࢂࡰࡱ࡯ + ࡭ࢁࢀࡴሻ +ࡹ࡯࡭ࡼࡳࡰࡼ + ࡿࢀࡰࢀ +ࡸࢀࡰࢀ + ���… ሺ૚ሻ 
Where, DTGDP is the ratio of debt to gross domestic product representing the extent 
of indebtedness; GOVED represents government and strategy development, 
CORMAC is co-ordination with macro policies, BORFINA represents borrowing 
and related financing activities, CASHFLM is cash flow forecasting and cash 
balance management, OPRX is operational risk management and DTRR represents 
debt records and reporting.10  
The models are given as follows; 
(xi) ࡰࢀࡳࡰࡼ�� = ��૚ +��૛ࡰ�ࡹ� + �૜ࡹ࡯࡭ࡼࡳࡰࡼ� +��૝ࡿࢀࡰࢀ� +� ૞ࡸࢀࡰࢀ� + �૟ +�����૟ࡰࢀࡲࡳࢂ� +���…………………… . ሺ૛ሻ 
(xii) But DEM = CPIA  
The specification of the model is: 
                                                     
9
 Student Paper, Saleh A. S. (2013) 
10
 Student Paper, A.S. (2013) 
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(xiii) ∆ࡳࡰࡼ�� �= ���૚ �+��૛∆ሺ࡯ࡼࡵ࡭ሻ� +��૜∆ሺࡹ࡯࡭ࡼࡳࡰࡼሻ� +��૝∆ሺࡿࢀࡰࢀሻ� +� ૞∆ሺࡸࢀࡰࢀሻ� +����∆�૟� ሺࡰࢀࡲࡳࢂሻ� +���…………………… . ሺ૜ሻ  
(xiv) Accordingly, the a priori expectations are: 
(xv) β1 > 0, β2 ˂ 0, β3 ˂ 0, β4 > 0, β5 ˂ 0 
(xvi) βts = coefficients 
(xvii) β1 = cons tan t (intercept) 
(xviii) µ t = error term 
 
 is to take care of the constant variable, , is the coefficient of debt management 
which is expected to be less than zero because it is negatively related to the extent of 
government indebtedness or debt ratio, is the coefficient capital market 
development which is expected to be positively related to debt ratio,  which is the 
coefficient of short term debt is expected to be positively related to debt ratio,  is 
the coefficient of long term debt and is expected to be negatively correlated with debt 
ratio; and β6 is the coefficient of debt forgiveness or relief and is expected to be 
negatively correlated with a country’s extent of indebtedness. 
where: 
DTGDP = Debt to GDP ratio. 
M2GDP = Broad money to GDP ratio as a measure of development of the stock 
market. The ratio is expected to be positively correlated to the extent of the 
government debt ratio. Broad money ratio is also a measure of the condition of the 
capital market. 
LTDT = Long term government debt would result in a more stable policy and 
ultimately may lower the rate of government borrowing and hence will be negatively 
correlated with the debt ratio. 
STDT = Short term government debt is supposed to be positively correlated with the 
debt ratio. Short term debt is known to be aggravating a decline in investments and as 
a result, debt overhang. It is therefore negatively related to the debt ratio.  
CPIAdt = this is directly related to the debt ratio and should be positive. The CPIAdt, 
represents the country performance institution assessment index of debt management. 
This variable is an extension of the variable defining debt management (DEM) 
explained earlier in this chapter. CPIAdt is therefore a combination of the two. It 
involves a unity between the scores obtained from the country wide debt management 
1
2
3
4
5
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performance assessment (DeMPA) process and the scores obtained from the country 
performance institution assessment in debt management.      
Ԑ = Error term 
The above equation represents the second model. The model looks at the explanatory 
power of the ratio of broad money to gross domestic product (M2GDP), ratio of 
market capitalisation to gross domestic product (MCAPGDP), long term debt 
(LTDT), short term debt (STDT) and CPIAdt. The ratios of broad money and market 
capitalisation to gross domestic product were variables that were used to measure the 
extent of the development of a country’s capital market, a development that plays a 
pivotal role in a nation’s effective debt management process, as well as efficient 
sourcing of funding in the domestic markets. The variables of long term debt (LTDT) 
and that of short term debt (STDT) were included precisely to help determine the 
choice in composition of debt, open to the policy makers as represented by debt 
managers.  
Here the study focuses on the relationship that exists between long term borrowings 
as against a short term one. The model was however unable to reflect on choice 
between domestic and external debts as a source of funding. This was as a result of 
the dearth of data on domestic debt among the sampled countries. Where the data was 
available it was just for a fraction of the specified period covered by the work. The 
data, though relatively inadequate, is presented and discussed extensively in 
subsequent chapters. 
4.9.4 Hypotheses Testing 
This research strives to test a number of hypotheses for the purpose of justifying the 
raised research questions. The hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
Null hypothesis (H0): There is a positive relationship between government debt and 
economic growth. 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): There is a negative relationship between government 
debt and economic growth.  
Null hypothesis (H0): Debt management does have a significant influence on the 
economic growth of a country. 
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Alternative hypothesis (H1): Debt management has no significant influence on the 
economic growth of a country. 
Null hypothesis (H0): There is a relationship that exists between the extent of debt and 
the maturity of debt. 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): There is no relationship that exists between the extent of 
debt and the debt maturity. 
Null hypothesis (H0): Debt relief does have a significant influence on a country’s 
level of indebtedness. 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): Debt relief has no significant influence on a country’s 
level of indebtedness. 
4.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the research approach adopted in order to answer all the raised 
questions was specified, with all the objectives of the work identified. Furthermore 
the types and sources of data used in the work have been extensively discussed. The 
sample and population sizes employed for the purpose of the proposed research on 
sovereign government borrowing and how it related to economic growth were also 
presented and discussed. The chapter also covered the most appropriate of the 
research philosophy to be employed and the form of knowledge expected. It has been 
argued throughout the presentation that the work was strictly of the quantitative 
method. The literature emanating from the process of government borrowing was 
however expected to be biased to objectivism having given birth to a range of 
positivist ideas and conclusions. The chapter has been able to model two major 
equations through which a number of the postulated questions and hypotheses were 
addressed.  
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Primary Data Presentation 
 Introduction 
In this chapter all data collected from the primary source is presented. As explained 
earlier in chapter four, primary data like the other sources, was equally essential for 
the study. The use of primary data in this study became necessary because overall 
debt data on countries in sub-Saharan Africa was not complete for most of the 
sampled countries e.g. World Bank debt indicators, IMF financial statistics, joint debt 
data, central government debt statistics and public sector debt statistics. Domestic 
debt data or statistics and data on debt maturities were frequently reported missing or 
incomplete. However, in the process of carrying out an assessment and analysis of 
sovereign debt data an access to first-hand, detailed and prompt information on debt 
and the structure of debt is most imperative. Detailed information on the level and 
composition of domestic public debt tends to be unavailable for policy making and 
analysis. Panizza (2008) for instance, noted how the situation was made even worse in 
sub-Saharan Africa where even the standard debt sustainability analysis on public 
debt resorted to the use of a definition of external debt that did not actually reflect 
what it was measuring. This lead to serious doubts regarding whether or not the extent 
of poor country external debt was actually decreasing. Thus, up to date data was 
necessary in the computation of debt sustainability and general debt management.  
Because most of the statistics were not forth coming, there was justification for 
making up for the missing data by sourcing through a survey questionnaire. This 
chapter therefore presents the makeup data, especially that which covers data lacking 
for a complete understanding of sub-Saharan debt. However, due to the nature of the 
data on debt, the survey covered only the mid-level and senior management staff of 
central banks, debt management offices and ministries of finance of the sampled 
countries. Thus, the number of respondents was expected to be lower than in for 
instance, a general survey. Management staff populations in most organisations do not 
usually form up to one third of the organisation. In this chapter a hundred duly 
completed questionnaires are presented.  
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 Profile of Respondents 
A higher proportion of the completed questionnaires returned were from Nigeria, 
which can chiefly be attributed to the fact that the country was visited in person by the 
researcher. Due to cost of travel around the other selected countries the questionnaires 
were distributed online. There was a very poor response from the three other sampled 
countries; Ghana, Uganda and South Africa. No response was recorded against 
Ghana, 2 from Uganda and none from South Africa. The remaining 98 responses were 
from Nigeria. The problem of poor response from other sampled countries was 
however not necessarily a serious issue, since the essence of the primary data was to 
complement the already collected secondary data.  
The respondents were largely senior and mid-level management staff of central banks, 
debt offices, and ministries of finance in the sampled countries. This feature of the 
target audience largely contributed to the overall number of responses. Senior and 
management staffs in most government departments are relatively fewer than their 
lower ranking counterparts and thus justify the total of 100 valid responses. 
All respondents were male, married and had achieved a minimum of a bachelor’s 
degree. The quality of the respondents’ profile indicates a reasonable level of subject 
awareness profession-wise, professional competence, experience and reliability. The 
following represents a breakdown of the responses received from the questionnaires 
distributed to respondents spread across the sampled countries. The total number of 
questionnaires distributed was meant to complement the number of structured 
interviews. The purpose of these sources of data was to supplement the secondary 
data from financial institutions and agencies. 
Table 5.1: Profile of Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Institution 
No of 
questionnaires 
Administered 
% of 
Response 
Ghana Bank of Ghana 30 0 
Nigeria DMO 35 34 
Nigeria CBN 35 32 
Nigeria FMF 25 20 
Nigeria WAIFEM 25 12 
Uganda Bank of Ghana 20 2 
South 
Africa 
Reserve Bank of South 
Africa 20 0 
Total 
 
190 100 
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Table 5.1 shows a profile of the respondents who were involved in the questionnaire 
survey process. A total of 190 questionnaires were administered with a total of 100 
responses recorded, representing 52.63%. Debt management related organisations 
engaged during the exercise included the central banks of the four sampled countries 
as well as the debt management office, Federal Ministry of Finance and the West 
African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM). More than 
90% of all responses were received from Nigeria, having being visited by the 
researcher in person. Two responses were recorded from the Bank of Uganda. There 
was no response recorded from the Bank of Ghana and the South African Reserve 
Bank. All respondents were of mid-level to senior management cadre and possessed a 
qualification higher than a bachelor’s degree. All respondents were male, married and 
above thirty years of age.    
Figure 5.1: Profile of Respondents 
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Figure 5.1 summarises the number of questionnaires distributed to the government 
departments spread around the sampled countries as shown in the preceding 
respondents’ profile table.  
 Response to Questionnaire  
Proponents of the survey research method strongly believe that representative 
sampling is essential for generalization from sample to the general population to be 
feasible. It has been argued that for a sample to be representative, the surveys 
response rate must be relatively high. For many, a research sample can only be a solid 
representative of a population where a probability sampling method is employed and 
the response rate is as high as 100%. According to Krosnick (1999) however, it is not 
be necessarily the case that representativeness increases monotonically with the rate 
of response. Accordingly, recent researches have shown that surveys recording low 
levels of response tend to prove more accurate than surveys with higher rates of 
response.  
For instance, comparing accuracy between the self-administered mail surveys to that 
recorded in the process of telephone surveys during the forecasts  of a state-wide 
election for a 15–year period, Visser, Krosnick, Marquette, and Curtin (1996) 
concluded that although the mail surveys recorded a response rate in the range of 20% 
and the telephone surveys returned up to 60% the mail surveys ended up predicting 
the election results much more accurately than the telephone surveys had. Thus, it is 
evident that the more researchers strive hard to boost the rate of response, the less 
representative the sample tends to become. 
Questionnaire surveys such as the ones we are presenting are a part of a process that 
generates standardized data, which are usually and to a larger extent amenable to 
quantification and further statistical analysis. Thus, it should be reasonably expected 
that the process will render a response rate that is up to 50% where the subject of 
research concerns the general public, although for specialised populations it should be 
higher (Rea & Parker, 2012). Generally, a response rate of up to 50% can be 
considered adequate for purposes of analysis and reporting research findings. This is 
dependent on the researcher’s satisfaction with the representativeness of the 
respondents. Brehm (1993) observes that even in the best academic surveys there 
tends to be significant bias based on demographic and attitudinal composition of the 
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samples obtained. Brehm (1993) further notes that in two leading academic nation-
wide public opinion surveys, certain demographic groups have been routinely 
represented in misleading numbers.  
 Debt Management Indicators 
The Governance and Strategy Development (See Appendix I) is the first section 
which contains five different indicators; legal framework, managerial structure, 
borrowing and debt-related transactions and loan guarantees. Other indicators under 
this section are debt management strategy, quality of content and decision-making 
process, evaluation of debt management operations, audit frequency and audit 
appropriate response.  
 Government and Strategy Development 
The essence of governance and strategy development is to ensure that certain 
indicators such as the legal framework, managerial structure with respect to 
borrowing and debt-related transactions and loan guarantees, issues of debt 
management strategy with respect to quality of content, debt management issues 
regarding the decision making process are in place and implemented effectively. 
Other equally important indicators include the evaluation of debt management 
operations, audit frequency and audit appropriate response. These indicators are 
assembled to form the variable of government and strategy development presented in 
this section. Respondents were requested to rate the extent of compliance to the 
indicators. 
Table 5.2: Government and Strategy Development 
Indicator       Valid Missing value Total Mean Mode 
GV1A 98 2 100 3.78 4 
GV1B 98 2 100 4.23 5 
GV1C 90 10 100 3.63 4 
GV1D 90 10 100 3.83 4 
GV1E 92 8 100 3.54 4 
GV1F 88 12 100 3.68 4 
GV1G 80 20 100 3.69 4 
GV1H 92 8 100 3.59 4.1 
  
Table 5.2 displays the descriptive statistics of the important variable of government 
and strategy development, which is coded GV1 for easier identification and analysis. 
GV is short for government and the figure 1 shows that it is the first variable as per 
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the questionnaire. All dimensions under the same variable are differentiated 
alphabetically. For example, there are the indicators of Legal Framework the 
Managerial Structure, Borrowing and Debt Related Transaction abbreviated to GV1A 
and GV1B respectively. The codes GV1C, GV1D, GV1E, GV1F, GV1G and GV1H 
were assigned to managerial structure, loan guarantees, and debt management 
strategy, quality of content, decision making process, and evaluation of debt 
management operation, audit, frequency and audit appropriate response respectively. 
The descriptive statistics in table 5.2 go on to show the valid and missing value, mean 
and mode of the distribution. Of the 100 questionnaires the least valid response was 
80, while the highest missing value was recorded under the indicator of audit 
frequency with 20. The mean score ranged between a low 3.54, recorded under the 
indicator of debt management strategy, decision making process, (GV1E) and a high 
4.23 under the indicator of Managerial Structure: Borrowing and Debt Related 
Transaction (GV1B). The mode score for all the indicators was 4, with the exception 
of a mode response of 5 recorded for GV1B. Figure 5.2 gives a graphical 
representation of the distribution. 
Figure 5.2: Government and Strategy 
 
 Legal Framework 
The indicator for the legal framework is meant to clearly set out the authority to 
borrow from both domestic and external sources, as well as perform debt-related 
transactions ranging from currency to interest swaps and other matters such as the 
issuance of loan guarantees. The legal framework ensures the legality of borrowing 
where most of the time this delegation is found in the primary legislation, usually in a 
separate law on public debt or similar law in the budget system law along with the 
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annual budget act or in a fiscal responsibility act. However, the first level of 
delegation of the borrowing power is derived from the parliament or congress as the 
case may be and down to the executive arm of government. In some instances the 
delegation of the borrowing power tends to be restricted by a statement of the purpose 
by which the government can borrow e.g. to finance deficit or to refinance a maturing 
facility. This restriction can also emerge in the form of a limit on the annual net 
borrowing or the outstanding debt (Bank, 2009). The legal framework is a crucial 
aspect of the process of government borrowing. On several occasions, debts have 
tended to be repudiated on the premise of the issue of legality. For instance Tideman 
and Lockwood (1993) noted that in the past many countries have repudiated their 
debts. Under normal circumstances however, repudiation of sovereign debts should 
have no justification. They concluded that a country might legitimately repudiate its 
debt on four premises: that the said facility had actually been contracted fraudulently, 
lacking a valid approval by the citizens, the lender had been negligent and the nation 
is bankrupt.  Table 5.3 presents statistics collated on the indicator of legal framework 
as compiled from respondent rankings on a scale of 1 to 5.  
Table 5.3: Legal Framework  
Scale Frequency Percent  Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                            1 4                  4 4.1 4.1 
2 12                12 12.2 16.3 
3 15                15 15.3 31.6 
4 37                37 37.8 69.4 
5 30                30 30.6 100 
Total 98                98 100  
Missing                       9 2                  2  
 
Total 100 100  
 
  
Table 5.3 covers the rankings attributed to the indicator of legality of contracting a 
government debt facility or the legal framework. Here, almost all rankings were 
carried out with two missing values. A total of 98 valid entries were made, while 2 
representing 2% of the entire legal framework scores were recorded as missing 
values. Legal framework was ranked at 1, 4 times, 2, 12 times, 3, 15 times, 4, 37 
times and 5, 30 times, representing 4, 12.2, 15.3, 37.8 and 30.6% respectively. These 
statistics indicate that the legal framework arrangements for government debt had 
been remarkably high with 79.6% of all valid entries ranking the indicator between 3; 
good, to 5; excellent in compliance.  
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Figure 5.3: Legal Framework 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 presents a graphical presentation of the scale rankings made on the 
indicator of legal framework.  
 Managerial Structure: Borrowing and Debt Related Transactions   
Here Borrowing and Debt-Related Transactions is considered, as well as the issue of 
loan guarantees. The indicator is relevant in the process of the assessment of a sound 
debt management strategy at any particular point of time. It is meant to ensure that the 
managerial structure for debt management is clearly shared between the political level 
(the legislative arm or the executive) that actually sets out the overall long-term 
central government objectives, approves the established strategy as well as the 
agencies responsibilities for carrying out the laid down function of implementing the 
debt management strategy (Bank, 2009). This measure has the advantage of rightly 
placing the overall decision concerning the volume of indebtedness and the acceptable 
risks inherent in the debt portfolio as they affect the budget, taxes, government 
spending programs and other such indicators on political decision makers, while 
allowing technical experts to handle the issue of determination of the optimum risk-
risk adjustable outcome as contained in the parameters. 
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Table 5.4: Managerial Structure, Borrowing and Debt Related Transactions  
Scale Frequency Percent  Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                        2 2 2 2.3 2.3 
3 17 17 19.3 21.6 
4 28 28 31.8 53.4 
5 41 41 46.6 100 
Total 88 88 100  
Missing                   9 12 12  
 
Total 100 100  
 
  
Table 5.4 presents the rankings given to aspects of managerial structure with respect 
to borrowing and debt-related transactions – GV1B. The respondents were asked to 
rank the extent of which they believed the managerial structure in their countries was 
balanced between the political level and the entities charged with the responsibility 
for the implementation of the government debt management strategy. 41 of all the 
valid entries ranked at 46.6% ranked the indicator perfect at 5%, 28% or 31.8% of the 
entries ranked it 4 or very good, 17 respondent entries or 19.3% ranked the adherence 
to the indicator 3 or good. The least ranking was 2; or fair, in 2 valid entries 
representing 2.3%. Missing values accounted for a total of 12 or 12% Overall, the 
survey response to the indicator was valid at 88% and the majority opinion indicated 
an effective separation between the government and the debt policies implementation 
agency. 
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Figure 5.4: Managerial Structure, Borrowing and Debt Related Transactions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the ranking of the indicator in a bar chart form representing the data 
presented in table 5.4.  
 Managerial Structure: Loan Guarantees  
The other aspect of managerial structure is the issue of loan guarantees, which are 
typically made to support a certain beneficiary, project or a specific sector of the 
economy. Since it is a political decision there was no need to separate the political 
decision of approval for a government source of funding and the issuance of loan 
guarantees. But having left the responsibility of the issuance of a loan guarantee to the 
technical and professional body in charge of government debt management, it is then 
left for the technical team to ensure the assessment and the pricing of the credit risk as 
well as to monitor this risk during the term of the guarantee and to co-ordinate the 
borrowings of the guarantee beneficiaries with the central government borrowing (and 
properly record them). However, a cross country experience indicates that a 
successful agency arrangement in debt management depends in part on the degree to 
which the principal-agent problems which arise from issues related to delegation of 
authority are resolved (Currie et al., 2003). Table 5.5 presents an assessment of 
compliance with the provision loan guarantee as contained in questionnaire responses 
received from a hundred respondents.  
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Table 5.5: Managerial Structure: Loan Guarantees  
Scale Frequency Percent  Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                        2 12 12 13.3 13.3 
3 19 19 21.1 34.4 
4 49 49 54.4 88.9 
5 10 10 11.1 100 
Total 90 90 100  
Missing                   9 10 10  
 
Total 100 100  
 
 
 
Table 5.5 presents the ratings with respect to the indicator of loan guarantees. Of a 
total 100 returned and duly completed questionnaires 90 entries representing 90% 
were recorded as valid and 10 or 10% were recorded as missing values. Of the 90 
valid entries 10 or 11.1% rated the indicator 5 or excellent, with 49, representing 
54.4% of the entries rated the indicator 4 or very good, 19 representing 21.1% rated 
compliance with the requirement of loan guarantees 3 or good and 12 representing 
13.3% of all valid responses ranked the debt management indicator 2, or fair. A total 
of 10 entries were recorded as missing values. The level of response was quite 
remarkable at 90% valid entries. 
Figure 5.5: Managerial Structure: Loan guarantees 
 
 
Figure 5.5 sheds more light onto the content of table 12 presented earlier. The 
statistical data on compliance to loan guarantees is shown graphically as a bar chart.  
 Debt Management Strategy: Quality of Content 
The indicator of the quality of content emphasises that the content of a debt 
management strategy should ensure that the analytical basis, upon which the risk 
indicators are disclosed, promotes transparency in its formulation. Bearing in mind 
that the content of strategy in debt management may vary from one country to 
another, table 13 presents the assessment of compliance to this debt indicator, 
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primarily in Nigeria. Responding to a questionnaire, the respondents ranked the level 
of compliance on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Table 5.6: Debt Management Strategy: Quality of Content  
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid                 1 2 2 2.2 2.2 
2 7 7 7.8 10 
3 4 4 4.4 14.4 
4 68 68 75.6 90 
5 9 9 10 100 
Total 90 90 100  
Missing             9 10 10   
Total 100 100   
 
Table 5.6 represents the statistics of all the responses recorded, based on the level of 
quality of content of the debt data. Of 100 questionnaires 90% of the entries were 
found to be valid and 10% were recorded as missing values. Of the 90 valid entries, 
the highest rating of 5 was found in 9 entries, representing 10%, 68 representing 
75.6% rated quality of content of debt strategy at a high 4, or very good, the rating of 
3 or good, was made in four responses or 4.4%, 7 and 2 responses representing 7.8 
and 2.2 percentages respectively rated the indicator 2; far, and 1; poor. By this, the 
indicator of quality of content is can be judged as being effective.  
Figure 5.6: Debt Management Strategy: Quality and Content 
 
 
 
The bar chart in Figure 5.6 sheds more light on the statistics earlier presented in table 
5.6.  
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 Audit: Frequency  
This indicator is relevant in assessing a country’s performance in the aspect of debt 
management. The frequency of audit in government debt management activities is to ensure 
that all operations are subjected to scrutinise the national audit bodies, where the standards of 
the audits should be of international standards. Table 5.9 presents statistical data on the 
indicator of audit frequency, mainly collected from questionnaire responses by a hundred 
respondents.  
Table 5.9: Audit Frequency  
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                               1 3 3 3.8 3.8 
2 3 3 3.8 7.5 
3 27 27 33.8 41.3 
4 30 30 37.5 78.8 
5 17 17 21.3 100 
Total 80 80 100  
Missing                          9 20 20  
 
Total 100 100  
 
 
Table 5.9 presents the response to the indicator of audit frequency as an element of 
governance and strategy development. There are a total of 100 questionnaire 
responses recorded of which a total of 80 or 80% were valid. Twenty or 20% of all 
entries were recorded as missing values. Of the 80 valid responses, 17 or 21.3% rated 
the indicator at a high 5 or excellent, 30 or 37.5% rated compliance with audit 
frequency 4, or very good, 27 representing 33.8% rated the indicator 3 or good, and 3 
entries each representing 3.8 and 3.8% of all valid entries, rated the indicator 2 and 1 
respectively. Implied by these statistics, these respondents were essentially reporting 
that the aspect of regular auditing to ensure scrutiny and compliance was very good. 
This is considered remarkable and as with the preceding indicators, indicates a strict 
compliance to the debt management standards. Figure 5.9 shows the distribution of 
respondents’ ranking of the audit response. The figure represents the data as a bar 
chart. 
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Figure 5.7: Audit Frequency 
  
 Debt Management Strategy: Decision Making Process 
Strategy in debt refers to the decision of the government’s preferred risk tolerance and how it 
is periodically updated. The indicator of debt management strategy as it relates to the decision 
making process ensures that there is in place a sound process for strategies for long term 
policies. Accordingly, the central banks and finance ministries should monitor to ensure that 
the strategy in place would not conflict with monetary policy implementation and utilise the 
strategy to be approved by the council of ministers or the cabinet.  
Table 5.7: Debt Management Strategy: Decision Making Process   
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                1 10 10 10.9 10.9 
2 14 14 15.2 26.1 
3 7 7 7.6 33.7 
4 38 38 41.3 75 
5 23 23 25 100 
Total 92 92 100  
Missing            9 8 8   
Total 100 100   
 
 
Table 5.7 presents the respondent ranking of the indicator of the decision making 
process. Of the 100 questionnaires returned only 8 representing 8% were recorded as 
missing values. A total of 92 responses or 92% were recorded as valid. The highest 
ranking of 5 was made by 23 respondents representing 25% of all responses. The 
highest frequency of 38 was recorded against 4 representing 41.3% of all responses. 
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Rankings of 3, 2, and 1 were made in 7, 14, and 10 responses, representing 7.6, 15.2, 
and 10.9%s respectively. The statistics show a high level of compliance with the 
indicator, with approximately 73.9% of the respondents rating it between 3 and 5. 
Figure 5.7 graphically represents the data in table 5.7. 
Figure 5.7: Decision Making Process 
  
 
 Evaluation of Debt Management Operation 
The essence of the debt indicator of the evaluation of debt management operation is to 
ensure that all debt management entities are made accountable by a clear evaluation 
of outcomes against the government’s set objectives, as well as to ensure compliance 
with the government’s debt management strategy and to promote transparency and 
good governance. Table 5.8 summarises the responses recorded as per the indicator of 
evaluation of the debt management operation. 
 
Table 5.8: Evaluation of Debt Management Operation  
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid             1 8 8 9.1 9.1 
2 6 6 6.8 15.9 
3 11 11 12.5 28.4 
4 44 44 50 78.4 
5 19 19 21.6 100 
Total 88 88 100 
  
Missing         9 12 12 
    
Total 100 100 
    
  
The indicator on the evaluation of debt management operation frequencies are 
presented in table 5.8. Out of a total of 100 questionnaires, 88 respondents or 88% of 
the all entries were found to be valid and 12 or 12% were recorded as missing. Of the 
valid entries, a total of 19 representing 21.6% rated the variable 5 or excellent. 44 
representing 50%, or the majority of all valid responses, rated the indicator at a high 4 
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or very good and 11 representing 12.5% rated the same indicator 3 or a good 6, and 8 
responses representing 6.8% and 9.1% each, rated the indicator 2 and 1 respectively. 
Figure 5.8 presents the same data in a bar chart graph form.  
Figure 5.8:  Evaluation of Debt Management Operation 
 
 
 Audit: Appropriate Response 
This debt management performance indicator is meant to identify whether or not 
regular internal audits by the debt office, as well as periodic external auditing by the 
office of the auditor general, are carried out to ensure transparency, compliance and 
accountability. The indicator thus requires that the office of the auditor generally 
responds to audit reports as soon as possible to address outcomes or audit findings. In 
addition, the indicator emphasises meetings with representatives of the auditor’s 
general office. Table 5.10 presents statistics on respondents’ ratings of the extent of 
compliance to the indicator of audit appropriate response.   
Table 5.10: Audit: Appropriate Response  
Scale Frequency Per cent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                         2 29 29 31.5 31.5 
3 12 12 13 44.6 
4 18 18 19.6 64.1 
5 33 33 35.9 100 
Total 92 92 100  
Missing                     9 8 8  
 
Total 100 100  
 
 
Table 5.10 presents 100 responses on the indicator of audit appropriate response. Of 
this number 92 responses were found to be valid, while 8 or 8% were recorded as 
missing values. Of the valid entries 33 representing 35.9% rated the indicator 5 or 
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excellent, 18 or 19% indicator on a scale of 1 or poor. By implication, all the 
provisions for prompt response were observed frequently in all the debt management 
aspects of the sampled countries. The overall result indicates a good and balanced 
outcome.  
Figure 5.8: Appropriate Response 
  
 
Figure 5.10 supports the data presented in table 5.10. Accordingly, the statistics are 
represented in a bar chart form. The indicator of audit response was seen to be rated 
excellent by the majority of the respondents, thereby confirming the extent to which 
the countries under investigation adhere to the World Bank’s guidelines on debt 
management.  
 Coordination with Macroeconomic Policies 
The next variable to be presented is that of co-ordination of government debt policies 
with its other macroeconomic policies. As we have seen earlier, government debt 
often translates into increases in taxation for the private individuals or households. 
Although the Ricardian equivalence theory promoted the idea that government debt 
had no impact at all, the government’s choices of debt instruments tends to have a 
reasonable impact on the private sector and by extension the economy. Hence, it is 
imperative to ensure that government debt management strategy is in agreement with 
a country’s macroeconomic policies. Below are the descriptive statistics on the 
responses of a cross-section of intermediate and top management debt management 
and economic policy decision makers in the sampled countries. 
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Table 5.11: Co-ordination with Macroeconomic Policies 
Indicator Valid Missing Total Mean Mode 
CM2A 90 10 100 4.01 4.0 
CM2B 90 10 100 4.10 4.0 
CM2C 90 10 100 3.97 4.0 
CM2D 86 14 100 3.76 4.0 
CM2E 93 7 100 3.92 4.0 
  
Table 5.11 shows the descriptive statistics of the five dimensions under co-ordination 
with macroeconomic policies, such as inflation, GDP and unemployment. These are 
the aspects of fiscal policy, which relate to the provision and quality of debt service 
forecasts and the availability and quality of information on key macro-economic and 
debt sustainability analysis. Furthermore, we observe three other monetary policy 
dimensions relating to the clarity of separation between debt management and 
monetary policy operations, regularity of information sharing between agencies 
handling government debt and limited access to the central bank financing. These 
indicators are, Fiscal Policy: Provision and Quality of Debt-Service Forecasts 
(CM2A), Fiscal Policy: Availability and Quality Information on Key Macro Variables 
and DSA (CM2B), Monetary Policy: Clarity of Separation between Debt 
Management and Monetary Policy Operations (CM2C), Monetary Policy: Regularity 
of Information Sharing (CM2D) and Monetary Policy: Limited Access to Central 
Bank Financing (CM2E); all reflecting the variable of coordination with 
Macroeconomic policies. The valid and missing entries for the five variables are 90 - 
10, 90 - 10, 90 - 10, 86 - 14 and 93 – 7 respectively. The mode for the distribution 
across all the indicators is 4. The mean for CM2A is 4.01, CM2B, is 4.10, CM2C, is 
3.97, CM2D, is 3.76 and for CM2E records a mean of 3.92. Figure 5.11 gives a 
pictorial representation of the data in table 5.11. 
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Figure 5.11: Co-ordination with Macroeconomic Policies 
 
 Fiscal Policy: Provision and Quality of Debt-Service Forecasts 
Table 5.12 presents the statistics on the indicator of ensuring the provision of quality 
of debt-service forecasts coded CM2A. This covers the ability to have access to 
information on future debt transactions as well as government cash flows. 
Table 5.12: Fiscal Policy 
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                  2 3 3 3.3 3.3 
3 6 6 6.7 10 
4 68 68 75.6 85.6 
5 13 13 14.4 100 
Total 90 90 100 
  
Missing              9 10 10 
    
Total 100 100 
    
 
The responses indicate that a total of the 100 questionnaire responses received, 90 
entries or 90% were found to be valid while missing data account for 10%. Of the 
total valid entries 13 or 14.4% rated the indicator 5 or excellent, 68 representing 
75.6% rated the indicator 4 or very good, 6 responses or 6.7% of the valid scores and 
3 or 3.3% of the valid scores rated the indicator 3 and 2 respectively. The rating 
indicates that there was a high level of compliance with the indicator. Figure 5.12 
gives a graphical representation of the data discussed in table 5.12. 
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 Figure 5.12: Fiscal Policy 
  
 
 Fiscal Policy: Availability and Quality Information on Key Macro Variables 
and DSA 
The indicator of fiscal policy; availability and quality information on key macro variables and 
debt sustainability analysis exists to identify the extent of the level of co-ordination and the 
quality and frequency of information sharing among the different authorities. The indicator 
attempts to ensure that during the assessment meetings with officials from the budget and 
macroeconomic unit in the ministry of finance and the debt office or agency. Table 5.13 
presents data collected from respondents’ assessment of compliance with the indicator on a 
scale of 1 to 5. 
Table 5.13: Availability of Quality Information on Key Variables  
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 1 1 1 1.1 1.1 
2 5 5 5.6 6.7 
3 8 8 8.9 15.6 
4 46 46 51.1 66.7 
5 30 30 33.3 100 
Total 90 90 100 
  
Missing             9 10 10 
    
Total 100 100 
    
  
Table 5.13 presents the variable of fiscal policy, which relates to availability and 
quality of information on key macro variables and DSA (debt sustainability analysis). 
All the respondents should be conversant with what debt and other relevant 
information is shared between the principal debt management agency and the central 
bank and the frequency of these exchanges. From the statistics we see that of a total 
100 questionnaires returned 90 were recorded to be valid, while 10 or 10% were 
recorded as missing data. Of the 90 valid scores 30 representing 33.3% duly rated the 
indicator 5 or excellent, 46 or 51.1 rated the indicator 4 or very good, 8 representing 
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8.9% rated CM2B 3 or good, 5 representing 5.6% ranked the indicator 2 or fair and a 
single respondent representing 1.1% of all valid entries rated CM2B a low 1 or poor. 
Figure 5.13 represents the data under discussion as a bar chart.  
Figure 5.13: Availability of Quality Information 
 
 
 Monetary Policy: Clarity of Separation between Debt Management and 
Monetary Policy Operation 
This indicator attempts to ensure that there is a clear separation between monetary policy 
operations and all debt management transactions, as well as to encourage the maintenance of 
information sharing on current and future debt transactions with the government’s cash flows. 
One component of effective co-ordination between macroeconomic policies is the 
effective separation between the agencies handling debt management from those 
involved with other aspects of macroeconomic policies. For instance, respondents 
here should be aware of who is responsible for the preparation of cash flow forecasts, 
the frequency of such forecasts as well as the period covered by them. This way, the 
level of efficiency would be promoted through specialisation, transparency and 
accountability. The respondents’ assessment of the extent of compliance with the 
provision of this indicator is presented in table 5.14 of this work. 
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Table 5.14: Clarity of Separation between Debt Management and Monetary Policy 
Scale Frequency Per cent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                1 3 3 3.3 3.3 
2 5 5 5.6 8.9 
3 13 13 14.4 23.3 
4 40 40 44.4 67.8 
5 29 29 32.2 100 
Total 90 90 100 
  
Missing            9 10 10 
    
Total 100 100 
    
 
Table 5.14 shows the statistics on the aspect of monetary policy, which relate to 
clarity of separation between debt management and monetary policy. From the table, 
as with all others before, we see that there were 100 questionnaires recorded. Of this 
number a total of 90 were found to be appropriately scored and valid, while 10, 
representing 10% were recorded as missing data. The highest ranking of 5 or excellent 
level of compliance was by 29 entries representing 32.2% of all valid entries; 40 
entries or 44.4% rated the indicator 4 or very good and 13 entries representing 14.4% 
ranked the same indicator 3 or good. Between the three groups, 91% of all the 
rankings awarded did not go below 3 or good. Implied by these statistics, compliance 
with this aspect of debt management was high among the countries covered by the 
survey. The rankings of 2, fair and 1, poor were made by two groups of 5 and 3 
respondents representing 8.9 and 3.3% respectively. Figure 5.14 provides a graphical 
representation of the data distribution in the table  
 
Figure 5.14: Clarity of Separation between Debt Management and Monetary Policy 
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 Monetary Policy: Regularity of Information Sharing 
This aspect of debt management is very important in maintaining a regular track of 
the activities of all the agencies dealing with debt management vis-à-vis the other 
macroeconomic policies, with the aim of minimising cost and risk. The indicator was 
assessed via a questionnaire with the collated responses presented in table 5.15 of this 
work. 
Table 5.15: Monetary Policy: Regularity of Information Sharing  
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 1 2 2 2.3 2.3 
2 8 8 9.3 11.6 
3 14 14 16.3 27.9 
4 47 47 54.7 82.6 
5 15 15 17.4 100 
Total 86 86 100 
  
Missing             9 14 14 
    
Total 100 100 
    
 
Table 5.15 presents monetary policy, which relates to the issue of regularity of 
information sharing. Out of a total of 100 responses recorded, 86 were duly completed 
and classified valid and 10 representing 10% were recorded as missing values. In 
accordance with this, a total of 15 respondents, representing 17.4% rated the indicator 
5 or excellent, 47 or 54.7% of all valid scores rated the indicator 4 or very good, 14 
respondents or 16.3% rated the indicator 3 or good, 8 or 9.3% rated the indicator 2 or 
fair, and 2 respondents or 2.3 ranked the indicator lowest at 1 or poor. These statistics 
indicate a high level of compliance to this indicator of debt management, which 
promotes the regularity of information sharing. Figure 5.15 is a graphical 
representation of the statistics presented in table 5.15. 
Figure 5.15: Regularity of Information Sharing 
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 Monetary Policy: Limited Access to Central Bank Financing 
The monetary policy indicator which relates to limited access to Central Bank 
financing, requires that there should be an awareness of whether the government has 
an overdraft, or otherwise and means facility with the Central Bank. The respondents 
attempting this aspect of the questionnaire, as with other indicators, were intended to 
be knowledgeable about whether the government actually used the facility and the 
frequency of the usage as well as the amounts and for what length of time. Table 5.16 
presents all collected data in respect of the assessment of the extent of compliance 
with the indicator of limited access to central bank financing.  
Table 5.16: Limited Access to Central Bank Financing 
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 1 4 4 4.3 4.3 
2 7 7 7.5 11.8 
3 12 12 12.9 24.7 
4 39 39 41.9 66.7 
5 31 31 33.3 100 
Total 93 93 100 
  
Missing             9 7 7 
    
Total 100 100 
    
 
Table 5.16 presents the statistics on the last of dimensions under co-ordination with 
monetary policy. The table shows that there were a total of 100 returned 
questionnaires. Of this number 93 or 93% of all the entries were found to be valid, 
while the remaining 7% were recorded as missing values. Of the valid responses 
recorded 31, representing 33.3% rated the indicator at a high 5 or excellent, 39 or 
41.9% ranked it 4 or very good, and 12 or 12.9% ranked the indicator 3 or good, 7 and 
4 responses, representing 7.5 and 4.3 percentages rated the indicator 2, fair, and 1, 
poor, respectively. These statistics are graphically represented in figure 5.16.  
Figure 5.16: Access to Central Bank Financing 
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The statistics of the responses in table 5.16 indicate a remarkable compliance to the 
indicator of Limited Access to Central Bank Financing, with only 7 and 4 respondents 
representing 11.8 and 4.3% respectively, awarding the least ratings of 2, fair and 1, 
poor. It reveals that 83.9% of all respondents rated the indicator at least average. 
 Government Borrowing and Related Financing Activities 
This segment focuses on the variable of borrowing and other related financing 
activities. This variable is an essential aspect of government debt management, 
introduced to ensure that all government borrowing activities denominated in the local 
currency in the domestic markets are transparent, as well as predictable enough to 
enable the provision of a mechanism to finance government expenditure in a cost-
effective manner and at the same time minimise risks (Bank, 2009). Domestic debt is 
one of many forms of deficit financing available to the government. However, 
domestic borrowing from the banking system or from the private sector requires a 
more developed banking and financial system (Beaugrand, Loko, & Mlachila, 2002). 
Thus, issues of domestic borrowing and related activities are considered necessary in 
the process of assessing a government debt management strategy. Domestic debt is 
relevant as a source of financing in the developing world, since it tends to reduce 
inflationary pressures and minimises the risk inherent in external debt. External debt 
may sometimes be preferred because it may reduce the possibilities of crowding-out 
effects on private investments as well as reduce risks of inflationary pressures.  
Under this variable we consider several dimensions upon which the respondents were 
expected to assess with a rating on a scale of 1 to 5. These indicators are government 
domestic borrowing in relations to market-based mechanisms and preparation of a 
borrowing plan, domestic borrowing and the availability and quality of documented 
procedures and external borrowing with respect to provision of a borrowing plan and 
assessment of costs and terms, external borrowing in relations to the availability of 
documented procedure and external borrowing; involvement of legal advisers. 
Additional indicators under this variable include loan guarantees, as it concerns 
availability and quality of documented policies and procedures on-lending, extent of 
availability and quality of documented policies and procedures and derivatives and 
how much they are covered by quality of documented policies and procedures.  
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For more organised data, recording, analysis and easier identification the indicators 
were coded accordingly: Domestic Borrowing; Market-Based Mechanism and Preparation 
of a Borrowing Plan (BF3A), Domestic Borrowing: Availability and Quality of Documented 
Procedures (BF3B), External Borrowing: Borrowing Plan and Assessment of Costs and 
Terms (BF3C), External Borrowing: Availability of Documented Procedures (BF3D), 
External Borrowing: Involvement of Legal Advisers (BF3E), Loan Guarantees: Availability 
and Quality of Documented Policies and Procedures (BF3F), On-lending: Availability and 
Quality of Documented Policies and Procedures (BF3G), and Derivatives: Availability and 
Quality of Documented Policies and Procedures (BF3H). Table 5.17 show statistics from 
the questionnaire responses collected on the variable of borrowing and related 
financing activities of the government debt department and associated agencies.   
Table 5.17: Government Borrowing and Related Financing Activities          
Indicator Valid Missing Total Mean Mode 
BF3A 90 10 100 3.48 5 
BF3B 94 6 100 3.71 4 
BF3C 90 10 100 3.93 4 
BF3D 90 10 100 4.12 4 
BF3E 92 8 100 3.77 4 
BF3F 97 3 100 3.62 4 
BF3G 95 5 100 3.52 4 
BF3H 95 5 100 4.04 4 
Table 5.17 summarises the statistics of the responses received from 100 respondents, 
assessing the different indicators making up the variable of borrowing and related 
financing activities. Of the 100 respondents the highest valid entries were recorded 
under the indicator of loan guarantees: availability and quality of documented policies 
and procedures (BF3F), with 97% completion and 3% missing data recorded. The 
least responses were recorded under indicators BF3A, BF3C, and BF3D, with 90% 
completion and 10% missing data records respectively. The highest frequency was 
recorded under the indicator of Borrowing Market Based Mechanism and Preparation 
of a Borrowing Plan (BF3A), with an aggregate mode of 5. The mode for the other 
indicators was 4. The mean of the distribution ranged between a minimum of 3.48 
recorded under BF3A and a maximum of 4.12 recorded under BF3D. Figure 5.17 
represents the data in a chart form.  
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Figure 5.17: Borrowing and Related Financial Activities 
 
 
 Domestic Borrowing: Market-Based Mechanism and Preparation of a 
Borrowing Plan 
Table 5.18 presents the statistics of the data obtained on the indicator BF3A. The 
statistics relate to the response of respondents on the extent of the government’s 
compliance with the requirement that borrowing activities in local currency in the 
domestic market remain transparent and predictable enough to provide the 
government with a mechanism to finance its expenditure at lower costs and minimised 
risks. 
Table 5.18: Market-Based Mechanism and Preparation of a Borrowing Plan 
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                1 7 7 7.8 7.8 
2 19 19 21.1 28.9 
3 14 14 15.6 44.4 
4 24 24 26.7 71.1 
5 26 26 28.9 100 
Total 90 90 100 
  
Missing            9 10 10 
    
Total 100 100 
    
 
Table 5.18 presents the indicator of domestic borrowing, the aspect of market-based 
mechanisms and preparation of a borrowing plan. The respondents attempting this 
must have had knowledge and information of the level of compliance among 
government debt related agencies in the sampled countries. We can observe from the 
statistics in the table under reference that out of a total of 100 likely responses a total 
of 90% valid entries were recorded. 10% were recorded as missing values. Of the 
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90% valid entries, 7 representing 7.8% ranked the indicator 1, poor, 19 representing 
21.1% ranked the indicator 2, or fair, and 14 or 15.6% ranked the indicator 3, or 
average. A high ranking of 4 and 5 was made by 24 and 26 of the respondents, 
representing 26.7% and 28.9% respectively. With about 63.3% of all scores ranked at 
least average indicates a high compliance with the indicator among the sampled 
countries. Figure 5.18 sheds more light on the statistics in table 5.18. 
 
Figure 5.18: Graphical Presentation of Market-Based Mechanism 
 
 
 Domestic Borrowing: Availability and Quality of Documented Procedures  
According to the Bank (2009) international practice indicated that it was beneficial for 
the government when it made available in advance to market participants and 
investors with details of borrowing plans and other related activities as well as acting 
consistently in the process of the issuance of new treasury bills and other similar 
activities e.g. T-bills buy backs. Table 5.19 presents the respondents views on 
compliance with the requirement of availability and quality of documented procedure.   
Table 5.19: Availability and Quality of Documented Procedures  
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid         1 1 1 1.1 1.1 
            2 10 10 10.6 11.7 
                 3 16 16 17 28.7 
           4 55 55 58.5 87.2 
           5 12 12 12.8 100 
Total 94 94 100 
  
Missing     9 6 6 
    
Total 100 100 
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Table 5.19 shows that of the 100 questionnaires returned a total 94 representing 94%, 
were found to be duly completed and ranked on a scale of 1 to 5, while 6 or 6% was 
recorded as missing values. Of the 90% valid responses, a total of 12 or 12.8% rated 
the indicator 5 or excellent, 55 or 58.5% ranked the indicator 4 or very good, 16 or 
17% ranked the indicator 3 or good, 10 representing 10.6% ranked the indicator 2 or 
fair; and only 1 representing 1% ranked the indicator 1 or poor. Implied by this, 
approximately 87.2% of the total rated the indicator at least 3 or average. This 
indicates a remarkable level of compliance by the debt offices of the sampled 
countries in the aspect of the availability and quality of documented procedures in 
handling government domestic debts. Figure 5.19 provides a bar chart representation 
of the statistics in table 5.19. 
Figure 5.19: Quality of Documented Procedures 
 
 External Borrowing: Borrowing Plan and Assessment of Costs and Terms 
Because any government debt management strategy that relies excessively on external 
and foreign currency sources of funding could be exposed to high risk, it is required 
that the most beneficial and cost effective terms and conditions are being achieved 
through a regular evaluation of all, in cost of each form of external loan and any 
complimentary attached to such a facility. Accordingly, table 5.20 show respondents’ 
opinion on the extent of compliance by government debt agencies to this important 
requirement as covered under the indicator. 
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Table 5.20: Borrowing Plan and Assessment of Costs and Terms  
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 2 12 12 13.3 13.3 
3 11 11 12.2 25.6 
4 38 38 42.2 67.8 
5 29 29 32.2 100 
Total 90 90 100   
Missing            9 10 10   
  
Total 100 100 
    
 
Table 5.20 shows a total of 90% valid responses, with 10% values recorded as 
missing. Of the valid 90% scores, 12 representing 13.3% ranked the indicator on scale 
2, or fair, and 11 respondents representing 12.2% rated the indicator 3, or average. 
The ratings of 4 and 5 were made by 38 and 29 respondents, representing 42.2% and 
32.2% respectively. Overall 86.7% of the total responses rated the indicator at least 3 
or fair. No single rating of 1 or poor was recorded, which portrayed the level of 
compliance with the indicator among the sampled countries as good. Figure 5.20 
depicts the collected data in a bar chart diagram. 
 
Figure 5.20: Borrowing Plan and Assessment of Costs and Terms  
 
 External Borrowing: Availability of Documented Procedures  
The quality and availability of documented procedures is important in the case of government 
external debt record. This aspect of borrowing exists to ensure that all borrowing 
activities from foreign sources are well documented and possess sound legal 
documentation. The key requirement here is to ensure the capture of any loan 
contracted into the debt recording or management system. Ideally such a recording 
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should be done at the time of loan contracting or signing. With this in mind, the 
respondents rated the extent of compliance with the indicator in their various 
domains.  
 
Table 5.21: Availability of Documented Procedures   
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                3 16 16 17.8 17.8 
4 47 47 52.2 70 
5 27 27 30 100 
Total 90 90 100   
Missing            9 10 10     
Total 100 100   
  
  
Table 5.21 present the statistics on total of 100 responses recorded. Of this number, 
precisely 90% were found duly completed and valid with 10% recorded as missing 
values. Of the 90 valid entries, a total of 27 responses representing 30%, rated the 
indicator 5 or excellent, 47 or 52.2% rated the indicator 4 or very good and 16 
representing 17.8% of all valid scores was ranked on scale 3 or average. There were 
no 1 and 2 ratings on the indicator of availability of documented procedures of 
government external borrowing. This was considered remarkable in respect to the 
level of compliance with the debt management indicator especially among the 
surveyed nations. Figure 5.21 is a graphical representation of the statistics in table 
5.21.  
 
Figure 5.21: Availability of Documented Procedures    
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 External Borrowing: Involvement of Legal Advisers  
An effective and sound debt management strategy should be founded on a strong and clear 
legal framework (Bangura et al., 2000). Table 5.22 presents the responses received on the 
indicator of involvement of legal advisers in the process of government external 
borrowing. This aspect of borrowing is most relevant, especially in the process of 
foreign borrowing, where the laws tend to drastically differ between countries 
depending on the legal, financial and political system. This indicator ensures that 
sound legal features are included in any loan agreement. With this in mind, the 
respondents rated the extent of compliance with the indicator in their various 
domains. Respondents’ ratings of compliance to the requirement that debt 
management strategy ensures that there exists a sound legal feature included in any 
loan agreement contracted by or on behalf of the government is presented below.  
 
Table 5.22: Involvement of Legal Advisers    
                 Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 1 1 1 1.1 1.1 
2 7 7 7.6 8.7 
3 20 20 21.7 30.4 
4 48 48 52.2 82.6 
5 16 16 17.4 100 
Total 92 92 100 
  
Missing             9 8 8 
    
 
There were a total of 100 duly completed and returned questionnaires. Of this number 
a total of 92 or 92% was found to be valid, with 8 entries or 8% recorded as missing 
values. Of the 92 valid scores recorded, a total of 16 representing 17.4% ranked this 
important indicator of debt management 5 or excellent, 48 or 52.2% ranked the 
indicator 4 or very good, 20, representing 21.7% ranked the indicator 3 or average, 7, 
or 7.6% ranked the indicator 2 or fair and a single score representing 1.1% ranked the 
indicator 1 or poor. The rankings thus show a high level of compliance with the 
indicator ensuring legal features included in loan agreements by debt systems of the 
countries under review. Figure 5.22 represents the statistics in table graphically. 
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Figure 5.22: Involvement of Legal Advisers  
 
 Loan Guarantees: Availability and Quality of Documented Policies and 
Procedures 
This indicator covers the aspect of how a debt strategy ensures compliance with the 
provision that strong control and clear operational guidelines are in place to approve 
and issue loan guarantees and central government on-lending and whether the 
procedure is used properly. Table 5.23 presents the respondent assessment on how in 
their opinion loan guarantees and government on-lending are controlled and 
monitored. 
 
Table 5.23: Availability and Quality of Documented Policies and Procedures  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 1 8 8 8.2 8.2 
2 7 7 7.2 15.5 
3 17 17 17.5 33 
4 47 47 48.5 81.4 
5 18 18 18.6 100 
Total 97 97 100 
  
Missing             9 3 3   
  
Total 100 100 
    
 
Table 5.23 presents 100 duly completed responses with 97% completed and valid 
entries and 3% of the values recorded as missing. Of the total 97% valid scores, 18, 
representing 18.6% ranked the indicator 5 or excellent, 47 or 48.5% ranked the 
indicator 4 or very good, and 17, representing 17.5% ranked the indicator 3 or 
average. 7 and 8 entries, representing 7.2 and 8.2 percentages indicated ratings of 2, 
fair, and 1, poor. As with the preceding ratings, this ranking portrays a high level of 
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compliance with the important indicator. Figure 5.23 represent the statistics in a 
graphical form. 
Figure 5.23: Availability and Quality of Documented Policies and Procedures  
 
 On-lending: Availability and Quality of Documented Policies and 
Procedures  
Table 5.24 presents statistics on the survey results recorded on availability and quality 
of documented policies and procedures. This indicator ensures that government debt 
management strategy makes provision to cover credit risk and administration charges 
and the process seeks to mitigate the risk by charging a guarantee fee or adding an on-
lending fee or risk premium to the cost of borrowing. The indicator also emphasises 
the assessment of whether documented policies and procedures are in place for the 
purpose of loan guarantees and government on-lending. As with the case of all 
preceding indicators, respondents ranked the indicator on a scale of 1 representing 
poor and 5 showing excellent implementation.  
Table 5.24: On-lending; Availability and Quality of Documented Policies  
Scale Frequency Percent Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 2 27 27 28.4 28.4 
3 10 10 10.5 38.9 
4 40 40 42.1 81.1 
5 18 18 18.9 100 
Total 95 95 100   
Missing            9 5 5   
  
Total 100 100   
  
  
Table 5.24 portrays 100 responses of which 95% were valid and 5% recorded as 
missing. Of the 95 valid entries 18 representing 18.9%, 40 or 42.1%, 10 or 10.5%, and 
27, representing 28.4%, ranked the indicator 5 or excellent, 4 very good, 3, or 
average, and 2 representing fair, respectively. Overall, the indicator ranking recorded 
a least ranking of 2 which indicates a high level of compliance in its observance 
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among the debt management agencies in the sampled countries. Figure 5.24 presents 
the data as a bar chart.  
Figure 5.24: On-lending  
  
 Derivatives: Availability and Quality of Documented Policies and 
Procedures 
Table 5.25 presents the last of the indicators under the variable of borrowing and 
related financing activities. The statistics cover the survey conducted and responses 
recorded as per the indicator of availability and quality of documented policies and 
procedures on financial derivatives. The indicator of derivatives exists to ensure the 
presence of a risk management framework and documented policies and procedures 
for the use of derivatives that are supported by a clear decision-making process and 
delegated authorities to transact and other record and documentation processes. 
Respondents, as with the preceding sections, ranked the indicator on a scale of 1 to 5, 
with 5 being the highest ranking or excellent and 1 being the lowest or poorest.  
Table 5.25: Derivatives  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 2 3 3 3.2 3.2 
3 8 8 8.4 11.6 
4 66 66 69.5 81.1 
5 18 18 18.9 100 
Total 95 95 100   
Missing             9 5 5   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.25 presents a total of 100 responses consisting of 95% valid entries and 5% 
entries recorded as missing values. Of the number making all valid entries 18 
representing 18.9% rated the indicator 5 or excellent, 66, or 69.5% scored the 
indicator 4 or very good, 8 or 8.4% rated the indicator 3 or average, and 3 entries 
ranked the indicator 2 or fair. The lowest ranking of 1 was zero or absent from all 
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rankings. We conclude here, as with the preceding recorded responses, that the 
statistics indicate a very high level of compliance with the provision of the indicator 
under review by the debt management related agencies among the sampled countries. 
 Cash Flow Forecasting and Cash Balance Management, Operational Risk 
Management and Debt Records and Reporting 
The next group of variables that are included in the list of variables as provided by the 
debt management performance assessment tool of the World Bank are the Cash Flow 
Forecasting and Cash Balance Management, Operational Risk Management and Debt 
Records and Reporting. Cash flow forecasting and cash balance management exist to 
ensure that all cost-effective cash management policies and measures are put in place 
in order to make it possible for the authorities to meet with a high level of certainty 
their financial obligations as and when they fall due. This assurance is only attainable 
with the availability of accurate and timely forecasts of the central government’s 
expenditure and revenue cash flows, in addition to the aggregate level of cash 
balances in the central government’s bank accounts. There are two indicators under 
the cash flow forecasting and cash balance management which are effective cash flow 
forecasting and effective cash balance management; coded CF4A and CF4B 
respectively. 
Operation Risk Management ensures that there is a provision for strong controls and 
that well-documented procedures exist for the settlement of transactions, maintenance 
of financial records and that there is access to the government debt management 
system. Under this variable there is expected to be a provision for the assessment of 
the efficiency and control over loan administration and payment activities. The 
indicators here are debt administration, debt security, segregation of duties, staff 
capacity and human resources and operational risk management, business continuity 
and disaster recovery plans. For the purpose of analysis these indicators are coded 
OR5A, OR5B, OR5C, OR5D, OR5E, OR5F and OR5G. 
Debt Records and Report ensures the maintenance of loan documentation in a secure 
location that will protect the documents from incidents such as theft, fire or flood or 
other incidents that may damage or destroy any of these records. Furthermore, there 
should be a clear separation between the debt managers with the authority to negotiate 
and transact on behalf of the central government. Indicators under this variable are 
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debt records; completeness and timeliness; debt records – registry system; central 
government debt data - statutory and mandatory reporting requirements; public sector 
debt data – statutory and mandatory reporting requirements and debt statistical 
bulleting – quality and timeliness. These indicators are coded DR6A, DR6B, DR6C, 
DR6D and DR6E respectively; and are listed with their descriptive statistics in table 
5.26. 
The statistics obtained from the survey are presented in the upcoming tabulations and 
graphical, chart representations. The following section deals with all the three 
variables introduced earlier, each having a number of indicators accordingly assessed 
by the collected responses. 
Table 5.26: Descriptive Statistics 
Indicator Valid Missing Total Mean Mode 
CF4A 90 10 100 3.41 4 
CF4B 93 7 100 3.16 3 
OR5A 84 16 100 3.65 4 
OR5B 91 9 100 4.07 4 
OR5C 91 9 100 3.96 4 
OR5D 93 7 100 4.03 4 
OR5E 90 10 100 3.86 4 
OR5F 91 9 100 3.43 3 
OR5G 92 8 100 3.73 4 
DR6A 91 9 100 4.11 4 
DR6B 92 8 100 4.01 4 
DR6C 91 9 100 3.96 4 
DR6D 91 9 100 3.89 4 
DR6E 91 9 100 3.7 4 
  
 
Table 5.26 provides us with descriptive statistics covering the three variables and all 
the debt management indicators under them. From the statistics above we see that 
there was a total of 100 responses received, a least of 84 valid entries and highest 
number of 16 missing values recorded: both recorded under the indicator of debt 
administration (OR5A). The average mode of distribution was a high 4 and the mean 
value ranged between a minimum of 3.16 and a maximum of 4.11 recorded under 
CF4B and DR6A respectively. These statistics are represented in a bar chart in figure 
5.26. 
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Figure 5.26: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Effective Cash Flow Forecasting 
The indicator of Effective Cash Flow Forecasting was to assess the effectiveness and 
accuracy of the government debt management agencies’ forecasting of debt servicing, as well 
as the expected cash flow and cash balances available to the government in its bank accounts. 
Table 5.27 presents the respondents’ assessment of the level of compliance to the debt 
indicator.     
Table 5.27: Effective Cash Flow Forecasting  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                  1 10 10 11.1 11.1 
2 17 17 18.9 30 
3 12 12 13.3 43.3 
4 28 28 31.1 74.4 
5 23 23 25.6 100 
Total 90 90 100 
  
Missing              9 10 10   
  
Total 100 100   
  
  
Table 5.27 shows all duly completed statistics on the indicator of effective cash flow 
forecasting. Of a total 100 recorded responses, 90% were valid and 10% were 
regarded as missing values. Of the valid entries, 23, representing 25.6% ranked the 
indicator 5 or excellent, 28, representing 31.1%, ranked the indicator 4 or very good, 
12 entries, representing 13.3% rated the indicator 3 or average, 17 or 18.9% ranked 
the indicator 2 or fair, and 10 or 11.1% ranked the indicator a low 1, or poor. Overall, 
precisely 50.9% of all entries ranked the indicator at least average; 3. This indicates a 
high level of compliance with the debt management requirement effective cash flow 
forecasting. Figure 5.27 represent the information. 
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Figure 5.27: Effective Cash Flow Forecasting 
 
 Effective Cash Balance Management  
The indicator of Effective Cash Balance Management requires that all management of 
government aggregate level of cash balances in its bank accounts is integrated with other debt 
management activities, such as the process of government T-bills buy back, repurchase or its 
reversal. Table 5.28 relates the assessment of government debt management agencies’ 
compliance to the provision. 
Table 5.28: Effective Cash Balance Management  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                  1 11 11 11.8 11.8 
2 14 14 15.1 26.9 
3 33 33 35.5 62.4 
4 19 19 20.4 82.8 
5 16 16 17.2 100 
Total 93 93 100 
  
Missing              9 7 7   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.28 presents a total of 100 responses, with 93% valid entries and 7% recorded 
missing values. Of the 93% valid entries 16 or 17.2%, rated compliance to the 
indicator CF4B at 5, excellent, 19, representing 20.4% rated the Effective Cash Balance 
Management as very good at 4, 33 or 35.5% rated the same indicator 3 or average, 14 
or15.1% rated the indicator 2 or fair, and 11 representing 11.8% rated the indicator 1, or poor. 
In aggregate, about 61.3% of all rated the indicator at least 3 or average. This was a 
remarkable assessment of compliance with the requirement of the Effective Cash Balance 
Management by the debt management agencies in the sampled countries. Figure 5.28 
summarises the information in table 5.28. 
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Figure 5.28: Effective Cash Balance Management   
 
 Debt Administration: Availability and Quality Documented Procedures for 
Debt Service 
The indicator of debt administration; availability and quality documented procedures for debt 
service is next in our data. This indicator requires that there should be in place a well-
documented procedure for the settlement of transactions, maintenance of financial records as 
well as a secured access to government debt management system.  Table 5.29 present 
respondent rankings of the indicators as per the level of compliance in the sampled countries. 
 
Table 5.29: Debt Administration  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                  1 2 12 2.4 2.4 
2 8 8 9.5 11.9 
3 23 23 27.4 39.3 
4 35 35 41.7 81 
5 16 16 19 100 
Total 84 84 100 
  
Missing             9 16 16   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.29 shows the responses received from 100 respondents. Of the total 100 duly 
completed questionnaires returned, 84% of all entries were recorded as valid. A total of 16 
entries representing 16% were recorded as having missing values. Of the 84 valid entries 
recorded, 16, representing 19% rated the indicator of debt administration 5 or excellent, 35 or 
41.7% rated the indicator 4 or very good, 23 entries representing 27.4% rated the indicator 3 
or average, 8 entries representing 9.5% rated the process of debt administration 2 or fair and 2 
or 2.4% rated the indicator 1 or poor. With 88.1% of all the responses assessing the indicator 
of debt administration at least average, this indicates a high level of compliance with the 
requirement by the debt offices, especially those of Nigeria and Uganda. These statistics are 
graphically represented in figure 5.29. 
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Figure 5.29: Debt Administration  
 
 
 Debt Admin: Availability and Quality Documented Procedures for Data 
Recording and Storage 
The indicator of debt administration: availability and quality of documented procedures for 
data recording and storage like the previous emphasises on debt administration, but where it 
ensures that debt data in the debt recording or management system must be secure. The 
statistical data collected from respondent assessment of the indicator is shown in table 5.30.  
 
Table 5.30: Debt Administration   
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                  1 1 1 1.1 1.1 
2 1 1 1.1 2.2 
3 6 6 6.6 8.8 
4 66 66 72.5 81.3 
5 17 17 18.7 100 
Total 91 91 100 
  
Missing              9 9 9   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.30 displays the statistics of 100 responses recorded as per the indicator of debt 
administration availability and quality documented procedures for data recording and storage 
or OR5B. From the table we see a total of 91 valid entries representing 91%, and a total of 9 
entries or 9% of all entries. Of the 91 valid entries 17, representing 18.7% ranked the 
indicator 5 or excellent, 66 or 72.5% ranked the indicator 4 or very good and 6, representing 
6.6% rated the indicator 3 or average. Two single entries each representing 1.1 and 1.1 rated 
the indicator 2 or fair and 1 or poor respectively.  Precisely 96.7% of all valid entries rated the 
indicator at least average. These statistics are represented in figure 5.30 as a bar chart. 
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Figure 5.30: Debt Administration  
 
 Data Security: Availability and Quality of Documented Procedures for Data 
Recording and System and Access Control 
The indicator of Data Security; Availability and Quality of Documented Procedures for Data 
Recording and System and Access Control is next in our presentation. Table 5.31 provides us 
with statistics of all responses collected from respondents assessing the extent of compliance 
to the requirements of data security.  
Table 5.31: Data Security  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid         1 2 2 2.21 2.2 
                 2 6 6 6.6 8.8 
      3 7 7 7.7 16.5 
      4 55 55 60.4 76.9 
     5 21 21 23.1 100 
Total 91 91 100 
  
Missing     9 9 9   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.31 presents the statistics of 100 duly completed and returned questionnaires 
distributed to assess the level of development of debt management strategies and its 
performance among the sampled countries. Of the total 100 entries collected, a total of 91 
representing 91% were recorded as valid and 9 entries or 9% are recorded as missing values. 
Of the valid entries a total of 21 representing 23.1% ranked the indicator 5 or excellent, 55 
representing 60.4% ranked the indicator 4 or very good, 7 or 7.7% ranked the indicator 3 or 
average, 6 or 6.6% of all valid entries ranked the indicator 2 or fair implementation, and 2 
representing 2.2% rated compliance to the debt data security provisions 1 or poor. Overall 
89% of all valid rankings rated compliance with the provision for debt data security at least 3 
or average. And that was considered remarkable, where the majority of respondents or 60.4% 
rated it very good. These statistics are represented as a bar chart in figure 5.31. 
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Figure 5.31: Data Security  
 
 Data Security: Frequency of Back-Ups and Security of Storage 
The next indicator is concerned with data security: frequency of back-ups and security of 
storage, where debt data is required to be secured and accessible only to authorised staff, with 
proper back-ups to prevent against loss of vital information on the correct status, amount and 
level of government debt at any particular period of time. Table 5.32 presents respondent 
assessment of compliance with the indicator provision ranking from 1, poor to 5, excellent. 
 
Table 5.32: Frequency of Back-Ups and Security of Storage  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 1 1 1 1.1 1.1 
2 6 6 6.5 7.5 
3 9 9 9.7 17.2 
4 50 50 53.8 71 
5 27 27 29 100 
Total 93 93 100 
  
Missing             9 7 7   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.32 shows the statistics of 100 duly completed returned questionnaires, consisting of 
93% valid and 7% entries recorded as missing values. Of the 93% valid ratings, 27, 
representing 29% ranked the indicator of data security; frequency of back-ups and security of 
storage 5 or excellent, 50 or 53.8% ranked the compliance with the indicator at 4 or very 
good, 9 or 9.7% ranked the indicator 3, 6 or 6.5% of all valid entries rated the indicator 2 or 
fair, and I or 1.1% of the entries ranked the implementation of the indicator at 1 or poor. 
Overall, 91.4% of all valid entries rated the indicator at least 3, good or average in overall 
compliance with the provision of the frequency of back-ups and data storage. These statistics 
are further represented in a column chart form in figure 5.32.  
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Figure 5.32: Frequency of Back-Ups and Security of Storage  
 
 Segregation of Duties  
The segregation of duties indicator is next in our data presentation. Segregation of duties 
provision in debt management exists to ensure that there is a clear demarcation between the 
debt managers and the authority especially with regard to negotiating debt and transacting on 
behalf of the central government.  Segregation of debt duties helps in encouraging prudence 
and prevention of fraud. Table 5.33 presents the statistics on the indicator as obtained from 
respondents’ assessment. 
Table 5.33: Segregation of Duties  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 1 1 1 1.1 1.1 
2 10 10 11.1 12.2 
3 14 14 15.6 27.8 
4 41 41 45.6 73.3 
5 24 24 26.7 100 
Total 90 90 100 
  
Missing             9 10 10   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.33 presents 100 duly completed and returned questionnaires. Of this number 90% 
were recorded as valid entries and 10, representing 10% were recorded as having missing 
values. Of the 90 valid entries, 24 representing 26.7% rated compliance with the indicator of 
segregation of duties at 5 or excellent, 41 representing 45.6% of all entries ranked compliance 
at 4 or very good, 14 or 15.6% ranked the indicator 3 or good, 10 or 11.1% ranked the 
indicator 2 or fair and 1 or 1.1% rated the indicator 1 or poor. Overall, compliance with 
segregation of duties provision was rated at least “good” by 86.7% of all responses, which 
was considered remarkable. These statistics are graphically represented in figure 5.33. 
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Figure 5.33: Segregation of Duties  
 
 Staff Capacity and Human Resources Management  
The next indicator represents staff capacity and human resources management, which ensures 
that all staff involved in the process of government debt management are assessed and found 
to have been subjected to the code of conduct and conflict-of-interest guidelines as regards 
the management of their own personal financial affairs.   
Table 5.34: Staff Capacity and Human Resources Management  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                 1 2 2 2.2 2.2 
2 19 19 20.9 23.1 
3 26 26 28.6 51.6 
4 26 26 28.6 80.2 
5 18 18 19.9 100 
Total 91 91 100 
  
Missing            9 9 9   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.34 shows the statistics on 100 questionnaire entries returned where respondents 
assessed the level of compliance with the provision of the debt management staff capacity 
indicator in the sampled countries. Of the hundred returned responses 91 entries or 91% were 
recorded as valid and 9 or 9% were recorded as missing values. Of the 91% valid entries 18 or 
19.9% rate the indicator 5 or excellent, 26 representing 28.6% of all valid entries ranked the 
indicator 4 or very good, 26 or 28.6% rated the indicator 3 or good, 19 or 20.9% ranked the 
indicator 2 or fair and 2 or 2.2% rated compliance with the indicator 1 or poor. 74.7% of all 
valid entries rated compliance with the indicator of staff capacity at least good or 3. These 
statistics are further presented in figure 5.34 as a column chart. 
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Figure 5.34: Staff Capacity and Human Resources Management  
 
 Operational Risk Management, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery 
Plans 
The next indicator of debt management presented in the course of this work is the indicator of 
Operational Risk Management, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plans. This 
indicator covers the process that allows an organisation to prepare for future incidents that 
may have a negative effect on the core objective and its long-term mission. It also covers 
disaster recovery, which promotes the ability to regain access to data, hardware and software 
necessary to resume operation especially after a human or natural disaster. Statistics on 
respondents’ assessment of the indicator are presented in Table 5.35. 
Table 5.35: Operational Risk Management  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                
2 17 17 18.5 18.5 
3 17 17 18.5 37 
4 32 32 34.8 71.7 
5 26 26 28.3 100 
Total 92 92 100   
Missing           9 8 8   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.35 summarises the 100 returned questionnaires. Of the 100 responses 92, representing 
92% were recorded as valid entries and 8 or 8% were recorded as missing values. Out of the 
92% valid entries collated, a total of 26 or 28.3% rated the compliance with the indicator 
OR5G as excellent or 5, 32, representing 34.8% ranked compliance at 4 or very good, 17, 
representing 18.5%, rated the indicator 3 or good, and 17 representing 18.5% rating the 
indicator at 2 or fair. There was no rating of 1 or poor on the scale. The level of compliance 
with this indicator is good, but relatively lower than preceding ones. Figure 5.35 presents the 
scenario presented in table 5.35 in a column graph. 
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Figure 5.35: Operational Risk Management  
 
 Debt Records: Completeness and Timeliness  
Debt management process requires that debt data be complete and timely. Thus, the indicator 
of Debt Records: Completeness and Timeliness ensures the promptness and 
comprehensiveness of data kept on government debt for easier reference and effective 
decision making. Table 5.36 presents data on questionnaire assessment of the level of 
compliance to this indicator by debt agencies in the sampled countries. 
Table 5.36: Completeness and Timeliness debt records  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                2 4 4 4.4 4.4 
3 10 10 11 15.4 
4 49 49 53.8 69.2 
5 28 28 30.8 100 
Total 91 91 100   
Missing            9 9 9   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.36 presents statistics of 100 duly completed and returned questionnaires. Out of the 
total of 100 duly completed questionnaires 91 or 91% were found to be valid entries and 9 or 
9% were recorded as missing values and therefore invalid. Of the 91% valid entries 28 or 
30.8% ranked compliance with the indicator at 5 or excellent, 49 representing 53.8% rated the 
indicator 4 or very good, 10 representing 11% rated compliance with this indicator 3 or good 
and 4 or 4.4% rated the indicator 2 or fair. With 95.6% of all entries rating overall compliance 
with the indicator at least good was found very remarkable. Figure 5.36 sheds more light on 
the statistics presented in table 5.36. 
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Figure 0.36: Completeness and Timeliness of debt records  
 
 Debt Records: Registry System  
Government debt management procedure requires that there should be tight controls and 
security around the system and the debt database. The indicator of Debt Records: Registry 
System ensures compliance with this provision. Thus, in table 5.37 an assessment of the level 
of compliance with indicator is presented in the form of returned completed questionnaire 
ratings on scale of low 1 and high, 5. 
Table 5.37: Debt Records 
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                1 1 1 1.1 1.1 
2 7 7 7.6 8.7 
3 12 12 13 21.7 
4 42 42 45.7 67.4 
5 30 30 32.6 100 
Total 92 92 100 
  
Missing            9 8 8   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.37 presents an assessment of the indicator of debt records; registry system, 100 duly 
completed and returned questionnaires. Of the 100 duly completed and returned 
questionnaires, 92 or 92% entries were found to be valid and 8 or 8% were recorded as 
missing values. Out of the 92 valid entries 30, representing 32.6% rated the indicator 5 or 
excellent, 42 or 45.7% rated the indicator 4 or very good, 12 or 13% rated the indicator 3 or 
good, 7 or 7.6% ranked the compliance with the indicator 2 or fair, and a single entry 
representing 1.1% rated the indicator 1 or poor. A total of 90.2% of all the valid entries at the 
end rated the indicator at least good in compliance.  This is represented graphically in figure 
5.38.  
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Figure 5.38: Debt records 
 
 
 Central Government Debt Data: Statutory and Mandatory Reporting 
Requirements 
The indicator of Central Government Debt Data: Statutory and Mandatory Reporting 
Requirements in this work is meant to assess and ensure compliance with the effectiveness of 
the registry in maintaining accurate and timely records of all investors in government 
securities that were issued in the domestic market. The indicator also mandates regular and 
timely reporting for statistical purposes. To assess the extent of compliance with this debt 
management indicator respondent opinions are presented in table 5.38. 
 
Table 5.38: Central Government Debt Data  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                2 5 5 5.5 5.5 
3 15 15 16.5 22 
4 50 50 54.9 76.9 
5 21 21 23.1 100 
Total 91 91 100   
Missing            9 9 9   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.38 presents the total of duly completed and returned questionnaires. Of the 
number, a total of 91 or 91% was recorded as valid and 9 or 9% was recoded as 
missing values. Of the valid entries 21 or 23.1% ranked the indicator 5 or excellent, 
50 or 54.9% ranked the indicator 4 or very good, 15 or 16.5% ranked compliance with 
the indicator of statutory and mandatory reporting as good at 3, and 5 representing 
5.5% rated the indicator least at 2 or fair. The extent of compliance was clear with 
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94.5% of all entries rating the indicator at least good and 50% rating it very good. 
These statistics are presented in figure 5.38 in a column chart. 
Figure 5.38: Central Government Debt Data  
 
 Public Sector Debt Data: Statutory and Mandatory Reporting 
Requirements  
The indicator of Public Sector Debt Data: Statutory and Mandatory Reporting 
Requirements like the Central Government Debt Data: Statutory and Mandatory 
Reporting Requirements tries to ensure that information on the extent of domestic 
debt subscribed by foreign investors is made available for statistical reporting 
purposes. In addition, the registry should ensure regular reconciliation and auditing by 
the appropriate units or agencies.  Table 5.39 presents the collected data from 
respondent responses in assessment of compliance to the indicator. 
Table 5.39: Public Sector Debt Data 
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                2 11 11 12.1 12.1 
3 3 3 3.3 15.4 
4 62 62 68.1 83.5 
5 15 15 16.5 100 
Total 91 91 100   
Missing            9 9 9   
  
Total 100 100   
  
 
Table 5.39 presents 100 returned responses on the debt management indicator of 
Public Sector Debt Data: Statutory and Mandatory Reporting Requirements. Of the 
100 responses, 91 or 91% were recorded as valid, and 9 or 9% was recorded as 
missing values. Of the 91% valid entries 15 or 16.5% rated the compliance with the 
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public sector debt indicator as excellent or 5, 62 or 68.1% rated the indicator 4 or very 
good, 3 or 3.3% of the entries ranked the compliance with the indicator 3 or good, and 
11 or 12.1% of all valid entries were recorded rating compliance with the provision of 
the indicator 2 or fair. Figure 5.39 depicts the scenario in a column chart form.   
Figure 5.39: Public Sector Debt Data  
 
 Debt Statistical Bulletin: Quality and Timeliness  
The indicator of Debt Statistical Bulletin: Quality and Timeliness is the last of the 
indicators to be presented, which formed our variables guiding this work. The 
indicator as the title implies, ensures the presence or availability of a timely and 
periodical debt statistical bulletin that would present a quality information of the 
government debt data and statistics for investors as well as decision making and 
records. Table 5.40 portrays an assessment of the level of compliance with the 
requirement of this indicator, in the form of responses obtained from duly completed 
and returned questionnaires.   
Table 5.40: Debt Statistical Bulletin  
Scale Frequency % Valid% Cumulative% 
Valid                1 3 3 3.3 3.3 
2 15 15 16.5 19.8 
3 9 9 9.9 29.7 
4 43 43 47.3 76.9 
5 21 21 23.1 100 
Total 91 91 100 
  
Missing            9 9 9   
  
Total 100 100   
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Table 5.40 shows 100 returned completed questionnaires of which 91 or 91% entries 
were found to be valid and 9% was recorded as missing values. Of the 91% valid 
entries, 21 representing 23.1% of the entries rated compliance with the statistical 
bulletin indicator 5 or excellent, 43 or 47.3% ranked the indicator 4 or very good, 9 or 
9.9% ranked the level of compliance with the provision 3 or good, 15 or 16.5% rated 
the compliance with the indicator 2 or fair, and finally 3 or 3.3% ranked the indicator 
1 or poor in overall compliance. The overall ranking, as with all other debt 
management indicators, was found to be sound, with almost 77% of the entire valid 
entries rating the level of compliance with the indicator as at least good. Figure 5.40 
shows the data in table 5.40 in a column chart form. 
Figure 5.40: Debt Statistical Bulletin   
 
 
5.45 Conclusion 
In this chapter it was observed how the use of the survey questionnaire resulted in a 
moderate collection of primary data, which can be considered adequate in supporting 
the proposed work on debt management. The primary data was intended to support 
and complement the more comprehensive data gathered from the secondary sources. 
Hence the reason for the moderate number of respondents recorded in the chapter. 
The data presented was however found to give a good insight into the developments 
in the process of debt management as it occurred around the sub-Saharan African 
countries. The general impression made from the responses over the various 
indicators, themes and the respondent opinion shows that there was a high level of 
compliance among the countries. This, as seen from the respondent ratings which tend 
to average at 4 or very good for most of the indicators as made available under debt 
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management performance assessment tool of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. The forthcoming analysis in the subsequent chapters will shed more 
light on the data presented in this chapter. 
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Secondary Data Presentation 
 
 Introduction 
 
This chapter continues with the process of data presentation started in chapter five. In 
this chapter however, the data being presented is of secondary form. As explained in 
the methodology chapter (4), use of secondary data would complement the use of 
primary data in completing the triangulation of the data research approach. Secondary 
data, however, forms the vast segment of all the data used in this work for obvious 
reasons. Research in the subject area was found to be excessively and heavily 
dominated by an extensive use of secondary data. In addition, the sources of data for 
the same subject leaned heavily towards national and international multi-lateral and 
bilateral institutions that strictly employed the use, as well as render storage, analysis, 
interpretation and dissemination of the secondary data. Thus in this work, secondary 
data is considered the major source of data, with primary data complementing where 
the former fails to be significant, or cover important details. 
In the process of dealing with the subject of government debt and its management we 
expect to work with processed and unprocessed statistical data, which might need to 
be further transformed into shapes and forms to further assess and analyse the trends 
for the purpose of putting forward a general statement or inferences. The process 
might be as simple as trying to understand some trends, especially gross domestic 
product per capita and how it relates to government debt or its composition. Other 
issues of interest that we can obtain from the secondary data may be in the form of 
government market instruments, different sources of government debt and its 
currency features and the risk implications associated with them. Issues of interest on 
debt, debt servicing and penalty on default are just a segment of the nature of data this 
work proposes to utilise and manipulate for further statistical analysis and possible 
inferences.   
158 
 
The statistical data to be presented in this chapter largely relates to economic policy 
and growth, external debt, the financial sector and the public sector. Due to this, 
several indicators were considered, collated and organised for the purposes of 
carrying out further statistical analysis and a possible determination of causality 
between variables. The data represented different variables used in explaining and 
assessing the developments in government debt and its management. The gross 
domestic product (GDP), the GDP percentage annual growth, GDP per capita, 
external debt stock, total, market capitalisation of listed companies, market 
capitalisation of listed companies as a percentage of GDP, Cash Surplus/Deficit as a 
percentage of GDP, CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) economic 
management cluster average, total debt service as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services, gross savings as a percentage of GDP, money and quasi money (M2) as 
a percentage of GDP and the gross government debt to GDP ratio. These data as 
described were sourced from the World Bank data bank indicators and the IMF 
economic outlook. 
 Time Series Macro-Economic Data 
Macroeconomic statistical data that deals with the aspect of international finance such 
as GDP, growth and debt, sometimes arrives in a time series form for the purpose of 
stabling trends, easier comparison and determining change, which can be used in 
analysis, interpretation of country performance and used in carrying out meaningful 
inferences. Our data was sourced with the intent of covering four sub-Saharan 
countries for a period of 30 years (or so) beginning from 1980 to 2012. All efforts 
were made to ensure that comprehensive and relevant data on the stipulated indicators 
were obtained, however the dearth of data in the sub-Saharan African region is 
phenomenal and in several instances years of missing data were reported.  
Furthermore, due to non-availability of data in some instances, variables were 
narrowly defined to accommodate for or to represent a missing subject whose 
presence is invaluable to the work. For instance, central government debt data was 
missing for almost all the countries under focus. The central government debt consists 
of the entire stock of direct government fixed term contractual financial obligations to 
others, which is outstanding as of a particular period of time. The central government 
debt includes both domestic and foreign liabilities ranging from currency and money 
deposits, securities other than shares and loans. The scant nature of the data on central 
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government debt (which actually is largely missing for all the countries under study), 
even at the World Bank, resulted in a decision to put the total external debt stock in its 
place.  
The use of the total external debt stock was however, not without some major 
shortcomings. Total external debt is debt that is owed to non-residents, that is 
repayable in currency, goods or service. Total external debt is the summation of all 
public debts, publicly guaranteed debts, as well as the private nonguaranteed long 
term. Total external debts also include the use of IMF credit and short term debts. By 
this it is seen clearly that total external debt excludes the domestic debts of a country 
and includes private non-guaranteed debts. But we also knew that except for South 
Africa, until recently most of sub-Saharan Africa sampled in this work rely heavily on 
external sources of financing, with some of these countries recording insignificant 
ratios to zero domestic financing due to undeveloped capital market (Christensen, 
2004). For this reason, it was considered safer to use total external debt data in place 
of central government total for our analysis. As for private non-guaranteed debt, it 
was made clear that it was a debt that was typically not very high among most low 
income countries (LICs) (Bangura et al., 2000). Hence, the work proceeded to use 
total external debt data as a representation of total government debt.    
 External Debt: Nigeria 
As discussed earlier, a large proportion of the debt owed by countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa suffering from debt crises and distress has been sourced externally. The debt 
crises led many of the countries in the region to be declared insolvent and thus the 
phenomenon of debt overhang was ensured. In order to ascertain the debt overhang as 
it impacts on economic growth, certain trends in key variables were considered using 
data obtained from the World Bank economic indicators on the four countries 
sampled. Starting with Nigeria, table 7.1 presents a range of indicators depicting a 
country’s extent of indebtedness. As explained earlier in chapter 4 of this work, we 
have in the below table values corresponding to external debt to GDP ratio, external 
debt to export ratio, interest on debt to export ratio and total debt service to export 
ratio. The ratios were used in a model to determine the extent of the impact of 
indebtedness on the economic growth of a nation. The end result was expected to shed 
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light on the existence of the debt overhang phenomenon, thereby answering research 
question one and the research objective raised in the beginning of the work.  
Table 6.1: Trend in external debt ratios (Nigeria) 
Year EDT/GDP EDT/X INT/X TDS/X M2/GDP 
1980 0.13922052 0.60529 3.273383 4.145606 0.2241355 
1981 0.18739629 0.99717 5.932145 9.196041 0.2495052 
1982 0.2333281 1.2532 9.693899 16.22599 0.3247923 
1983 0.49580304 2.08613 12.9758 23.61052 0.5369072 
1984 0.62395794 1.76025 15.69831 32.94432 0.7453366 
1985 0.64609665 1.45911 12.74341 32.78037 0.8018639 
1986 1.07211238 2.22719 14.97084 38.03891 1.1391647 
1987 1.20469194 0.96264 8.268439 14.13063 1.1993175 
1988 1.27294244 0.87616 20.85862 30.36505 1.6502893 
1989 1.24310962 0.29979 17.61396 24.69282 1.7898806 
1990 1.08719452 0.33603 14.60178 22.59629 1.8712322 
1991 1.22393836 0.24432 15.597 22.05631 2.8864172 
1992 0.99036864 0.13928 14.39115 18.57413 4.405509 
1993 1.94664739 0.12702 8.193786 13.39577 12.570724 
1994 1.82967783 0.14396 11.39059 18.94678 14.759426 
1995 1.19432835 0.04747 7.352167 14.73073 11.166285 
1996 0.8978734 0.03481 6.430877 13.13697 10.584602 
1997 0.79468675 0.02344 3.545592 8.712038 11.996182 
1998 0.94716691 0.03625 5.483716 13.07433 16.423811 
1999 0.81871692 0.02618 3.313841 7.605597 19.507082 
2000 0.68084781 0.01294 3.603309 8.756349 22.336042 
2001 0.68040537 0.01346 4.076827 12.72069 29.665226 
2002 0.50608621 0.01167 1.788886 8.061251 26.317377 
2003 0.50456337 0.00981 1.499194 5.925512 26.10286 
2004 0.41765825 0.01042 1.427133 4.470264 24.260454 
2005 0.18241633 0.00439 8.65052 15.41075 23.277774 
2006 0.0279545 0.0005 0.439079 10.98065 24.497702 
2007 0.02320691 0.00055 0.135599 1.442617 35.191522 
2008 0.01991647 0.00042 0.098868 0.475172 43.175645 
2009 0.04040444 0.00088 0.152918 0.728828 60.713462 
2010 0.03168146 0.00054 0.082361 0.384375 49.303541 
2011 0.03666837 0.00045 0.098374 0.370739 52.110672 
2012 0.0383726 0.00044 0.146117 0.305572 57.244951 
Source: World Bank Debt Indicators 
 
Table 6.1 portrays time series data on the extent of indebtedness for Nigeria spanning 
32 years, from 1980 to 2012. The trend shown is in ratios and was used to assess the 
effect that borrowing-on had on economic growth. The indicators however, show an 
explicit trend - for instance, the case of the debt ratio in the first column. From the 
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1980s onwards, when the debt crisis was on an accelerated build up among the SSAs 
and for mono cultural and excessively raw material export dependent economies such 
as Nigeria, the rise in debt started gradually in 1980 with 13.92%, rising between 
1986, 1987 and peaking in 1989; with 107.22, 120.47%, and 127.29% respectively.  
In 1989, the debt ratio dropped slightly to 124.31% and continues to drop gradually 
until the year 1993, when the ratio climbed to its highest level at 194.66% of the 
GDP. This was a ratio that was almost twice the county’s overall value of goods and 
service in that period. This was a period of acute political crisis and instability in the 
country. This might have led to the deteriorating macro-economic policy and 
performance. However, in 1994 and 1995 the debt ratio started to record a consistent 
decline with 188.97% and 119.43% respectively. Debt ratio for Nigeria continued its 
decline due to some drastic radical direct government fiscal policy in the subsequent 
years. Eventually, a relative stability was recorded, following a new democratic 
government in 1999. This development coincided with the new millennium agitation 
for debt relief and debt cancellation. Thus by the year 2006 the country’s external 
debt figure stood at a low ratio of 2.79. By the fiscal year 2012 the debt ratio was 
relatively higher than the previous period at 3.837%. 
Column 2 shows the trend of external debt to export of goods and services over the 
years spanning 1980 to 2012. The ratio of the external debt to exports indicates that 
external debt constitutes a large proportion of the country’s total exports. Beginning 
from a high 60.55% in 1980, the ratio continued to rise reaching a high 222.72% in 
the year 1986. 1986 was a period that marked the beginning of the country’s structural 
adjustment programme, introduced under the IMF/World Bank guidelines. 
Accordingly, the government’s access to foreign finance was expected to expand 
further than, as well as the fall in the real exchange rate as result of the currency 
devaluation conditionality.  
Afterwards, the ratio continues to drop, reaching a low 0.05% of total exports in 2006, 
a year after a substantial debt cancellation of $18 billion. Subsequently, the ratio 
picked up gradually through 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, with 0.055%, 
0.042%, 0.088%, 0.054%, 0.045% and 0.044%, respectively. This trend shows that 
the ratios were safe and not so significant to be detrimental to the nation’s incomes, 
but rise as a result of gradual increase in renewed external government borrowings.   
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Figure 6.1: Trends in external debt (Nigeria)   
 
      
Figure 6.1 portrays total debt service and interest on debt as ratios of total exports of 
goods and services as the leading fluctuating indicators over the years. The horizontal 
axis represents the various periods from 1980 to 2012 and the vertical y axis 
represents a scale for the corresponding debt service ratios on the right side, 
completing the square. Debt service figures are shown as being classed 500, 1000, 
1500, 2000 and 2500 respectively. This trend shows a persistent increase in debt 
service and interest on debt to total export and services ratios over the periods, where 
it reached a peak in period eight corresponding to 1986, whilst dropping drastically 
afterwards. This trending continued to oscillate, fluctuating up and down within the 
average points of 1000 on a maximum scale of 2500, except for period 15 recording 
almost 1250. Point 29 on the horizontal axis, representing the period corresponding to 
2006, marked the minimal point for the same reasons explained for external debt for 
the same period.  
The trend in interest paid on debt as a ratio of exports of goods and services tended to 
follow the same pattern with the total debt service, but at a relatively slower and lower 
momentum. For instance, while total interest paid on debt service attained peaked at 
about 1.250, which corresponds to a peak of 2000 attained under the total debt 
service. This is shown at 20 and 30 on a horizontal axis scale respectively. 
 External debt: Ghana 
Ghana was introduced earlier, along with three other sub-Saharan African countries, 
to make up the four sampled nations of this study. Its selection, as explained earlier in 
chapter 4 (methodology) was informed by its features as an SSA, debt distressed 
HIPC, which befitted from the World Bank IMF Debt Relief Initiative. Studying the 
Ghanaian Debt trend with respect to exports of goods and services would complement 
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other indices in the construction of a useful trend in government borrowing among the 
SSAs. Other important measures in government borrowing include total debt service 
on external debt to GDP ratio as well as total interest paid on external debts as a ratio 
of GDP (Appendix 1). Below, we present the total external debt incurred by Ghana, 
exports of goods and services and GDP, for the period spanning 32 years, from 1980 
to 2012. The last column gives data on M2, which represents broad money, as 
explained earlier and was used for analysing capital market development. The ratio of 
broad money to GDP and the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP were the two 
measures of capital market development employed in this work. 
 Table 6.2: External debt: Ghana 
Year EDT EXPT GDP M2 
1980 1.4E+09 3.76E+08 4.45E+09 795055 
1981 1.54E+09 2.01E+08 4.22E+09 1203057 
1982 1.48E+09 1.35E+08 4.04E+09 1483923 
1983 1.67E+09 2.25E+08 4.06E+09 2080548 
1984 1.96E+09 3.55E+08 4.41E+09 3196220 
1985 2.24E+09 4.8E+08 4.5E+09 4671800 
1986 2.75E+09 9.49E+08 5.73E+09 6911240 
1987 3.28E+09 9.98E+08 5.07E+09 10597000 
1988 3.06E+09 9.45E+08 5.2E+09 15501000 
1989 3.29E+09 8.79E+08 5.25E+09 23975000 
1990 3.73E+09 9.94E+08 5.89E+09 27164000 
1991 4.16E+09 1.12E+09 6.6E+09 37779100 
1992 4.24E+09 1.11E+09 6.42E+09 57531460 
1993 4.58E+09 1.21E+09 5.97E+09 76804870 
1994 5.1E+09 1.38E+09 5.45E+09 1.17E+08 
1995 5.49E+09 1.58E+09 6.46E+09 1.68E+08 
1996 5.79E+09 2.23E+09 6.93E+09 2.34E+08 
1997 5.71E+09 2.23E+09 6.89E+09 3.36E+08 
1998 6.31E+09 2.53E+09 7.48E+09 3.95E+08 
1999 6.51E+09 2.48E+09 7.72E+09 4.96E+08 
2000 6.26E+09 2.43E+09 4.98E+09 7.65E+08 
2001 6.56E+09 2.4E+09 5.31E+09 1.2E+09 
2002 7.21E+09 2.63E+09 6.17E+09 1.67E+09 
2003 7.89E+09 3.1E+09 7.63E+09 2.05E+09 
2004 7.44E+09 3.49E+09 8.88E+09 2.61E+09 
2005 7.18E+09 3.91E+09 1.07E+10 3.12E+09 
2006 3.69E+09 5.14E+09 2.04E+10 4.35E+09 
2007 5.11E+09 6.07E+09 2.48E+10 5.95E+09 
2008 5.69E+09 7.14E+09 2.85E+10 8.29E+09 
2009 7.19E+09 7.61E+09 2.6E+10 1.03E+10 
2010 9.32E+09 9.48E+09 3.22E+10 1.36E+10 
2011 1.13E+10 1.75E+10 3.96E+10 1.83E+10 
2012 1.24E+10 1.87E+10 4.07E+10 2.29E+10 
 Source: World Bank Debt Indicators 
164 
 
 
Table 6.2 presents some useful debt data to be used in analysing the relevance of 
government debt in macroeconomic policies among the low income sub-Saharan 
African countries. Having earlier studied the trend of debt data from Nigeria, studying 
the trend in two or more countries will go a long way in constructing a picture and 
making a pattern, even before a statistical analysis is carried out as specified in the 
methodology segment of this work.  
An examination of the external debt figures obtained on Ghana tends to show a trend 
not very different to that observed earlier in the Nigerian situation. The column on 
external debt indicates that, except for the year 1982 (when borrowing slowed down), 
a persistent increase in external sourcing of finance up until the year 2006, when the 
figure dropped to a low $3.690 billion from a figure of $7.182 billion in 2005, 
representing a decrease of $3.492 billion or 48.62%. In 2006, a period of the debt 
relief initiative, especially for HIPCs, which includes sub-Saharan African countries 
such as Ghana, the figure for external debt dropped significant. The borrowing 
however, continued to increase all through to 2012 with a high figure of $12.435 
billion. 
Column two of the same table 6.2 shows the total exports of Ghana from 1980 to 
2012. The pattern recorded is a trend of increases in exports due to several reasons. 
However, in relation to external debt, the figure led to an interesting occurrence. For 
instance, between the year 1981 and 1982, external debt recorded a decline from 
$1.5388 to $1.4842 billion, which corresponds to a decrease in exports from $2.0081 
billion to $1.3473 billion for the same period. Both external debt and exports of goods 
and services increased to $1.6659 billion and $2.2541 billion at the end of 1983 
respectively. The trend continued with a direct positive relationship between external 
debt and exports of goods and services by Ghana. The question as to whether 
increases in external financing leads to higher domestic production of goods and 
services and impliedly growth would be determined through statistical regression 
analysis. The data presented was used to compute a postulated relationship between 
external borrowing and economic growth.  
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Figure 6.2: Trends in external debt (Ghana)  
  
 
Figure 6.2 gives the trends as obtained from the data on external debt, the total 
exports of goods and services for Ghana between 1980 and 2012.  Along the 
horizontal axis we have the periods from 1 to 33 representing the years above. On the 
two vertical (X) axis we have the classed values of equal intervals for the variables 
under consideration. The red curve represents external debt, the green represents 
exports of goods and services, pink represents the GDP and the navy blue coloured 
horizontal curve depicts the period in years. 
This trend is clearly moving in a positively sloping direction, except for 26 to 27 in 
the case of external debts and 28 to 29 in the case of GDP. Otherwise, the trend is on 
a rising movement all through for all the indicators. Our statistical analysis was bound 
to shed further light on the relationships between the variable and probably with 
tangible explanations. The variable M2 represents broad money for the same period 
but was however, to be used to answer questions raised under a separate hypothesis.  
 External Debt: Uganda 
Next in the process of the secondary data presentation is the following external debt 
data on Uganda. As is the case with the previous two sub-Saharan African countries 
studied, here external debt data, total exports of goods and services and gross 
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domestic product for a 32 year period between the years 1980 to year 2012 are 
presented. The data was used in statistical computations and analysis with respect to 
the outlined objectives, and the research questions raised in the introductory chapter 
(1). The data considered includes the debt ratio i.e. external debt to gross domestic 
product, total external debt to export of goods, total debt service to gross domestic 
product ratio and interest paid to gross domestic product ratio, which can be seen in 
the attached appendix 1. Below we present the trend of debt data for the purpose of 
establishing the structure in comparison to those presented earlier. 
Table 6.3: Trend in Uganda external debt, in relation to export, gdp 
Year EDT EXPT GDP 
1980 6.91E+08 2.42E+08 1.24E+09 
1981 7.07E+08 2.15E+08 1.34E+09 
1982 8.74E+08 1.83E+08 2.18E+09 
1983 1.01E+09 1.94E+08 2.24E+09 
1984 1.07E+09 4.59E+08 3.62E+09 
1985 1.24E+09 4.84E+08 3.52E+09 
1986 1.42E+09 5.03E+08 3.92E+09 
1987 1.94E+09 5.17E+08 6.27E+09 
1988 1.94E+09 4.93E+08 6.51E+09 
1989 2.2E+09 4.2E+08 5.28E+09 
1990 2.61E+09 3.12E+08 4.3E+09 
1991 2.8E+09 2.48E+08 3.32E+09 
1992 2.95E+09 2.5E+08 2.86E+09 
1993 3.05E+09 2.27E+08 3.22E+09 
1994 3.4E+09 3.49E+08 3.99E+09 
1995 3.61E+09 6.79E+08 5.76E+09 
1996 3.71E+09 7.23E+08 6.04E+09 
1997 3.91E+09 8.38E+08 6.27E+09 
1998 3.94E+09 6.35E+08 6.58E+09 
1999 3.54E+09 7.35E+08 6E+09 
2000 3.54E+09 6.6E+08 6.19E+09 
2001 3.77E+09 6.73E+08 5.84E+09 
2002 4.01E+09 6.93E+08 6.18E+09 
2003 4.57E+09 7.22E+08 6.34E+09 
2004 4.77E+09 1.01E+09 7.94E+09 
2005 4.44E+09 1.28E+09 9.01E+09 
2006 1.28E+09 1.52E+09 9.98E+09 
2007 1.63E+09 1.99E+09 1.19E+10 
2008 2.27E+09 3.51E+09 1.44E+10 
2009 2.74E+09 3.75E+09 1.58E+10 
2010 2.97E+09 4.09E+09 1.72E+10 
2011 3.26E+09 3.98E+09 1.68E+10 
2012 3.77E+09  1.99E+10 
     Source: World Bank Debt Indicators 
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Table 6.3 shows the trend of external debt recorded by Uganda over the years under 
consideration. As with the trend established under the Ghanaian external debt record, 
the trend recorded for Uganda began with a moderate sum of $609 million at the end 
of 1980 to a high amount of $1.009 billion in just 3 years at the end of 1983. This 
increase continued with the same momentum, figures growing at an accelerated rate 
until the year 2006, when the figure dropped to $1.276 billion from $4.437 billion at 
the end of 2005, representing a decrease of $3.161 billion or 71.24%.  
This scenario is essentially a replay of what was witnessed under Ghana and Nigeria. 
The year 2006 was a period of debt relief implementation and most HIPCs including 
completion point Uganda had their outstanding external debts drastically reduced or 
entirely forgiven. In this case 71.24% had reduced, only to rise again to $1.628 billion 
at the end of 2007 representing an increase of $0.353 billion or 27.66%. This trend 
continued to increase further to $2.267 billion at the end of 2008 representing a rise 
by $0.638 or 39.14%. The years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012; recorded declining rates 
of increases in the external figures with $0.469 billion, $0.236 billion and $0.289 
billion, to $2.736 billion, $2.972 billion and $3.261 billion representing 20.69%, 
8.63% and 9.72% respectively. 
The next column shown on the table shows the export of goods and services for the 
same period discussed in this section. The pattern of exports shows an overall increase 
from 1980 to 2012. There were instances of fluctuating values, which makes it 
difficult to establish a precise relationship with two other variables in the table. 
However, beginning with the first 4 years from 1980 there was witnessed a steady 
decline in total exports from $242 million to $215 million and to $182 in 1980, 1981 
and 1982 respectively.  
In the year 1983, exports of goods and services increased to $194.9 million giving an 
inconsistent trend and relationship when the trend in total external debt is considered. 
The total external debt on the other hand records a continuous rise for the same 
period. This makes a conclusive precise determination of a particular relationship 
potentially not be feasible, hence the need for a more reliable statistical and empirical 
experiment and test and analysis.  
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The third column shows values for gross domestic product for the period under 
review. Except for some periods, overall GDP recorded on average, an increase from 
1980 to 2012.  
Figure 6.3: Trend in external debts (Uganda) 
 
 
Figure 6.3 depicts a sketch of the movement between the three economic indicators 
under review: total external debt, exports of goods and services, gross domestic 
product and how each of these relate to one another. The horizontal, i.e. the Y axis, 
gives the periods spanning from 1980 (or period one) to 2012 (or period 32). The blue 
curve lies infinitely on the horizontal axis. Exports of goods and services started flat 
and by period 5 and 6, recorded a slight increase on up to period 7, where it flattened 
through 8 and finally started to fall from 10, reaching its lowest in period 13. The total 
exports curve picked up from period 15, continued to move with same momentum, 
reaching a high point in period 18. The exports continued to fluctuate but nominally, 
on an increasing rate until period 25 when the value of exports suddenly recorded an 
upward jerk - and that trend continued on until the year 2011 (or period 31) when 
there is a slight fall.  
In the year 2012, a higher value of exports was recorded. The trend observed is not 
particularly peculiar, except for period 25, which actually coincided with the debt 
relief era. Thus, it was considered interesting, if reduction in government external 
financing could impact positively on exports of goods and services. Only further 
statistical analysis could establish, justify and elaborate upon this postulation. 
The red curve depicts our total external debt over the same period under review. This 
curve tend to tell the same story as depicted in the graph, except for some few 
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fluctuations until the year 2006, total external debt recorded a persistent rise. The pink 
curve depicts the GDP indicator, which is perpetually upward sloping, but with 
several fluctuations. This trend followed the trend conveyed by the figures in table 31. 
GDP recorded an increase between 1980 and 1988, from $1.245 billion to $6.509 
billion, representing a rise of $5.264 or 22.81%. However, between 1989 and 1991, 
the trend was reversed, where a persistent decline was recorded all through the period, 
ultimately dropping to a low figure of $2.857 billion from $3.322 billion in 1991. This 
represents a decline of $0.465 billion or 13.95%. From this point, except for the year 
1999 posting a lower figure of $5.999 billion compared to $6.585 billion the previous 
year (1998). From then on the country’s GDP continues to grow reaching its highest 
value at $19.881 billion in 2012. 
The trend above was clearly as indicated by the chart, and might not be depicting a 
particular pattern in relation to movement in the country’s total external debt profile. 
Any particular pattern at this level was strictly coincidental and such a result might 
not be appropriate for analysis or sufficient for forecast and generalisation. 
 Trend in external debt (South Africa)   
South Africa is among the sub-Saharan African countries selected as a sample for the 
current study. As with Nigeria, South Africa was not a HIPC and was never 
considered for the debt relief initiative. However as an SSA, its selection was 
informed by a need to construct a broad analysis that would enable effective 
comparison that was all inclusive of the varied economies in the region.  
In chapter three it was observed that South Africa was using 100% domestic sources 
of financing. This must explain the absence of a record of total debt data in table 32 
between 1980 all through to 1993. Zero was however used for completeness of data. 
From 1994 up until 2012, external debt data was recorded, but it was also 
acknowledged that there was no clear definition between domestic debts issued 
abroad from those subscribed by foreign investors in the domestic market.  
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Table 6.4: Trend in external debt, exports, and gdp (South Africa) 
Year EDT EXPT GDP 
1980 0 2.85E+10 8.05E+10 
1981 0 2.46E+10 8.68E+10 
1982 0 2.12E+10 8.01E+10 
1983 0 2.13E+10 8.6E+10 
1984 0 2.17E+10 8.52E+10 
1985 0 2.11E+10 6.71E+10 
1986 0 2.43E+10 7.95E+10 
1987 0 3.15E+10 1.04E+11 
1988 0 3.34E+10 1.15E+11 
1989 0 3.33E+10 1.25E+11 
1990 0 2.71E+10 1.12E+11 
1991 0 2.61E+10 1.2E+11 
1992 0 2.79E+10 1.31E+11 
1993 0 2.93E+10 1.3E+11 
1994 2.17E+10 3E+10 1.36E+11 
1995 2.54E+10 3.44E+10 1.51E+11 
1996 2.61E+10 3.55E+10 1.44E+11 
1997 3.01E+10 3.66E+10 1.49E+11 
1998 2.48E+10 3.45E+10 1.34E+11 
1999 2.42E+10 3.37E+10 1.33E+11 
2000 2.51E+10 3.7E+10 1.33E+11 
2001 2.43E+10 3.57E+10 1.18E+11 
2002 3.1E+10 3.66E+10 1.11E+11 
2003 3.66E+10 4.69E+10 1.68E+11 
2004 4.16E+10 5.79E+10 2.19E+11 
2005 4.8E+10 6.76E+10 2.47E+11 
2006 5.6E+10 7.83E+10 2.61E+11 
2007 6.94E+10 9.01E+10 2.86E+11 
2008 6.81E+10 9.8E+10 2.73E+11 
2009 7.73E+10 7.76E+10 2.84E+11 
 2010 1.02E+11 9.94E+10 3.63E+11 
2011 1.15E+11 1.18E+11 4.02E+11 
2012 1.38E+11 1.09E+11 3.84E+11 
Source: World Bank Debt Indicators 
 
Table 6.4 present the indicators for total external debts, exports of goods and services 
and the gross domestic product for the period under study (1980 – 2012). Debt 
recorded a persistent increase over the period under review. Total exports of goods 
and services and gross domestic product figures indicates a generally fluctuating 
trend, but one which eventually ended in an increase over the years. As with the other 
sub-Saharan African countries reviewed in this work, the economic indicators data on 
South Africa as presented in the table could not be used to establish any meaningful 
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relationship between, say, external debt and exports of goods and services, or the 
overall GDP. Thus, we present the data with the intent of employing the use of 
statistical tools to establish the relationships as raised by the hypothesis formulated in 
chapter 4. 
For instance, where total external debt remained at zero for over a decade total 
exports of goods and services kept recording different inconsistent figures, thus is a 
result of some other factor other than government borrowing. In 1980, the total debt 
figure was nil as against a total exports figure of $28.496 billion only. By the year 
1981 the export of goods and services had decreased to $24.611 billion, representing a 
decline of $3.885 billion or 13.63%. By the year 1982 the export of goods and 
services had further dropped to a relatively low figure of $21.186 billion. However, 
by the years 1983 and 1984, the exports of goods figures were recorded at $21.269 
and $21.696 billion respectively. The movement thus caused an increase of $0.083 
billion, and $0.427 billion or 0.39% and 2% over the two periods respectively.  
This trend dropped again in 1985, then rose in 1986 and 1987 with $24.305 billion, 
$31.481 billion and $33.355 billion respectively. Throughout all these years there 
were no government borrowing abroad and thus no relationship could be established, 
at least not at this stage. This inconsistent trend continued until 1994 when total 
exports of goods and services reached $30.010 billion only.  
However, this period witnessed the introduction of an external debt figure of $21.671 
billion. This change raised more questions: could there be a correlation between 
external debt and change in exports of goods and services? At this stage the ready 
answer will be very improbable, because in the following years 1995, 1996, 1997, 
total debt figure tended to increase to $25.358, $26.050, and $30, 072 billion 
respectively. These fluctuations were further confirmed by a sudden drop in the debt 
figure to $24.779 billion at the end of 1998. No meaningful relationship could be 
constructed from these trends. The figure below will shed more light on the scenario 
described in this section.  
Examining the last column, which shows the total gross domestic product, the story 
did not change particularly in its relation to the total external debt figures - our main 
focus in this research. On average, GDP growth over the years under review had been 
maintained, however, in between periods, several fluctuations with substantial drops 
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were also witnessed. For instance, the gross domestic product figure for South Africa 
in 1980 stood at a total of $80.544 billion, while total external debt was naught. 
Between 1981 and 1982 the GDP figure fluctuated, first rising to $86.830 billion and 
then falling, quite substantially, to $80.086 billion for the two periods respectively. 
Gross domestic product continued the inconsistent trend in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 
1986, with $86.013, $85.171, $67.066 and $79.502 billion respectively. All this was 
during a period of zero external financing by South Africa.  
This showed no immediate correlation between the two phenomena. However, in 
1994, a total external debt figure was recorded to the tune of $21.7 billion, at a time 
when GDP had skyrocketed to $135.778 billion. The unspecified relationship 
continued between debt and gross domestic product up to the end of the periods under 
review, finally with $115 against 402.803 billion; and $138 against $384.313 billion 
in 2011 and 2012 respectively. This confirmed that at a glance, the data in the table 
above (32) may not construct any relationship between the two indicators, especially 
as their association continued to reveal much inconsistency. Hence, further statistical 
analysis as suggested earlier, was in the right direction. The probability that other 
factors other than debt were responsible for GDP growth and exports of goods and 
services might not be very unlikely by the end of our work.    
Figure 6.4: Trend in External Debts – South Africa 
 
 
Figure 6.4 replicates the movement of the three economic indicators on South Africa 
for the same period under review. The periods are shown on the horizontal axis in the 
figure above, while the vertical axis depicts the range of values in US dollars for the 
same time period. The red curve which lies flat until period 14 represents external 
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debt of South Africa, while the green curve shows the growth of exports of goods and 
services and the gross domestic product is shown by the pink curve. 
As discussed under table 6.3, the most notable (and noticeable) relationship that 
existed between debt and total exports is present from the early periods until the 14th 
period (or 1994). The later periods of the review, especially from 2008 to 2012, were 
quite interesting and relevant. For instance, if the 1980s were considered relevant in 
the effect of borrowing on exports of goods and services or the gross domestic 
product, the later years would have proved intriguing due to the presence of huge 
government external debt. 
In the next section a more inclusive debt indicator - government gross debt to GDP 
ratio will be considered. This was a further step in gauging the relationship that might 
have existed between government gross debt ratios, i.e. extent of indebtedness, to the 
indicator of GDP growth ratio. The data was however, not as comprehensive as the 
total external debt data presented earlier. Here, the data obtained on the same sampled 
countries covered a fewer number of years. However, comparing government gross 
borrowing to debt ratio to GDP growth enabled us to observe a different relationship 
that which might have existed between government borrowing and economic growth. 
Thus, in the next section we will endeavour to establish a kind of a causal relationship 
between borrowing and economic growth. 
 Government Gross Debt to GDP Ratio   
In an attempt to assess the impact of government borrowing on economic growth, an 
attempt was made earlier in this work to link government indebtedness to economic 
growth. For instance, it was argued that there exists an optimal level of government 
debt, where it is assumed that at certain levels of government debt ratio, the impact 
might revert to become negatively related to growth. If there is a level above that 
which government tends to substantially affect economic growth, then it follows that 
reducing government debt to a certain scheduling should become a priority for debt 
mangers and management offices.  
As further argued earlier in the write up, there was actually no preferred level for 
government debt. It was postulated that debt level might have been triggered by lower 
economic growth instead of the other way round. In order to look at this phenomenon 
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there was a need to compare a country’s annual growth to gross government debt as a 
ratio of GDP. The data below gives the annual GDP growth and gross government 
debt to GDP ratios for 12 years commencing 2000.   
Table 6.5: Pattern of Debt: Nigeria 
Year GDP growth (annual %) Gsgvdtgd 
2000 5.318093381 84.221 
2001 4.411065196 87.971 
2002 3.784648183 68.783 
2003 10.35418456 63.862 
2004 33.73577503 52.657 
2005 3.444666813 28.605 
2006 8.210964859 11.808 
2007 6.828398348 12.789 
2008 6.270263697 11.582 
2009 6.934416004 15.174 
2010 7.839739477 15.463 
2011 4.653336827 17.16 
2012 6.74519613 18.39 
Source: Government Debt Statistics 
 
Table 6.5 shows the record of GDP annual growth and the gross government debt as a 
ratio of GDP. This trend tends to show that at lower economic growth rate relative 
higher debt ratio was recorded. But it is also evident that there is a lack of consistency 
in the pattern. For instance in the 2000, growth rate was recorded at 5.32%, which 
corresponds to a debt ratio of 84.22% and when growth rate was 4.41%, the debt ratio 
was 87.97% respectively. From these two periods it would be safe to assert that at 
lower debt ratio, higher growth rates were recorded. This was, however, not a reliable 
assertion since in the year 2003 debt ratio was lower at 68.78%, while a 
corresponding growth rate was still lower at 3.78% when compared to 2001 and 2000 
respectively. This makes the relationship between the two phenomena suddenly 
directly lacking in an established pattern with regards to any of the periods reported 
earlier. In 2003 however, a high growth ratio of 10.35% corresponds with a debt ratio 
of 63%, and in 2004 a growth of 33.74% corresponds to a debt ratio of 52.65%, 
conforming to the assertion that a higher debt ratio might have the tendency to impact 
negatively on the growth of a country.  
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The data presented here helps to portray the observable trend and possible relationship 
between debt and economic growth. Thus, in an effort to establish the relationship and 
before the proposed statistical analysis, a review of the trends and patterns of data 
would shed light on a probable outcome, which could assist us in a better 
understanding of the government debt phenomenon.     
 
Figure 6.5: Graph showing Pattern of Debt – Nigeria   
 
 
Figure 6.5 portrays a pictorial representation of the gross government debt as a ratio 
of gross domestic product and the actual GDP growth rate in percentages as presented 
in table 6.5. The curves in the figure, with red being gross government debt and blue 
depicting GDP growth rate. From the beginning the trend tends to show an opposing 
relationship between the two indicators. Afterwards, the pattern is maintained, but 
with reversed movement directions up to period 5 or year 2004. Between period 7 and 
8, which corresponds to 2006 to 2007, the relationship inverted i.e. GDP growth rate 
drop corresponded to a rise in gross government debt, from 8.21% to 6.82% against a 
rise from 11.81% to 12.79% respectively. 
The next two periods between 2007 and 2008 and from 2008 to 2009, show a 
fluctuating trend with a decrease in growth rate from 6.83% to 6.27% and from 6.27% 
to 6.93% respectively. This was accompanied by a similar movement in gross 
government debt to GDP ratios, recording first a decrease from 12.79% to 11.58% 
and then a rise from 11.5%to 15.17% for the same periods respectively. The 
remaining three periods until the year 2012 revealed an inconsistent movement 
between the two variables with GDP growth rates fluctuating up, then down and later 
rising again to 6.75%, from 6.93% to 7.84%, then dropping to 4.65% and finally 
rising to 6.74% for the periods respectively. 
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 Gross Government Debt to GDP Ratio to GDP Growth: Ghana 
To further establish whether there is a peculiar trend or relationship that might have 
existed between government borrowing and economic growth, we next consider GDP 
growth against gross government debt as a ratio of GDP to observe the pattern over a 
period. Here we look at the period from 2001 to 2012, obtainable from the World 
Economic outlook of the IMF.   
Table 6.6: Pattern of Debt: Ghana 
Year GDP growth (annual %) Gsgvdtgd 
2001 4 98.199 
2002 4.5 84.588 
2003 5.2 81.796 
2004 5.6 54.04 
2005 5.900003848 43.77 
2006 6.4 21.923 
2007 6.45973558 23.259 
2008 8.430504083 30.099 
2009 3.991256102 32.688 
2010 8.007036608 43.031 
2011 15.00707161 39.8099 
2012 7.914626014 49.091 
Source: World Bank Debt Indicators and World Economic Outlook 
 
Table 6.6 displays a trend of all the GDP annual growth ratios against the government 
gross debt to GDP ratios for the period 2001 to 2012. Except for the years 2009 and 
2012, GDP growth had been positive for the whole the period since 2001. The GDP 
growth ratio started at 4% in 2001 and continued to record a persistent increase 
reaching a high ratio of 8.4% in 2008. This represented an increase of 4.43 percentage 
points or 110.75% change over the years from 2001. However after this period, in 
2009 the GDP growth rate tumbled significantly to a low 3.99% representing a drop 
of 4.44% points or 52.67%. The movement of the GDP growth ratio continued its 
movement with increases in 2010 and 2011 recording 8.01% and 15.01% 
respectively. In 2012 however the GDP dropped to 7.91%.  
In comparison, the third column on the table portrays the gross debt to GDP ratios 
over the same period under review. The debt ratio continued to decline with an 
increase in GDP growth rate until the year 2007 when the decline of the debt ratio 
slowed down with a slight increase to 23.25% from 21.92% in 2006. The remaining 
period from 2008 to 2012 reveals an inconsistent pattern of movement in both GDP 
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growth ratios and gross debt to GDP ratios. At higher growth ratios relatively, lower 
debt ratios were recorded and vice versa. For instance, in 2011 a GDP growth rate of 
15.01% was recorded against a gross debt to GDP ratio of 39.81%. However, GDP 
growth rates dropped to 7.91% the following year in 2012, yet gross debt to GDP 
ratio rose to a high 49.09% for the same period. Thus, the trend tends to be only 
predictable at low levels of GDP growth, but inconsistent at higher levels of GDP 
growth rate. 
This provides us with the ground to tentatively assert that at lower levels of GDP 
growth rate government borrowing tends to affect economic growth negatively. Or, 
growth tends to be more sensitive to growing government debt. At higher GDP 
growth rate there tends to be either reduced or no effect of borrowing on economic 
growth.  
 
Figure 6.6: Graph Showing Trend in Debt and Economic Growth – Ghana  
 
 
Figure 6.6 further depicts the relationship between GDP growth’s curve and gross 
debt to GDP ratio. The blue curve shows the GDP growth and the red curve shows the 
gross government debt to GDP ratios. The trend is most obvious from period 1 to 
period 5. GDP growth climbs gradually and the gross government debt ratio declines 
at an accelerated rate. Between periods 5 and 6 we also observe a movement that is in 
a similar direction. After period 7 the pattern is seen as inconsistent and erratic. This 
is merely to buttress the observation made earlier, that at lower levels of GDP growth; 
government borrowing tends to have a significant effect on growth but tends to 
become irrelevant at higher growth rates. 
 Gross Government Debt to GDP Ratio to GDP Growth: Uganda 
This section continues with the same data presentation as the previous section on 
gross government debt to GDP ratio and the annual GDP growth for Uganda, 
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covering a period of 1997 to 2012. Here, the same traits was observed as noted under 
Nigeria and Ghana; all in an effort to study how the phenomenon of government 
borrowing could affect the economic growth of a country. Under Uganda, the data 
sourced from the IMF’s Economic Outlook is more comprehensive. At least in this 
case, we are able to obtain three years data, which is over and above what we had 
obtained in the case of Ghana and Nigeria.    
 
Table 6.7: Debt Pattern: Uganda 
Year GDP growth (annual %) Gsgvdtgd 
1997 5.100001864 53.541 
1998 4.905265483 52.545 
1999 8.053948377 57.759 
2000 3.141907338 61.73 
2001 5.183661126 63.454 
2002 8.732685764 69.109 
2003 6.473258671 68.242 
2004 6.807233344 62.398 
2005 6.332565117 52.821 
2006 10.78474439 35.493 
2007 8.412425966 21.941 
2008 8.708751901 21.428 
2009 7.251045316 21.431 
2010 5.861476763 26.841 
2011 6.620384148 29.3 
2012 3.410515784 31.067 
Source: World Bank Debt Indicators and IMF World Economic Outlook 
 
Table 6.7 reveals the trend of GDP growth ratio and gross government debt to GDP 
ratio over the years under review. The figures displayed in the second column 
representing GDP growth rate over the 15 years under review indicates that there was 
no particular observable pattern in the trend. GDP growth started from a moderate 
ratio of 5.10%, when then then fell to 4.91% in 1997 and 1998 respectively. By the 
year 1999, GDP growth ratio had jumped to 8.05%, representing a rise by 3.14%or 
63.95% over the previous period. By the year 2000, the GDP growth ratio dips 
significantly to 3.14% representing a drop of 4.91% or 60.99%. 
In the following years: 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, the growth ratios recorded were 
5.18, 8.73, 6.47 and 6.81 respectively. These ratios as with the recorded earlier, 
randomly fluctuated, showing no specific pattern in the trend. This trend continued, 
where it reached a peak in 2006 with 10.78% from 6.33% at the end of 2005. This 
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represents an increase of 4.45 percentage points or 70.30% respectively. The ratios 
continue their inconsistent movement in the following years: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011 and 2012, with 8.41, 8.71, 7.25, 5.86, 6.62 and 3.41 respectively. 
So far, a study of the trend above helps to paint a particular picture of GDP growth 
ratios movement over time. It has been made clear that the rise and fall of GDP ratios 
had no relationship with figures shown in the next column of gross government debt 
to GDP ratios for the same period. For instance, when the lowest GDP growth rate 
was recorded in the year 2000 at 3.14%, the corresponding gross government debt 
ratio was recorded at a high 61.73%. On the other hand, the highest GDP growth ratio 
was recorded at 10.78% in the year 2006, against a corresponding debt ratio of 
35.49%.  
These two periods may tempt us with the assumption that the lower the GDP growth 
recorded, the more the tendency for higher government debt (and vice versa). In the 
same vein, we could further postulate that at higher levels of GDP growth rates, lower 
levels of borrowing were embarked upon by government. This relationship was 
however, found not to be significant and feasible when we further study the entire 
trend. In particular, the year 2002 recorded a GDP growth ratio of 8.73 against a debt 
ratio of 69.11, 2003 recorded a growth ratio of 6.47%, against a debt ratio of 68.24% 
and in 2004 the GDP growth rate was 6.80, while a debt ratio of 62.40%. There was 
no precise conformity with the negative causal relationship between government debt 
and economic growth postulated above. In addition, there was no clear cut direction 
of the relationship - if there existed such a relationship, it was difficult to establish 
whether GDP growth rate impacted on government rate of indebtedness, or the other 
way around.                  
Figure 6.7: Trend in Debt and Growth – Uganda  
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Figure 6.7 depicts the trend considered earlier in this section. The relationship 
between GDP growth rate and debt ratio indicates no particular pattern over the 
period under review. For Uganda, the trend was not so different from the other two 
sub-Saharan African countries reviewed earlier in this work.  
However, it is clear from the figure that during the earlier years there tended to exist 
an inverse relationship between GDP growth rate and debt ratio. Except for few 
fluctuations between period 3 and 4, the trend for the earlier periods up to period 6 or 
year 2002 was negative. While the debt ratio tended to flatten between periods 6 and 
7, GDP growth rate on the other hand dipped to flatten in the next period. Debt ratio 
however, continued on an accelerated decline until period 11, which corresponded to 
the year 2007. And beyond that point to the next 2 periods (2008 and 2009), the debt 
ratio flattened to pick up from period 13, then rose until period 16 or 2009 to 2012.  
Generally, the trend that has become evident is that during most of the periods the 
relationship that existed between debt and growth was negative and reversed though 
in several instances the relationship became indeterminate. In some instances, the two 
curves either move in same direction or either of the curves flattens, with the other 
rising or sloping downwards. 
 Gross Government Debt to GDP Ratio to GDP Growth: South Africa 
South Africa was an interesting country among the sampled sub-Saharan Africa 
economies. Unlike in the case of other sub-Saharan African countries, South Africa 
had little history of external debt and was among the few countries that had a 
developed domestic capital market. South Africa was not a HIPC and thus had not 
befitted from a substantial debt relief or debt cancellation during the IMF-World Bank 
Debt Relief Initiative. In this section, we review the gross government debt data for 
South Africa against the record of GDP growth rate over the years. 
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Table 6.8: Debt Pattern: South Africa 
Year GDP growth (annual %) Gsgvdtgd 
2000 4.154588522 43.317 
2001 2.73542315 43.488 
2002 3.667837611 36.949 
2003 2.949074425 36.909 
2004 4.554543404 35.884 
2005 5.277116992 33.201 
2006 5.603717693 30.968 
2007 5.547756915 28.331 
2008 3.622103 27.232 
2009 -1.52634694 31.579 
2010 3.086635659 35.313 
2011 3.457231392 38.82 
2012 2.548464215 42.091 
Source: World Bank Debt Indicators and IMF Economic Outlook 
 
Table 6.8 displays a trend of the two economic indicators of GDP growth and 
government gross debt to GDP ratio. Column 2 which presents the GDP growth ratios 
shows an array of erratic rates over the years. Between year 2000 and 2001, GDP 
growth rates fell from 4.15 to 2.73% respectively. This corresponds with debt ratios 
shown in the next column of a high 43.32 and 43.49%, for the same periods 
respectively.  
Here it is safe to assert that at lower GDP growth rates higher debt ratios are posted. 
Impliedly, high government debt is negatively related to growth - invariably high 
government borrowing tends to hinder growth.  However, by studying the trend in the 
table it would not be hard to understand that such a relationship happened for just a 
moment among several others over the years under review. For instance year 2002 
told an entirely different story, although, not precisely unrelated to the first scenario. 
GDP growth rate jumped to 3.67% representing an increase of 0.93 percentage points 
or 33.94%. Debt ratios for the corresponding period declined from 43.49 to 36.95%, 
representing a fall of 6.54 percentage points or 15.04%. The same relationship turned 
out to be maintained, but it was relatively insignificant.  
Further along the trend, the year 2003 saw to the decline of both GDP growth rate and 
debt ratios to 2.95 and 36.91% respectively. This movement disrupted the established 
relationship where both indicators travelled in the same direction. However, the 
following three periods witnessed a reversion to the initial relationship where in 2004, 
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2005 and 2006, the indicators of GDP growth rate and debt ratio related negatively 
with 4.55, 35.88, 5.28, 33.20, and 5.60, 30.97 respectively. The next two periods 
however, change the trend again with a relatively significant decrease in the values of 
the two indicators. In 2007 and 2008, the indicators of GDP growth and debt ratio 
recorded a decline to 5.55, 28.33, and 3.62, 27.23% from 5.60, 30.97% at the end of 
2006 respectively.  
An interesting development however, occurred in 2009 with a significant decrease in 
GDP growth ratio to – 1.53% from 3.62% at the end of 2008, representing a decline 
of 5.15 percentage points or 57.73%. This corresponds with an increase of the debt 
ratio for the same period from 27.23 at the end of 2008 to 31.58% at the end of 2009, 
representing a rise of 4.35 percentage points or 15.97%. The negative relationship 
between the two variables was once again stressed. The next two periods, 2010 and 
2011 further distorted the trend, where the two indicators recorded increases to 3.09, 
35.31 and 3.46, 38.82, respectively. The two indicators moved in the same direction 
with GDP growth and debt ratios increasing over the periods respectively.  
By the year 2012 however, the negative relationship between GDP growth rate and 
government gross debt to GDP ratio (or extent of indebtedness) resumes. The year 
2012 witnessed a GDP growth ratio that declined to 2.54 from 3.09% by the end of 
2011, representing a decline of 0.55 percentage points or 17.80%. On the contrary, the 
corresponding period saw an increase in the recorded debt ratio from 38.82% at the 
end of 2011 to 42.09% at the end of 2012. This represents an increase in debt ratios 
by 3.27 percentage points or 8.42%.  
 
Figure 6.8: Trend in debt and growth – South Africa  
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Figure 6.8 presents a pictorial representation of the relationship that exists between 
GDP growth and gross government debt to GDP ratio. From the figure, we can see 
that debt ratio is depicted by the red curve and GDP growth is shown along the blue 
curve. The horizontal X axis shows the periods ranging from 1 to 13 (2000 to 2012) 
and the vertical or Y axis portrays the different ratios to 50. As discussed earlier in the 
section, in many instances (and for most levels of the curves) the relationship that 
exist between GDP growth and debt ratio tended to be negative. However, in several 
instances we also witness a flattening or reversal scenario, yet most occurrences 
depict a negative relation -at higher GDP growth ratios, debt ratios tended to be low 
and vice versa. 
 Conclusion 
The relationship that exists between these two important variables however, might not 
be precisely determined by mere comparison between an array of figures and ratios. 
In any case the comparison was hardly consistent, especially when similar patterns 
were considered using similar variables under the same circumstances but for the 
other three sampled sub-Saharan African countries. While the work tried to establish a 
certain relationship that exists between government debt and economic growth, first 
with external debt data and later with gross government debt data, several 
explanations emerged. For example, at lower levels of debt, GDP growths tends to be 
high and the relationship tends to become indeterminate at higher levels of GDP 
growth ratios, as seen in the process of reviewing the sampled country data. 
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Data Analysis 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter proceeds with the analysis of the harmonised data, a portion of which 
was presented in the previous chapter. Here an attempt is made to answer the research 
questions raised in the introductory part of this work. These research questions gave 
rise to a number of hypotheses as presented in the methodology chapter, four. 
Particularly, in this stage of the work the attempt to employ the statistical method – 
the regression analysis – is to establish whether the phenomenon of debt is related to 
economic growth. This is in a clear endeavour to test, validate or refute what had been 
learnt in the process of review of literature in related subject area.  
For example, Cohen (1995) referred to debt as a phenomenon that operated like 
marginal tax on a country’s resources, which invariably explained its adverse impact 
on domestic production. Furthermore the Brady arrangement, which actually led to 
some level of reduction in external debt burden among a number of debt crisis ridden 
countries,  failed to stop the discounting of debt even after the deals (Claessens et al., 
1997). 
Specifically, effort will be made to examine the aspect of debt management strategy 
and how it impacts upon economic growth, as well as to try to answer questions 
pertaining to the relationship that exists between a country’s extent of indebtedness 
and the composition of its borrowing. The work will go further on to determine the 
extent of the development of a country’s capital market and how it is related to GDP 
growth. Does the utility of various debt instruments positively correlate to their 
maturities? Questions pertaining to the effect of borrowing per head growth and how 
it tends to turn negative at higher debt levels would be verified. That is whether an 
excessive use of domestic borrowing could result in excessive pressure on 
institutional investors, with banks left to absorb too much government debt and 
ultimately have a negative effect on financial stability and investment referred to as 
debt overhang, would equally be addressed. The issue of  government’s switch from 
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external to domestic borrowing, leading an economy to be exposed to a different types 
of vulnerability and whether these vulnerabilities to an economy are caused by 
currency and maturity mismatches among countries with an open capital account and 
having a large stock of foreign or short term domestic debts shall also be in focus. 
Debt management strategy here was taken to be measured by CPIA, where data 
became incomplete DeMPA performance scores and HIPC/MDRI assessment were 
employed. DeMPA performance scores were placed on a scale of A, B, C and D. A 
stands for Outstanding, B is sound, C is fair and D is poor. Thus, countries’ debt 
management was assessed based on the scores against the debt performance indicators 
(Appendix A). 
Under DeMPA however, the rating is A to D from right from its inception in 2008. 
There is no provision for a performance below D i.e. E and F. For this reason the 
following assumptions were made: All assessments after 2008 must be scored A to D. 
This is for the simple reason that these performances are post HIPC initiative and 
MDRI; two World Bank and IMF initiatives that were equally based on a particular 
ranking. The HIPC/MDRI decision point and the period prior to debt relief have been 
grouped E and F respectively. There were five classes with an unequal class sizes 
(Saleh, 2013). 
The gross domestic product (GDP), the GDP percentage annual growth, GDP per 
capita, external debt stock, total market capitalisation of listed companies, market 
capitalisation of listed companies as a percentage of GDP, Cash Surplus/Deficit as a 
percentage of GDP, CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) economic 
management cluster average, total debt service as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services, gross savings as a percentage of GDP, money and quasi money (M2) as 
a percentage of GDP and the gross government debt to GDP ratio were the variables 
employed in our regression analysis. As explained earlier, the data on them was 
sourced from the World Bank debt indicators and the IMF economic outlook.  
 Regression Analysis 
The model is specified in the multiple regression form. In the cases of the dependent 
and independent variables, there is more than one variable. For instance, it was stated 
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that the dependent or explained variable in the first model, is the debt ratio (edtgdp) 
against a range of independent variables. 
The variables were earlier specified in the work. Model I considers the relationship 
that exists between debt and economic growth. Hence the dependent variable, was the 
gross domestic per capita (gdpcap) against a range of independent variables; the ratio 
of current stock of debt to gross domestic product (edtcap), edtgdpl2, standing for debt 
overhang and past debt accumulation, debt service as a ratio of export earnings (dsx), 
the ratio of fiscal deficits to gross domestic product (defgdpl), the rate of inflation 
(infl), the real exchange rate misalignment (rermts), the ratio of broad money to gross 
domestic product (m2gdp) and the impact of population pressure on domestic 
resources (rpop).     
 Regression Output 
Multiple regressions analysis was carried out in order to investigate the relationship 
that exists between government borrowing and economic growth. The secondary data 
was mainly obtained from the World Bank’s Economic Indicators. Preliminary 
analyses were conducted to ensure that there was no violation of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Furthermore, the correlation between the 
predictor variables included in the study was examined. 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std Deviation N 
Gdpcp 1352.9316 1720.106 132 
Edtgdp 2.63E+21 7.93E+21 118 
Edtgdpl2 6.26E+65 4.04E+66 118 
Dbtsvx 17.9477 16.59261 118 
Infl 0.6512 0.47846 129 
Rermts 221.3425 402.86672 132 
  
Table 7.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the defined variables. From the table the 
mean distribution of per capita gross domestic product over the period under review 
standing at 1352.9316, a standard deviation of 1720.106; all in a sample size of 132 
are presented. GDP per capita is arrived at dividing mid-year population. In 
comparison, the mean per capita of $1352.93 was by far below that of the developed 
economies, posting above $10,000 average. The standard deviation of 1720.11 
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however, indicates the frequency and tendency of change from the mean score. The 
figure relates to the deviation from the centre of the distribution.  
The descriptive statistics go on to present the debt ratio as represented by external 
debt to gross domestic product for the number of observations over the period under 
report. Thus, debt ratio recorded a mean of 2.63E+21 a standard deviation of 
7.93E+21 in a sample size of 118. Debt service to interest ratio also stood at a mean 
of 17.9477 and a standard deviation of 16.59261, in a sample size of 118 respectively. 
The mean inflation rate stood at a low 0.6512 and a standard deviation of 0.47846, in 
a total number of observations of 129. The variable of real exchange rate recorded an 
average of 221.34 and a standard deviation of 402.86, in a sample of 132. The 
discrepancies in the sample size were observed to be as a result of a number of 
missing data in the template, which was clearly acknowledged in the process of the 
analysis. 
 Correlations 
The various correlations between the variables are shown in Appendix B to this work. 
Precisely, tabulation was employed to determine the potential presence of multi-
collinearity between the independent variables, especially. The Pearson’s correlation 
result in the table presents a most insignificant correlation between the explanatory 
variables. Except however, correlation between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable, the debt ratio gdpcp on edtgdp. Here expectedly, the correlation 
between the two variables was a high 0.862, which is seen to be very significant. 
Furthermore, from the table there is a clear emphasis on a no or low multi-collinearity 
between the independent variables with a significant 1 – tailed test result, where no 
clear incident of multi-collinearity is evident. The sample sizes remain the same for 
all the variables respectively. 
 Coefficientsa 
The test coefficients of this analysis are attached to this work as Appendix B. In this 
section the study continue to check and cross check the extent of multi-collinearity 
between the independent variables of edtgdp, dbtsvx, infl and rermts. Under the 
coefficientsa table, focus on tolerance value and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
was made. Where the tolerance value is less than 0.10, then it may be concluded that 
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there is a possibility of multicollinearity, however where the VIF is seen to be above 
10, then further conclusion that there is likelihood of multicollinearity between the 
independent variables could be drawn. And thus, a contemplation to remove one of 
the independent variables is possible. Accordingly, and looking at the tolerance values 
of 0.219, 0.244, 0.846, 0.751, and 0.969, for the independent variables edtgdp, 
edtgdpl2, dbtsvx, infl and rermts respectively. None of the values recorded under the 
tolerance column fell below 0.10. As a result, the absence of multi-collinearity 
between the independent variables is duly established. A further requirement for 
multicollinearity is the variance inflation factor, where the values of 4.56, 4.10, 1.182, 
1.331 and 1.032 have been recorded for the explanatory variables of edtgdp, edtgdpl2, 
dbtsvx, infl and rermts respectively. None of these values was found to be in excess of 
the maximum of 10. Thus, the sufficient condition for the absence of multi-
collinearity is established. Impliedly, the checks have confirmed the model to be free 
of the problem of multicollinearity and as a result none of the independent variables 
needed to be removed. 
 Outliers, Normality and Linearity 
Next in our evaluation the outliers, normality and linearity were considered 
(Appendix C). Here, a check of the normal probability plot as depicted in the Normal 
P – P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual was carried out. Here all points on the 
plot were checked to ensure that they lie in a reasonably straight diagonal line from 
the bottom left to the top right. In a similar manner, the Normal P-P Plot figure 
portray an upward sloping, left corner positively progressing points to right top 
corner. Although heavily slumping in the middle, all points reasonably depict a 
diagonal pasture. This trend confirmed the normal probability distribution of the 
model’s data. 
Further to ascertain the normality and linearity of the distribution data the study went 
on to study the scatter plot, which is attached to this work as Appendix C. Here there 
is need to ensure that the residuals are distributed within a rectangle, with the scores 
concentrated in the centre, that is, along point 0. Accordingly, the figure attached as 
Appendix C shows a distribution of points concentrated in the rectangular centre, 
relatively along the 0 point area. The standardized residuals were seen to be within the 
bracket 3.3 and -3.3, thus confirming the normality and linearity assumptions of the 
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data in the distribution. Standardized residuals exceeding 3.3 or short of – 3.3 implies 
outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).     
 Model Evaluation 
In the process of model evaluation the Model Summaryb table shown in table 7.2 of 
this work is considered. Here, R square was examined in order to understand the 
explanatory power of the independent variables over the dependent variable. The R2 
recorded as 0.862 implying that approximately 86% of variance in the dependent 
variable or the gross domestic per capita product (gdpcp) was actually explained by 
all the independent variables (rermts, edtgdpl2, dbtsvx, infl, edtgdp), which are 
included in the model. And furthermore, 86.2% is of high significance. 
Table 7.2: Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 0.928a 0.862 0.855 654.0876 
  
a. Predictors: (Constant), Rermts, Edtgdpl2, Dbtsvx, Infl, Edtgdp 
b. Dependent Variable: Gdpcp 
ANOVA  
Table 7.2 is referred to as ANOVA, shows how the significance (or not) of the entire 
model is determined. Here, the degrees of freedom (df), the frequency (F) column and 
the significance column showing the P – value were examined. The equation F (5, 
109) = 135.88, p < 0.0005, should hold for the model to be significant. Impliedly, for 
the model to be significant, it has to be significant at 99.999% level. 
Table 7.3: ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Squares F Sig. 
1.             Regression 290665648.8 5 58133129.76 135.879           .000b 
                Residual 46633533.64 109 427830.584   
                Total 337299182.4 114    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Gdpcp   
b.Predictors: (Constant), Rermts, Edtgdpl2, Dbtsvx, Infl, Edtgdp 
 
Table 7.3 shows a significance of 0.000b signifying a near perfectly suitable model 
with 100% significance. 
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  Evaluating the Independent Variables 
Referring to coefficientsa, an evaluation of each of the independent variables was 
carried out. From the table 7.3 it can be observed that under the standardized 
coefficient that the best of all the predictors was the debt ratio variable (edtgdp) with 
1.394, followed by the variable of debt service to export ratio (dbtsvx) with a 
significant negative correlation of -0.117. The next best predictors are the variables of 
inflation (infl) and real exchange rate with Beta values of 0.082 and -052 respectively.  
Table 7.1 showing the descriptive statistics, indicates that an increase in the debt ratio 
(edtgdp) by 1 standard deviation 7.93, the gdpcp would likely to increase by 1.39 
standard deviation units. Likewise, an increase of debt service to export ratio by a 
single standard deviation or 16.59, the gross domestic product per capita (gdpcp) 
would likely decrease by -0.117. The same effect occurs where the variable of 
inflation got increased by a unit standard deviation or 0.48 would lead to a likely 
decrease in the gdpcp by 0.82. Similarly, an increase in real exchange rate (rermts) by 
a unit standard deviation (402.87), the gdpcp would likely to decrease by -0.052 only. 
 Evaluation of the Model                                                                                                
In order to carry a proper evaluation of the model, there is a need to consider the 
Model Summaryb  table 7.2. This process requires checking the R Square in the Model 
Summary box. The predictors were debt ratio (dbtgdp), debt service to export ratio 
(dbtsvx), inflation (Infl), and the real exchange rate (rermts). The dependant variable 
remains the gross domestic product per capita (gdpcp). 
Checking the Model Summary box it can be observed that all independent variables     
debt ratio (dbtgdp), debt service to export ratio (dbtsvx). Inflation (Infl) and the real 
exchange rate (rermts) included in the model explained approximately 86.2% of 
variance (0.862 x 100%) in dependent variable (gross domestic product per capita). 
This implies that as much as 86.2 percent of variance in the dependant variable is 
explained by the independent variables of debt ratio (dbtgdp), debt service to export 
ratio (dbtsvx). Inflation (Infl) and the real exchange rate (rermts). 
ANOVA 
To further evaluate the model there is the need to refer to ANOVAa in table 7.3. The 
ANOVA table shows the extent of the overall significance of the model. Here, the 
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interest was in the figures under the columns: degrees of freedom (df), the F column 
and most importantly the significance column. The table thus gives F (5, 114) = 
135.879, P ˂ 0.005. The level of significance was actually recorded to be 0.000b. This 
indicates clearly that the model is sound and quite relevant to measure the proposed 
relationships. The p-value is usually be used to refer to the probability of being wrong 
when the formulated null hypothesis happened to be rejected (Brooks, 2008), the 
smaller the p-value the less the null hypothesis is plausible. 
 Model 1: The Impact of Borrowing on Economic Growth 
The purpose of the first model was to attempt to answer questions raised through the 
postulated hypothesis presented in chapter 4. Here, an effort is made to determine the 
extent to which borrowing especially among sub-Saharan countries, was related to 
economic growth. In the process the study endeavoured to ascertain whether or not 
the phenomenon of debt overhang actually exists. Similarly, the study proceeded to 
determine the extent to which debt service, real exchange rate, population and 
inflation all work in conjunction to impact on economic growth. Per capita gross 
domestic product (gdpcp) is employed as the dependent variable and the debt to gross 
domestic product (edtgdp), the squared value of edtgdp (edtgdpl2) to capture the debt 
over hang phenomenon and debt service to export ratio (dbtsvx) to measure the effect 
of debt servicing on the country’s export as represented by economic growth. The 
dummy variable of inflation (infl) was included to show the extent to which prices 
affect growth, real exchange rate (rermts), and the extent to which population (rpop) 
combine to impact on growth. 
The next task is to evaluate the extent to which the model complied with the assigned 
expectations. Thus based on the multiple regression results, there is the need to 
determine the individual variables’ responses to the various postulations. For instance, 
it was asserted that the variable of debt ratio should be positively related to the 
independent variable, gdpcp. Therefore, by observing the coefficientsa,, table 
particularly under the standardized coefficient Beta column, it can be seen that the 
debt ratio variable recorded a Beta value of 1.055, thereby confirming the model that 
debt ratio should be positively correlated to the measure of growth, gross domestic 
product per capita. Impliedly higher debt ratio leads to higher per head gross domestic 
production.  
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An aggregation of higher individual gross domestic production would undoubtedly 
translate into higher exports, revenue, income and economic growth. The debt ratio 
squared, edtgdpl2, representing the element of debt overhang, went on to assume the 
predicted feature of negative relation to growth. At a Beta value of -0.418, the debt of 
overhang phenomenon was upheld. By implication, with higher borrowing there was 
always the tendency of lower per capita gross domestic product, lower revenue, drop 
in income per capita, less savings, a drop in domestic investments and eventually 
what is referred to as debt over hang - a stagnation in domestic investment prospects 
due to persistent and increasing debt service on borrowed funds. 
The debt service to export ratio variable (dbtsvx) was predicted to be negative in 
relation to the gross domestic per head. This is because the higher the amount of funds 
employed for debt servicing purposes the less the amount of per head production or 
gross domestic product per capita. The check for the recorded Beta values in the 
standardized coefficients column of the coefficientsa table attached to this work as 
appendix B, shows the variable dbtsvx recording -0.114, thereby confirming the 
variable’s response to economic growth especially in the process of borrowing. 
Inflation was also figured to be negatively correlated to growth, especially at crises 
levels. 
However, insignificant price rises might not necessarily induce a negative impact on 
production and overall economic growth. The variable of inflation (infl) recorded a 
low and very insignificant value of -0.009. This result confirms the effect of inflation 
on growth. The variable of real exchange rate (rermts) was next in our model. Here it 
is argued that currency devaluation tends to make goods and services cheaper and by 
implication, generates higher sales, but only during structural adjustments. However 
where the real exchange rate deteriorates, it is reasoned that the drop tends to have a 
negative implication on growth, i.e. in relation to gross domestic capital per capita 
(grdcp) in our model. In the process of sovereign debt any decline in the real 
exchange rate of currency could compound the negative consequences of borrowing 
on the economy and ultimately growth. The real exchange rate variable, rermts, 
recorded a value of -0.105 confirming the expectation of the model. 
According to model the variable of population (rpop) was indeterminate. The 
coefficient is indeterminate and ambiguous and represents the impact of population 
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pressure on domestic resources. The expectation was that the variable could relate 
either way with gross domestic product (gdpcp), especially in issues of debt. In the 
current situation the value recorded for the coefficient stood at 0.295, standardized 
Beta coefficient. In this case the variable of population (rpop) remained positively 
related to growth. 
 Model 2: Debt Ratio, Debt Composition and Debt Maturity 
The second model in this work studies the relationship that may exist between extent 
of indebtedness and the choice of debt, the effectiveness of debt management strategy 
and whether the level of capital market development could impact on the level of 
indebtedness (debt ratio). Here, the dependent variable, debt ratio (edtgdp), against a 
range of predictors; the variable of debt management (cpiadt), ratio of broad money to 
gross domestic product (m2gdp), measuring capital market effectiveness, variable 
representing long term debt (ltdt), and another for short term debt (stdt) are 
considered. A choice between domestic and external debt would have enriched our 
findings, but due to the lack of data on domestic debt in most of the sub-Saharan 
Africa, particularly the sampled countries with the exception of South Africa. 
However, the data on domestic debt for South Africa was available for a little over a 
decade, which was short of the trend covering three decades (1980 – 2012).  
Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics                              
Column1 Column2 Column3 Column4 
 Mean Std Dev N 
Edtgdp 2.63E+21 7.93E+21 118 
M2GDP 54.3936 126.51414 132 
Lngtdbt 1.42E+10 1.82E+10 118 
Stmdbt 81.573091 1.07E+10 118 
Cpiadbt 3.5265 1.06884 132 
 
Table 7.5 presents the descriptive statistics relating to the second model. Here, the 
means and standard deviation of the variables that made up the relationship that exists 
between debt ratio (edtgdp), as the dependent variable and the ratios of broad money 
to aggregate domestic production (M2gdp), long term debt to total debt (Lngtdbt), 
short term debt to total debt (stmdbt) and the country performance institutional 
assessment to total debt (Cpiadbt), as the independent variables were considered. The 
statistics as depicted in the table show that the dependent variable, the debt ratio 
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averaged approximately 2.6 for the sampled countries over the years under study. The 
value of the debt ratio is also shown to have a standard deviation of approximately 
7.93 percentages point. The independent variables, M2gdp, lngtdbt, stmdbt, cpiadbt, 
recorded mean values of 54.39, 1.42, 81.57, 3.52 and standard deviation values of 
126.51, 1.82, 1.07 and 1.07 respectively. Therefore, if we could increase broad money 
to GDP ratio by a single standard deviation (126.51), long term to total debt ratio by 
1.82%, short term debt to total debt ratio by 1.07%; and the measure of debt 
management of country performance institutional assessment by only 1.07, then debt 
ratio would be likely to increase by -0.018 (m2gdp), 1.375 (lngtdbt), -0.705 (stmdbt) 
and 0.093 (cpiadbt) respectively.     
 Checking Assumptions: Multicollinearity 
The coefficient table (Appendix v) gives Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF). Where the tolerance value is less than 0.10 then it is assumed that there is the 
possibility of multicollinearity between the independent variables. A VIF value 
exceeding 10 also points to possible multicollinearity among the independent 
variables. In situations where all these values mentioned above are exceeded, the need 
to reconsider the maintenance of one of the independent variables in the process 
becomes necessary. 
Checking the Coefficientsa tables attached as Appendix B,  the results indicate that a 
tolerance value of 0.879 for the measure of efficient capital market or ratio of broad 
money to gross domestic product (m2gdp) was recorded, and 0.313 was recorded 
under the ratio of long term debt to total debt (lngtmdbt), 0.348 recorded for short 
debt to total debt ratio (stmdbt) and 0.782 was recorded against the variable of 
country performance institutional performance assessment, representing debt 
management (cpiadbt). Thus, none of the tolerance values recorded for all the 
variables were found to be below 0.10, and this implies a non-presence of 
multicollinearity between our the explanatory. 
The VIF values of 1.137, 3.198, 2.878 and 1.278 were recorded against the 
independent variables of capital market efficiency or the ratio of broad money to 
gross domestic product (m2gdp), ratio of long term debt to total debt (lngtdbt), ratio 
of short term debt to total debt (stmdbt) and the country performance institution 
assessment policy on debt management (cpiadbt), respectively. None of the values 
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recorded above were found to be in excess of the maximum 10. This further implies 
that our independent variables are free from the problem of multicollinearity. 
 Checking Assumptions: Outliers, Normality and Linearity and the 
Scatterplot  
In the process of interpreting the SPSS results there is the need to verify the data by 
checking the Normal Probability Plot (P–P) of the regression standardised residual 
and the scatterplot shown in the figure below (Appendix C). In the box it is expected 
that the normal p-p plot have all points lie in a reasonably straight diagonal line from 
the bottom left of the square box to the top right angle. In this case, the same pattern is 
depicted to confirm to linearity assumption and normality.  
In the scatterplot, the interest is to see the regression standardized residual on the y 
axis and the regression standardised predicted value on the x axis to be rectangularly 
distributed, with most of the scores concentrated in the centre (spread along the point 
0). Accordingly, the distribution in the scatter plot shown indicate that it is 
rectangularly distributed in the centre but slightly to the top left to the y axis. The 
distribution actually resembles a near normal distribution having being spread within 
the space (range) of -1 to +2. Standardized residuals exceeding 3.3 or short of – 3.3 
implies outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).   
 Correlations 
Appendix B (iii) depicts the various correlations between the dependent variable and 
the range of independent variables. The Pearson correlation shows the significance (or 
otherwise) of the relationship between the explained and explanatory variables in the 
model. It can be seen from the table that m2gdp is negatively, but insignificantly, 
correlated to debt ratio and lngtdbt is positively and significantly correlated to debt 
ratio. Both short term debt to total debt ratio and country performance institutional 
assessment of debt policy were positively but insignificantly correlated to level of a 
country’s indebtedness, recording correlation ratios of 0.385 and 0.474 respectively.  
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Table 7.6: Model Summary 
 
a. Predictors: (constant), cpiadbt, stmdbt, m2gdp, lngtdbt 
b. Dependent variable: edtgdp    
 
Table 7.6 gives the model summary. Checking the R square in the Model Summary 
box it is seen that all the independent variables (cpiadbt, stmdbt, m2gdp, lngtdbt) 
included in the model combined explained approximately 95.2% of variance in the 
dependent variable (edtgdp). This implies that the four predictors combined were able 
to explain up to 95.2% of the changes recorded in the dependent variable and as a 
result make the relationship that exists between them most significant.  
Table 7.7: ANOVA a 
Model Sum of Sqrs df Mean Squares F Sig. 
1.Regression 7.00E+45 4 1.80E+45 559.2        .000b 
   Residual 3.50E+44 113 3.10E+42   
   Total 7.40E+45 117    
 
a. Dependent variable: edtgdp    
b. Predictors: (constant), cpiadbt, stmdbt, m2gdp, lngtdbt 
 
Table 7.7, the ANOVAa help in a review of the model and determine its overall 
significance. The model, which proposes to measure the relationship that might have 
existed between the level of a country’s borrowing here represented by debt ratio and 
the choice of its debt between short term debt and long-term debt, as well as the 
extent of its capital market development and the effectiveness of its debt management 
strategy, as represented by ratios of long term to total debt, short term to total debt, 
ratio of broad money to gross domestic product and the country performance 
institutional assessment in debt policy score respectively. Thus, to check the 
significance of this model we consider, F (4, 113) = 559.2, P < 0.0005. Observing our 
table under column 6 we check the level of model significance to ascertain whether it 
complied with the requirement P < 0.0005. Our model indicates an overall 
Model         R R Square Adjusted Std. Error of R Square  Change Statistics  sig.  
   R Square the Estimate Change F Change df1 df2 F Change 
1 0.976a 0.952 0.95 1.80E+21 0.952 559.199 4 113         0,000 
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significance by recording significance equal to a 100% or P < 0.000. Therefore the 
model, choice of variables and relationships as a whole was relevant and significant.  
 Evaluating Each of the Independent Variables  
To evaluate each of the independent variables there was the need to refer to the 
coefficienta tables attached as Appendix B (v). This time, the standardized coefficient 
(Beta values) and the significance were checked. The best predictor of debt ratio or 
level of indebtedness as represented by edtgdp, long term debt (β = 1.375) followed 
by a country’s process of debt management as represent by cpiadbt (β = 0.093), then 
ratio of broad money to gross domestic product, m2gdp (β = -0.018), and lastly and 
the least of the predictors, the ratio of short term debt to total as represented by stmdbt 
(-0.705). The Standardized Beta values also show the number of standard deviations 
that scores in the dependent variable (DV) would have changed with a single standard 
deviation unit change in the predictor independent variable (IV). For instance, it is 
observed that from the descriptive statistics table that if we would increase broad 
money to GDP ratio by a single standard deviation (126.51), long term to total debt 
ratio by 1.82%; short term debt to total debt ratio by 1.07% and the measure of debt 
management of country performance institutional assessment by only 1.07, then debt 
ratio would likely increase by -0.018 (m2gdp), 1.375 (lngtdbt), -0.705 (stmdbt) and 
0.093 (cpiadbt) respectively.    
 Results from Multiple Regression  
Table 7.8: Multiple Regression Result 
 R2          β          B        SE  CI 95% (B) 
Model 0.952***      
M2gdp  -0.018** -1.10E+18 1.40E+18         0,000      0,000 
Lngtdbt  1.375**** 6.00E+11 1.60E+10         0,000      0,000 
Stmdbt  -0.705* -5.20E+11 2.60E+10 -20.085 -4.176 
Cpiadbt  0.093*** 6.90E+20 1.70E+20 1.189 586.75 
Statistical significance:   *p < 0.001; **p > 0.005; ***p < 0.001; ****p < 0.001 
 
Table 7.8 summarises the results of multiple regression process for model II. Multiple 
regressions were performed to investigate the ability of an effective capital market, 
choice of the debt structure and maturity, the government’s debt management strategy 
to predict levels of government indebtedness. All preliminary analyses were 
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conducted to ensure there are no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity 
and homoscedasticity. Furthermore, the correlations between the predictor variables 
included in the study were equally examined. 
Correlations were however found to be high between the variable of ratio short term 
debt to total debt (stmdbt) and that of debt management strategy (cpiadbt) with a 
recorded  r = 0.070 and a  p > 0.05 (see Table 54). This made the problem of multi-
collinearity a real possibility in the model. The variable measuring the impact of the 
capital market (m2dgp) was recorded to be positively correlated with the dependent 
variable, with however a p – value > 0.050. This situation further caused problems for 
our model. All other predictors were statistically correlated with the debt ratio or level 
of government’s indebtedness, but as a result of the issue of multi-collinearity which 
arose with respect to the two variables identified above as well as m2gdp, we review 
our model data and consider the stepwise regression analysis. By this, all insignificant 
variables or predictors would be eliminated leaving those most relevant for our 
analysis.  
Since there was no a priori hypotheses made that would determine the order of entry 
of the predictor variables, a direct method was employed for the multiple linear 
regression analysis. The four independent variables put together were able to explain 
95.2% variance in the level of indebtedness of the countries sampled in the model, 
F(4,302) = 559.199, P < 0.0005). However, only three of the four predictors turned 
out to be statistically significant, with ratio of long term debt to total debt (lngtdbt) 
recording a higher Beta value (β = 1.375, p < 0.001), more than the debt management 
index (cpiadbt) recording a positive but insignificant Beta value (β = 0.093, p < 0.001) 
and the ratio of short term debt to total debt (stmdbt) recording a negative but 
significant relationship with a Beta value (β = -0.705, P < 0.001). The fourth variable, 
ratio of broad money to gross domestic product (m2gdp), measuring the impact of 
capital market development on the level of indebtedness was found to be statistically 
insignificant and irrelevant in the model with a negative Beta value (β = -0.018, p > 
0.05).   
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 Stepwise Regression Analysis: Model II  
Given the problem of multi-collinearity and for easier management of the variables, 
the use of stepwise regression analysis was introduced. Furthermore, three additional 
variables; the variable of debt forgiveness or reduction (dbtfgvl2), another variable 
measuring the impact of capital market on the extent of indebtedness, ratio of market 
capitalisation to gdp (mcapgdp) and the absolute inflation values for the period under 
review were added. Debt forgiveness data was squared to reverse the negative and 
logged to make it linear.  
Table 7.9: Model Summary 
Model R R  Square Adjusted R Square Std Error of the Est Durbin Watson 
1 0.739a 0.546 0.537 5.18E+20  
2 0.795b 0.633 0.617 4.71E+20  
3 0.820c 0.672 0.652 4.49E+20 0.617 
 
a. Predictors (constant), stmdbt 
b. Predictors (constant), stmdbt, cpiadbt 
c. Predictors (constant), stmdbt, cpiadbt, lgdbtfgv2 
d. Dependent variable: Edtgdp 
 
Table 7.9 presents the model summary in accordance with the stepwise regression, 
three different values for three separate predictors. Both R square (and more 
importantly adjusted R square) recorded significant values for the three retained 
variables. All variables were found to be significant and positively related to the 
dependent variable or debt ratio. Short term debt, being one of the predictors, 
predicted 54.6% of variations in the dependent variable, debt management index was 
recorded as the second best predictor of variability in the dependent variable 
explaining about 63.3%; and the best predictor or debt relief was recorded to explain 
67.2% of changes in the debt ratio or the dependent variable. Adjusted R square for 
the three independent variables was recorded at 0.537, 0.617 and 0.652 respectively. 
There was evidently not a great deal of a difference between R square and the 
adjusted R square, implying that none of the variables was found to be redundant in 
the process of explaining changes in the dependent variable.    
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Table 7.10: ANOVA 
 
a. Dependent variable: Edtgdp 
b. Predictors (constant), stmdbt 
c. Predictors (constant) stmdbt, cpiadbt 
d. Predictors (constant), stmdbt, cpiadbt, lgdbtfgv2 
 
Table 7.10 presents the ANOVA statistics. Under ANOVA we focus our attention to 
the F column as well as the significance. Here we consider a null hypothesis; stating 
the model had no significant explanatory power. And to oppose this we consider the 
level of significance. Thus the first predictor reported, stmdbt, recorded an F value of 
58. 90%, at a significance of P – value < 0.001. This led us to reject the null 
hypothesis and thus accept the alternative hypothesis, that the model possesses a 
certain degree of explanatory power. The same outcome applied to the two other 
explanatory variables, cpiadbt and lgdbtfgv2, which recorded F values of 41.33 and 
32.17, and P – values less than 0.001 respectively. Accordingly, both models were 
considered to possess adequate explanatory power and therefore rejecting the null 
hypotheses; the model has no explanatory power.   
  Coefficients 
Appendix B (v) – B (vi), summarises and presents the model’s coefficients: both the 
standardized and the unstandardized. The coefficients table tends to be most 
interesting because it reveals the relationships between the independent variables and 
the coefficients. To analyse the coefficients we proceed by formulating the 
hypothesis: Ho: Coefficients of the independent variable is zero. By implication, the 
Model Sum of sqrs df Mean squares F Sig 
Regression 1.58E+43 1 1.58E+43 58.897           0,000b 
Residual 1.31E+43 49 2.68E+41   
Total 2.89E+43 50    
Regression 1.83E+43 2 9.15E+42 41.325           0,000c 
Residual 1.06E+43 48 2.21E+41   
Total 2.89E+43 50    
Regression 1.95E+43 3 6.49E+42 32.169          0,000d 
Residual 9.48E+42 47 2.02E+41   
Total 2.89E+43 50    
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null hypothesis suggests that the independent variable does not help in the prediction 
of the dependent variable.   
In order to test this, the t – statistics and the significance under the P – value to 
determine whether we reject the null hypotheses or not was checked. Thus, checking 
the various t values for all the independent variables, it was observed that with the 
exception of one variable M2gdp, the ratio of broad money to gross domestic 
problem, which measures capital market efficiency, all the other three independent 
variables were found relevant and statistically significant. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the independent variables did indeed help to predict the 
dependent variable. In the course of the step-wise regression analysis M2gdp was 
removed as a predictor of the dependent variable. 
 
Further on the coefficient table the interpretation of the unstandardized coefficients 
was checked. Here, it was assumed that one unit increase in the independent variable 
would lead to an increase or decrease by certain units in the dependent variable 
holding other variables constant. Thus, an increase in long term debt by $6 billion 
worth of additional borrowing could result in a percentage increase in the country’s 
debt ratio, holding all remaining variables constant. In the same manner, a decrease in 
short term debt by $5.2 billion worth of government borrowing could translate into a 
one percentage drop in debt ratio for the same period holding all other independent 
variables constant. 
The standardized coefficients compare units in the dependent variable to a standard 
deviation in the independent variable. For instance, long and short term debt ratios 
tend to have significant positive and negative correlation with a country’s debt ratio.  
   Conclusion 
This chapter succeeded in explaining the phenomenon of debt and its management in 
contrast to the opinions of professionals expressed on the same subject matter in the 
preceding chapters 5 and 6. Here, using the quantitative method in particular the 
statistical analysis, we have been able to establish some level of relationship that 
could exist between government borrowing and elements of economic growth. We 
saw how for instance, debt could be positively related to economic growth of the sub-
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Saharan African economies at low levels of borrowing, but changed to negative at 
higher levels of indebtedness. This is a vital finding for the debt managers in 
managing government debt.  
In addition, debt maturity was covered by the analysis and the conclusions drawn 
tended to improve our understanding of the relationship that existed between the 
maturities of debt against a country’s level of indebtedness. We saw that longer term 
debt tended to be more of a stabilising factor in comparison to short term debts. Our 
analysis also indicated that the element of debt management could still be important 
in managing government borrowing to economic prosperity. This fact goes a long 
way in justifying the separation of debt management function from the traditional 
government monetary policy. Other issues covered under the quantitative analysis are 
presented later in the general summary of findings to this work. By and large, debt 
and its management was relevant and played a pivotal role in the growth of sub-
Saharan African economies.  
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      Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the research work on the effect of debt 
management strategy on the economies of low income countries, with particular focus 
on sub-Saharan Africa. Here, the focus is directed at the trend from the set out 
objectives of determining whether debt management strategy embarked upon by a 
nation has any positive impact on the economic growth of such a nation. It has been 
established in the course of the discussions that debt management was relevant 
provided the forces of demand and supply obtain. It was also an important objective 
of this work to determine the extent to which a country’s level of capital market 
development could extend in shaping its borrowing trend and ratios. The work also 
sought to determine the important factor of the structure of government debt - where 
the research endeavoured to relate the choice in the composition and maturity of debt 
to level of indebtedness. For instance, trends in the short and long term debts domestic 
and external debts were studied, in an effort to establish a pattern among the sampled 
countries. Although there was an acute absence of some relevant debt data that would 
prove crucial for the work, a lot of effort was made to answer all the research 
questions raised in the process of the study.  
An important aspect of sub-Saharan borrowing was the role of the multilateral 
financial institutions in the debt profile. Thus, the impact of the debt relief in the 
process of debt management was afforded equal importance. The overall findings of 
the endeavour shall be summarised and concluded in this chapter. We present in the 
process, the research questions and accompanying hypotheses, formulated and 
postulated for the purpose of resolving the intricate subject of borrowing, among the 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The work has however, drawn several examples, 
references and comparisons from within and without the sub-Saharan region where 
necessary and appropriate.  
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Eventually, the work undertaken here turned out fruitful and enriched our 
understanding through accomplishing the set out objectives. For instance, the work 
has been able to support the aspect of debt management by relating it significantly to 
the level of indebtedness. The work has also been able to establish and confirm the 
phenomenon of debt overhang, as well as the irrelevant role the debt relief initiative 
had played in the process of economic growth and its failure to shape the ideal debt 
management strategy to be adopted by the borrowing sub - Saharan African countries.    
 Findings 
Findings in the process of this research came in different forms. As explained in the 
chapter on methodology, the data obtained came from different sources and were 
therefore of different forms. It has been made clear that the work would comprise of 
mainly the quantitative approach, hence a great deal of effort was employed to 
conform to the quantitative analysis. As a result serious attempts was made to answer 
all research questions raised on issues in debt management that may erstwhile not 
have been adequately covered by the quantitative approach. Precisely, attempts were 
made to answer all research questions that led to the formulation of hypotheses using 
the quantitative method as employed by previous researchers on similar subjects. 
However, where data was not available in the secondary form and data was 
unobtainable or was inadequate, the primary sourcing was utilised and eventually full 
analysis was conducted purely using the quantitative method. Thus, in the process of 
the presentation of our findings, only the quantitative results and answers would be 
made available and be expected. 
 Research Questions  
 What is the impact of borrowing on the economic growth of sub-Saharan 
African countries? 
The above research question was developed and included in the work as a result of a 
number of similar works attempting to answer the same questions. For instance Fosu 
(1996) looked at the relationship between debt and economic growth, Barungi and 
Atingi (2000) looked at growth and foreign debt, the Ugandan experience, Esther O. 
Adegbite (2008), studied the impact of Nigeria’s external debt on economic 
development and several others that included Krumm (1985), Lancaster (1989), 
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Feldstein et al. (1987) and Helleiner (1989) but who employed fewer samples from 
sub-Saharan Africa (Fosu, 1996).  
To answer the research question posed above, the work constructed a model which in 
turn postulated some hypotheses as presented in chapter four. The model, which 
proposed to relate gross domestic product per capita (gdpcp) as the dependent 
variable, related to a number of explanatory variables that included ratio of total debt 
to gross domestic product (edtgdp), the squared value of the debt to gross domestic 
product (edtgdp2), to capture the debt overhang phenomenon and the variable of real 
exchange rate (rermts) which measures the real exchange rate misalignment in the 
model. This variable, as explained earlier, is computed from the purchasing power 
parity relations and misalignment, which is defined as the percentage deviation from 
the mean. The fact that the variable has the tendency of creating distortion in a 
nation’s economy, it is expected to be negatively correlated to growth. 
Other variables in the model were the ratio of debt service as a ratio of export 
earnings. It was stated that the coefficient was expected to be negative in order to 
confirm, as well as reinforce, the liquidity channel, ratio of broad money to gross 
domestic product (m2gdp), measuring the level of capital market development. The 
variable was expected to be positive as higher level of broad money translates to 
bigger capital market activity and better alternative sources of funding to the 
government. Rpop is a variable that represents the impact of population pressure on 
domestic resources and the coefficient was supposed to be indeterminate and 
ambiguous. Lastly, inflation (Infl) was included in the model to represent the rate of 
inflation. The rate of inflation is expected to stimulate growth at low and sustainable 
levels. Infl however impacts negatively on growth at high and crisis levels. Related to 
this model were three hypotheses: 
 H0: There is a positive relationship between government debt and economic 
growth 
With the above hypothesis, we attempt to answer the research question given at the 
top of the section. For the same reason, we refer to the analysis carried out in chapter 
eight of this work. In chapter eight, an analysis of model one was carried out with all 
the tests and hypotheses. Thus, the outcomes of the various tests carried out shall be 
used here to validate or invalidate the above hypotheses and in the process answering 
our research question.  
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The results from the regression analysis indicate that all the variables coefficients 
tended to follow the trend of their expected values respectively. The value of R2 for 
all the variable indicated that they all explained a high proportion of changes in the 
dependent variable. For instance, the variables were able to explain 90.2% in changes 
in the dependent variable. Adjusted R2 stood at 89.50%. Furthermore, the regression 
results revealed all the coefficients of the explanatory variables to have behaved 
according to expectations outlined earlier in the model. For instance, it was postulated 
that debt ratio (edtgdp) would assume a positive relationship with the dependent 
variable (gdpcp). A natural measure of the indebted country external liabilities is their 
debt to gdp ratio. Checking the results, we found the Beta value recorded was a high 
1.015 for the edtgdp. This value was positive indicating that per capita gross domestic 
product (gdpcp) would rise by as high as 101.5% with a single unit change in the debt 
ratio (edtgdp) for the particular period. This clearly showed that borrowing by the 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa could be beneficial in attaining economic growth 
given the prospects of a higher per capita gdp. And this led us to accept the null 
hypotheses, that there is a positive relationship between debt and economic growth. 
Our critical t – value was -5.978 and significant at p < 0,001. 
It was however argued that repayments on government borrowing were bound to be 
scaled down to the debtor’s resources  (Cohen, 1995). Accordingly, repayments tend 
to assume a sort of marginal tax on the country’s resources and consequently have an 
adverse effect on domestic investment. But as was argued, the natural place to look 
for the evidence of capital accumulation was not investment (Easterly, 2002). 
Investment was a poor indicator of asset accumulation and was found to be a 
particularly non-productive measure in Africa, a region that had a high number of 
HIPCs (Devarajan, Easterly, & Pack, 2001). Thus, the rationale for the use of per 
capita output or gdp as an indirect way of measuring productive asset accumulation.   
In order to capture the phenomenon of debt overhang, we proceeded to check on the 
edtgdp2. This variable was expected to turn negative, especially in relation to growth. 
Checking the coefficients we see that the variable (edtgdp2) recorded a Beta value of – 
0.398 as expected, thereby confirming the phenomenon of debt overhang at certain 
(higher) levels of borrowing. This is evident because by implication the dependent 
(gdpcp) would record a decline by -0.398 with a 1 standard deviation (unit) change in 
the variable edtgdp2. 
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To further expound the effect of government borrowing on the economic growth of a 
country, the model went on to look at how the ratio of debt service to total exports 
(dbtsvx) is related to the per capita gross domestic product (gdpcp), or the dependent 
variable. Debt service as a ratio of exports of goods and service was expected to relate 
negatively with growth. When we check the regression coefficient of the variable we 
see that the standardized value of Beta was recorded as -0.059. This signifies a 
negative relationship with the growth variable (gdpcp), and by implication, gdpcp 
would be decreased by 5.9% in response to one standard deviation change in the 
explanatory variable, dbtsvx. This result further confirms the negative impact of 
borrowing on the economic growth of the borrowing country. 
The variables of effective capital market development (m2gdp), population (Rpop), 
real exchange rates (Rermts) and inflation (Infl) were all found to record standardized 
Beta values of 0.154, 0.376, -0.102 and -0.072 respectively, all in agreement with the 
postulated theory. Of particular interest was the only addition to the original model, 
the level of a country’s capital market development variable which recorded a positive 
Beta value of 0.154. This implies that the level of capital market development which 
offered alternative sources of funding to the government tend to impact positively 
with economic growth. Therefore, gdpcp would grow by an equivalence of 15.4% for 
every 1 standard deviation change in capital market growth.  
 Does Debt Management as a Strategy Impact on the Economic Growth of 
an Economy? 
In an attempt to answer the research question stated above we introduced the second 
model which related debt ratio (edtgdp) to a number of variables; the debt 
management index (cpiadbt), ratio of short term debt to total debt (stmdbt), ratio of 
long term debt to total debt (lngtdbt), the ratio of market capitalisation to gross 
domestic product (mcapgdp), measuring the impact of the capital market development 
in a country and dbtfgvl2 measuring the impact of debt relief or forgiveness. We saw 
that both short and long term debts tended to attract market risks that could lead to 
higher interest rates, which in turn could push the debt service ratio higher. Short term 
debts in addition tended to incur higher administrative costs as a result of frequent roll 
overs (Christensen, 2004). The two variables were, however, expected to relate 
positively with the debt ratio 
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As explained in chapter three, short term debt was supposed to relate positively with a 
country’s level of indebtedness or debt ratio. And the same expectation applied to 
long term debt. That is, the higher the borrowing the higher the debt to gross domestic 
product ratio. The same positive relationship was expected of the variable measuring 
the level of development of the capital market and debt forgiveness or relief. The debt 
relief initiative had as its major objective the reduction of the external debts of 
severely indebted countries (Freytag & Pehnelt, 2009). Thus, it was expected that any 
debt relief should relate negatively to a country’s debt ratio.  
 Debt Management Related to Indebtedness 
The four variables in the model discussed in the preceding section were to be 
answered by way of accepting or rejecting a number of formulated hypotheses. These 
hypotheses, were already presented in chapter four. For the purpose of resolving the 
questions contained in these tentative scientific statements the hypotheses are 
represented in the order they appeared in the model. The following is a presentation of 
the hypotheses contained in model 2. 
 H0: Debt management does have a significant influence on the economic 
growth of a country. 
To accept or reject the above hypothesis we proceed to our regression result we refer 
back to our regression results. Debt management index was represented by the 
country performance institutional assessment index on debt (cpiadbt) in the model as 
an explanatory variable. Our model whose variables combined to explain 69.9% 
change in the dependent variable or the ratio of debt to gross domestic product. In the 
model the index of debt management (cpiadbt) recorded a standardized Beta value of 
0.158, indicating a positive correlation with the debt ratio. The independent variable 
was expected to rise by 15.8% with every 1 standard deviation change in the 
independent variable, in this case cpiadbt. This implied that our null hypothesis need 
not be rejected and thus debt management tend to influence higher ratio. But this 
assertion is conditional on the level of the debt ratio, because we saw also that at 
higher debt ratios economic growth became negative. This result could also be 
interpreted as the debt index or debt management would only be effective at lower 
debt levels but becomes irrelevant at higher levels of debt. 
209 
 
 Debt Maturity and the Level of Indebtedness 
Here, we continue to look at how the choice of type of debt and its maturity would 
affect a country’s debt situation. For this purpose we refer to our long formulated 
hypothesis and check our regression analysis results to take a decision. According our 
hypotheses is stated as follows: 
H0: There is a relationship that exists between the extent of debt and the maturity of 
debt 
Short and long term debts tend to constitute the major, in some instances, only choice 
in government borrowing. And as a result, the two types of debt determines the 
maturity of debt especially in most African countries whose capital markets were not 
adequately developed. Thus, to test the hypothesis whether a relationship exists 
between the extent of debt and the maturity of debt we included the two variables as 
independent variables regressed against the debt ratios.  
Thus, checking our model coefficient table we saw that the variables recorded 
standardized Beta values of 1.865 for the short term debt and -1.026 for long term 
debt respectively. By implication, debt ratio would be altered by up 186.5% with a 
single standard deviation movement in the short term figure. Similarly debt ratio 
would decline by 102.6 with 1 standard deviation change in the value of long term 
debt. These values indicate that short term is positively correlated to a country’s debt 
ratio, thereby implying the higher governments incur short term debts the higher or 
worse their debt conditions becomes. Long term debts were, however, found to be 
negatively correlated to a country’s debt ratio. By implication the longer the debt the 
lesser the risks of debt crisis perhaps as a result of reduced frequency of debt 
servicing, lower interest rates and handling costs (Christensen, 2004). With this result 
we now refer to our hypotheses and promptly assert that there definitely exists a 
relationship between a country’s extent of indebtedness and its choice of debt 
instrument and their maturity. Thus, the composition of a country’s debt tends to play 
a role in its debt management strategy. 
 Debt Relief or Forgiveness Related to Indebtedness 
The debt relief initiative, especially to the low income highly indebted countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, played an important role in any debt management analysis in the 
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sub-region. As was discussed earlier debt relief was meant to substantially reduce the 
debt burden of the debt crisis ridden low income countries in Africa, but not long after 
the initiative several beneficiaries of the programme were caught up in the same circle 
of debt and debt crisis. Thus, to unravel what the relationship between debt relief and 
a country’s extent of indebtedness we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 H0: Debt relief does have a significant influence on a country’s level of 
indebtedness. 
In order to accept and validate the above hypothesis, or reject it entirely for an 
alternative one, we refer back to our regression result in the same model 2. The 
variable of debt relief recorded a standardized Beta value of -0.185, which signifies a 
negative correlation with the debt ratio or level of indebtedness. Impliedly, the result 
showed that debt forgiveness tended to have a negative relationship with a country’s 
extent of indebtedness; the higher the debt relief granted the lower the debt ratio 
attainable. Furthermore, the Beta coefficient recorded indicated that for any one 
standard deviation change in the value of debt relief a beneficiary country’s debt ratio 
would drop by 18.5 percentage points. Debt relief actually freed funds for the HIPCs 
and would be a good basis for a sound debt management in the affected countries. The 
failure of the debt relief initiative must be related to other factors e.g. poor debt 
management strategy.  
 Summary and Conclusion 
In summary, we observed that the entire process of debt management is vital to 
economic growth and development of a country. In particular, countries in sub-
Saharan Africa need to put in place an effective and sound debt management strategy 
that would aid in promoting the needed stability reduce risks and guide in the prudent 
management of borrowed resources. But debt management as we have seen, also 
became necessary, especially after the debt relief initiatives starting from the Brady 
plan to the recent relief for the HIPCs initiative. Debt management was however, seen 
to work in co-ordination with a chain of agencies rather than in isolation from other 
agencies. Although debt management units should be independent and autonomous in 
its discharge of duties in debt policy formulation down to the function of keeping and 
monitoring debt data.  
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Debt management particularly in sub-Saharan Africa was hardly separable from the 
activities and policy initiatives of the IMF and the World Bank. The idea of debt relief 
and forgiveness had been conditioned on the HIPCs accomplishment of certain stages 
such as decision and completion points. Thus, the process of debt relief tends to mark 
the commencement of the process of debt management. The World Bank’s debt 
management performance assessment introduced in 2006 provided to the SSAs a 
comprehensive guide in setting up a debt management. All analysis based on the 
responses gathered from the data collected via questionnaires developed based on the 
provisions of debt management performance assessment performance guidelines 
discovered that almost all the guidelines had been complied with by all the debt and 
related agencies in the sampled countries. By the end, we were able to discover that 
the debt management strategies embarked upon by the countries under review 
involved all the aspects of effective debt management as provided by the Bank’s 
guidelines but yet all of the countries were accumulating more external debts with two 
already showing signs of debt distress. The reason for this problem as we saw in our 
qualitative analysis was that the element of corruption was still a major obstacle 
among the sampled countries, except South Africa. Two factors emerged as the cause 
- First was the element of corruption in the form of bureaucratic bottlenecks and lack 
of up to date debt data. Closely related to this was the interference by the executive 
arm of government in government approval in violation of the provision that all 
approvals had to be effected through the legislative process.  
Equally important in this work was our quantitative analysis, where we were able to 
establish some reasonable assertions that at some levels there tended to be a positive 
relationship between borrowing and economic growth. However, at certain higher 
levels the relationships turned to negative. Confirming the latter, it was observed that 
countries face dramatic decline in their growth potentials particularly where their 
debt-to-GDP ratios were up to 90%. This work was however, unable to draw a line 
beyond when debt became a threat to economic growth, but the work was able to 
confirm that borrowing long was more beneficial and free from the economic 
instability and risk of debt service, higher cost and interest affecting short term 
borrowing. The analysis carried out quantitatively was able to defend the introduction 
of a debt management strategy as it was found to be correlated positively with a 
country’s extent of indebtedness, which led to the conclusion that a country’s choice 
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of debt and its maturity tend to affect its level of indebtedness. Further during the 
analysis carried out earlier in chapter seven we were able to establish that at lower 
levels of debt, GDP growths tend to be high and the relationship tends to become 
indeterminate at higher levels of GDP growth ratios. 
 Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have observed that debt management is a vital ingredient in the 
process of economic growth and development. Debt management however, is not 
concentrated in a single strategy but rather it a combination of numerous approaches 
and policies involved in the process of taking a decision on government borrowing. 
All statistical data and its analysis tended to reveal government borrowing as a normal 
process to a larger extent necessary for the attainment of the needed growth and 
economic development. However, in the candid opinion of a large number of our 
respondents borrowing as a strategy might not actually be the answer to sub-Saharan 
Africa’s economic predicament. In particular, debt management within a context of a 
domestic capital market that was scarcely developed would lack the apparatus to be 
used as a strategy to promote and implement government vital economic policies.  
For others debt management in Africa was fraught with corruption, especially in the 
manner funds were spent. This especially led to increased poverty amongst the highly 
indebted poor countries in the form of widening the gap between the leadership who 
misappropriated the funds in the first place usually with full but negligent of the 
knowledge of their intent right from the start. And where funds were sourced through 
bilateral or agreements with the multilateral financial bodies, borrowing tended to 
become a tool of neo-colonialism and exploitation of the abundant resources in the 
sub-Saharan Africa, through the process of conditionality and structural adjustment 
programmes that could only lead to further impoverishment of Africa and its people. 
We saw how a respondent argued that the sub-Saharan African debt crisis was 
artificially created by the major financial bodies by way of introducing policies and 
projects that these countries never needed in the first place. And where the funds were 
acquired they were mostly frittered away by corrupt leadership, payment to the 
agencies’ employees during project execution and implementation. Many respondents 
as we saw earlier were of the opinion that with transparent and upright leadership in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the story might be reversed, thereby placing the region that was 
213 
 
rich in both human and natural resources strategically as a net lender rather than in its 
current status as a bad debtor and frequent borrower funds.  
 Recommendations 
The overall discussion and analysis in the course of this work tends to point to 
government debt as a phenomenon that is entrenched in the economies of most 
nations not least those in sub-Saharan Africa. While figures tend to indicate its 
relevance (or lack of) sovereign debt management had become a major tool in 
economic policy and its formulation. The advent of globalisation – what many saw as 
a process of neo-colonialism – made it even more difficult for the poor less developed 
nations to attain the much needed economic independence that had been advocated  
by leading pan African leaders and  freedom fighters of the last century. Thus, looking 
at the elements of debt management and its strategy as promoted by the major 
international financial institutions for the HIPCs in particular and the greater 
percentage of the member countries to implement, the study recommends the 
following for consideration in any process of debt management by a sub-Saharan 
African country. 
1. Debt management strategy should only be promoted by a country if and only 
if, it is independently drafted by an autonomous debt management agency with 
minimal interference but collaboration with related external agencies and 
should be tailored towards addressing the poverty and economic development 
of such a nation; 
2. Every debt management strategy to be promoted must work towards the 
development of a vibrant and effective domestic capital market that would 
provide alternative funding for the government and with the objective of 
utilizing the choices with a view to reducing risks inherent in external debts, 
indexed debt introduction and a drive towards the use of the domestic market 
in both fiscal and monetary policy formulation and implementation; 
3. The approval of sovereign government debt should be made through the 
process of the parliament or legislature as the case may be, and all debt policy 
must be prepared and promoted by a designated debt management office that 
has in its employment qualified debt managers and other supporting staff who 
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are regularly trained in all the necessary aspects of debt management 
nationally and internationally; 
4. When contracting external debt the federal or central government should as a 
matter of policy borrow for self and on behalf of other sub-regional or state 
governments for the purpose of transparency and accountability; 
5. Terms and conditions of any external funding must be discussed and analyzed 
by the government through it professional debt managers with particular focus 
on the duration or maturity of the debt ,principal and  interest payments, how 
and the sources that they are charged in order to avoid a reoccurrence of 
double interest charges to many low income countries by some international 
financial bodies;  
6. Debt data and records should be managed and kept up to date for government 
easy reference in debt, fiscal and monetary policy promotion and 
implementation; 
7. A country’s debt management must not put excessive priority interest on 
access to debt relief from the international financial bodies offering the 
initiatives as a strategy, instead access to concessional lending should 
encouraged for cheaper funds and more stable and reduced risk financing; and 
8. Debt management strategy should ensure an optimal balance between short 
and long term government borrowing for the purpose of achieving 
governments economic and financial policy objectives. 
 Contributions 
This work has succeeded in researching and contributing to a relatively new field of 
study when the extent of literature on debt and debt management in sub-Saharan 
Africa is considered.  Most importantly, the work has contributed to the existing 
theory on debt management particularly by venturing into the study, for the first time 
in relation to the issue of debt management in the sub-Saharan Africa. This is obvious 
with the sampling of four sub-Saharan African countries, strict sourcing, analysis and 
interpretation of data on those nations throughout the research. Furthermore, the 
research has contributed immensely to empirical academic research, having carried 
out tests on clearly formulated questions and postulated hypothesis, with clear results 
given at the end. The study has therefore paved way for further research and analysis. 
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Professionally the work will prove to be highly valuable, especially with a detailed 
review of the World Bank/IMF’s Debt Management Performance Assessment tool.  
The work has shown the possibility of the existence of a relationship between 
effectively managed sovereign debt and the attainment of economic growth. The work 
has supported the existence of a causal relationship between sovereign debt and 
economic growth. Furthermore the study has in the process, been able to review the 
method in debt management performance and the extent of compliance to the 
guidelines. The work has both academic and professional relevance considering the 
sources of data, its analysis and the caliber of the participants. On the academic side 
the study has critically reviewed the phenomenon of debt overhang with supporting 
statistical analysis at the end. Other relevant issues includes the aspect of debt 
maturity and how it affects a country’s extent of indebtedness 
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10. Appendices 
10.1  Appendix A: Questionnaire 
Instruction:  Please rank on a scale of 1 to 5 each of the performance indicators 
under the sections below. 1 is the lowest score; while 5 is the highest score.  
1.Government and Strategy Development 1 2 3 4 5 
Legal Framework      
Managerial Structure: Borrowing and Debt Related Transaction      
Managerial Structure: Loan Guarantees      
Debt Management Strategy: Quality of Content      
Debt Management Strategy: Decision Making Process      
Evaluation of Debt Management Operation      
Audit: Frequency      
Audit: Appropriate Response      
      
2.Coordination with Macroeconomic Policies  1 2 3 4 5 
Fiscal Policy: Provision and Quality of Debt-Service Forecasts      
Fiscal Policy: Availability and Quality Information on Key Macro Variables and DSA      
Monetary Policy: Clarity of Separation between DeM and Monetary Policy Operations      
Monetary Policy: Regularity of Information Sharing      
Monetary Policy: Limited Access to Central Bank Financing      
      
3.Borrowing and Related Financing Activities 1 2 3 4 5 
Domestic Borrowing: Market-Based Mechanism and Preparation of a Borrowing Plan      
Domestic Borrowing: Availability and Quality of Documented Procedures      
External Borrowing: Borrowing Plan and Assessment of Costs and Terms      
External Borrowing: Availability of Documented Procedures       
External Borrowing: Involvement of Legal Advisers      
Loan Guarantees: Availability and Quality of Documented Policies and Procedures      
On-lending: Availability and Quality of Documented Policies and Procedures      
Derivatives: Availability and Quality of Documented Policies and Procedures      
      
4. Cash Flow Forecasting and Cash Balance Management 1 2 3 4 5 
Effective Cash Flow Forecasting      
Effective Cash Balance Management      
      
5. Operational Risk Management  1 2 3 4 5 
Debt Administration: Availability & Quality Documented Procedures for Debt Service      
Debt Admin: Availability & Quality Documented Procedures for Data Recording and Storage      
Data Security: Availability and Quality of Documented Procedures for Data Recording and System and 
Access Control 
     
Data Security: Frequency of Back-Ups and Security of Storage      
Segregation of Duties      
Staff Capacity and Human Resources Management      
Operational Risk Management, Business Continuity, and Disaster Recovery Plans      
      
6.Debt Records and Reporting 1 2 3 4 5 
Debt  Records: Completeness and Timeliness      
Debt Records: Registry System      
Central Government  Debt Data: Statutory and Mandatory Reporting Requirements      
Public Sector Debt Data: Statutory and Mandatory Reporting Requirements      
Debt Statistical Bulletin: Quality and Timeliness      
Signature of Participant………………………………………………………………………Date………………………… 
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10.2 Appendix B (i): Correlation – Model I  
 
10.3 Appendix B (ii) Coefficients – Model I 
Model Unstandardi
zed 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 95.0% 
Confidence  
Interval for B 
 
            B   Std Error                Beta             t     Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1. (Constant)     799.398   133.703  5.979   0,000       534.402 1064.393 
Edtgdp     3.02E-19      0,000          1.394  18.325   0,000        0,000   0,000 
Edtgdpl2     -2.64E-64      0,000 -0.619 -8.586   0,000         0,000   0,000 
Dbtsvx   -12.131      4.013 -0.117 -3.023   0.003        -20.085   -4.176 
Infl     293.97    147.723 0.082 1.99   0.049         1.189 586.752 
Rermts     -0.223     0.154 -0.052 -1.443   0.152         -0.529     0.083 
 
10.4 Appendix B (iii) Regression Results – Model I 
     R2          β          B        SE  CI 95% (B) 
Model   0.916***      
Dtgdp  1.394   3.02E-19    0,000 0,000             0,000    
Dtgdpl2  -0.619  -2.64E-64     0,000 0,000    0,000 
Dbtsvx   -0.117 -12.131     4.013 -20.085     -4.1 
Infl  -0.082 293.97  147.723 1.189  
Rermts          0.082 -0.223     0.154   -0.529  
  
 
 
 Gdpcp Edtgdp Edtgdpl2 Dbtsvx Infl Rermts 
Pearson Correlation    Gdpcp 1,000 0.862 0.578 -0.325 -0.344 -0.169 
 
Edtgdp 0.862 1,000 0.86 -0.213 -0.359 -0.103 
 
Edtgdpl2 0.578 0.86 1,000 -0.106 -0.2 -0.05 
 
Dbtsvx -0.325 -0.213 -0.106 1,000 0.367 0.129 
 
Infl -0.344 -0.359 -0.2 0.367 1,000 0.138 
 
Rermts -0.169 -0.103 -0.05 0.129 0.138 1,000 
Sig. (1 - tailed) Gdpcp              -         0,000         0,000         0,000         0,000 0.027 
 
Edtgdp        0,000              -         0,000         0,010         0,000 0.133 
 
Edtgdpl2        0,000         0,000              - 0.127 0.016 0.295 
 
Dbtsvx        0,000         0,010 0.127              -         0,000 0.082 
 
Infl        0,000         0,000 0.016         0,000                - 0.059 
 
Rermts 0.027 0.133 0.295 0.082 0.059               - 
N Gdpcp 132 118 118 118 129 132 
 
Edtgdp 118 118 118 118 115 118 
 
Edtgdpl2 118 118 118 118 115 118 
 
Dbtsvx 118 118 118 118 115 118 
 
Infl 129 115 115 115 129 129 
 
Rermts 132 118 118 118 129 132 
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10.5 Appendix B (iv) Correlations – Model II 
 
             Edtgdp           M2gdp         Lngtdbt            Stmdbt                      Cpiadbt 
Pearson Correlation Edtgdp 1,000 -0.132 0.856 0.385 474 
 
M2gdp -0.132 1,000 -0.237 -0.281 0.153 
 
Lngtdbt 0.856 -0.237 1,000 0.784 0.315 
 
Stmdbt 0.385 -0.281 0.784 1,000                            0,070 
 
Cpiadbt 0.474 0.153 0.315              0,070 1,000 
Sig.(1 - tailed) Edtgdp                   -        0.077              0,000              0,000                            0,000 
 
M2gdp 0.077                     -              0,005 0.001                            0,040 
 
Lngtdbt              0,000 0.005                     -              0,000                            0,000 
 
Stmdbt              0,000 0.001              0,000                      - 0.226 
 
Cpiadbt              0,000 0.04              0,000 0.226                  - 
N Edtgdp 118 118 118 118 118 
 
M2gdp 118 132 118 118 132 
 
Lngtdbt 118 118 118 118 118 
 
Stmdbt 118 118 118 118 118 
 
Cpiadbt 118 132 118 118 132 
 
10.6 Appendix B (v) Coefficients – Model II 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized    
Coefficients 
    95.0% Confidence  Interval 
for B 
  
            B   Std Error     Beta         t       Sig. Lower Bound Upper 
Bound 
1. (Constant) -4.00E+21 6.00E+20   -6.646            0,000 534.402 1064.393 
M2gdp -1.10E+18 1.40E+18 -0.018 -0.795           0.428      0,000               
0,000 
Lngtdbt 6.00E+11 1.60E+10 1.375 37.273            0,000      0,000               
0,000 
Stmdbt -5.20E+11 2.60E+10 -0.705 -20.146            0,000      -20.085 -4.176 
Cpiadbt 6.90E+20 1.70E+20 0.093 3.985            0,000       1.189 586.752 
 
10.7 Appendix B (vi) Coefficients – Model II  
Model   Correlations   Collinearity 
Statistics 
Collinearity 
 
Zero-order Partial                 Part Tolerance  VIF 
1(Constant)           
M2gdp -0.132 0.075 -0.016 0.879 1.137 
Lngtdbt 0.856 0.962 0.769 0.879 3.198 
Stmdbt 0.385 -0.884 -0.416 0.348 2.878 
Cpiadbt 0.474 0.351 0.082 0.782 1.278 
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10.8   Appendix C (i) – (iv) 
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10.9 Appendix D Data
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